Modal Ontological Argument with Joe Schmid

In this stream, I am joined by none other than Joe Schmid to talk about the Modal Ontological argument!

Joe Schmid is a brilliant young agnostic philosopher who runs the Youtube Channel "Majesty of Reason"

Majesty of Reason aims to explicate, analyze, and evaluate philosophical issues.

Join me on a journey to cultivate intellectual virtues, a love for the truth, a passionate and flaming curiosity, and a value for rigorous philosophical reasoning and evidence. Join me in discovering treasures.

"What altar of refuge can a man find for himself when he commits treason against the majesty of reason?"

― Baruch Spinoza

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[AnglicanSE]

Great vid! Personally the MOA is my favorite argument for Gods existence. A priori arguments are truly fun to think about!

[ivin]

necessarily necessarily necessary? 21:28

[roderictaylor]

Plantinga’s modal ontological argument defines a MGB and makes assumptions about the nature of possibility so that the proposition “It is impossible a MGB exists” becomes a logical consequence of “No MGB exists.” It then correctly observes that given these assumptions, if it is possible a MGB exists, then a MGB exists.

The problem with Plantinga’s MOA comes when trying to support the first premise of the argument. Given that the argument works in S5, it only makes sense if we are interpreting possibility as metaphysical possibility. Nevertheless, people continue to try to support S5 using epistemic arguments for the possibility of a MGB’s existence, even though we are working in an axiom system where interpreting possibility as epistemic possibility results in nonsense. They will argue that the concept of a MGB appears to be coherent. They will argue that no one has proven no MGB exists. They will argue it is impossible in principle to derive a contradiction from the definition of a MGB. They will argue that there are symmetry breakers, epistemic reasons for believing it is possible a MGB exists that do not have corresponding reasons for believing it is possible no MGB exists. All of this is a waste of time. Even if these assertions are all true, they are all arguments for the epistemic possibility of a MGB existing. They do nothing to support the first premise of the MOA.

We can see this clearly by more carefully analyzing the MOA. Assume for the sake of argument that no MGB exists. The MOA tells us it will then be impossible a MGB exists. Why? Why will it be impossible a MGB exists, if in reality no MGB exists? For exactly three reasons. (A) No MGB exists, (B) We’ve defined a MGB to be a necessary being, and (C) We are working in S5. So, if no MGB exists, it will be metaphysically impossible a MGB exists. Therefore, it follows if it is metaphysically possible a MGB exists, then a MGB exists.

But there is nothing, absolutely nothing in the MOA to suggest that if no MGB exists, it will then be epistemically impossible a MGB exists. For example, there is nothing in the MOA to suggest that if no MOA exists, then the idea of a MGB will somehow become conceptually incoherent, purely as an idea. If no MGB exists, it will be impossible a MGB exists, not because the idea of a MGB will somehow become conceptually incoherent, but purely because no MGB exists and the definitions and axioms we are assuming, and for no other reason. Therefore, even if we grant the idea of a MGB is perfectly conceptually coherent, we cannot use the MOA together with that to conclude a MGB exists.

There is nothing in the MOA to suggest that if no MGB exists, it will then be possible in principle to prove no MGB exists. If no MGB exists, it will be impossible a MGB exists, not because it will become possible in principle to prove no MGB exists, but purely because no MGB exists and the definitions and axioms we are assuming, and for no other reason. Therefore, even if we grant it is impossible even in principle to prove no MGB exists, we cannot use that together with the MOA to show a MGB exists.

There is nothing In the MOA to suggest that if no MGB exists, then there will fail to be epistemic symmetry breakers that favor the epistemic possibility of a MGB existing over the epistemic possibility of no MGB existing. If no MGB exists, it will be impossible a MGB exists, purely because no MGB exists and the definitions and axioms we are assuming, and for no other reason. Therefore, even if there are epistemic symmetry breakers in favor of the possibility of a MGB existing, we cannot use that together with the MOA to conclude a MGB exists.

Any attempt to justify the first premise of the MOA using epistemic arguments is a waste of time, because there is nothing in the MOA to suggest that if no MGB exists it will then be epistemically impossible a MGB exists. If no MGB exists, it will be metaphysically impossible a MGB purely because no MGB exists, because of the definitions and axiom system we have chosen, and for no other reason.

[SimeonDenk]

It is incoherent to say that a necessary being exists in a possible world. If necessary means "exists in all possible worlds" then to say possibly necessary is to say "exists in all possible worlds, in a possible world." This implies that the possible world in question contains a set of sub-worlds within that world.

This is the problem with modal operator stacking. And that is why S5 is complete rubbish.