Objections to Godel's Ontological Argument

An explication of eight objections to Kurt Gödel's Ontological argument for the existence of God. This video focuses on objections to the definitions and axioms, not the underlying logic (stay tuned for a future video on that), with particular focus on the lack of definition of "positive".

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Information for this video gathered from The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, The Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy and more!

[dodopod]

It seems pretty obvious to me that when Godel says "positive property", he doesn't mean a property that's preferable, he means one that has positive existence. He seems to be presupposing the old Platonic metaphysics where evil is a privation of goodness, and not something that can exist on its own. I'm not trying to endorse Platonism here, but if you accept its premises, all of your objections here fail (except for 2, which follows a different thread).

Objection to objection 1: the properties which a Platonist would consider to be most real are precisely the ones which theists are prone to attribute to God -- power, goodness, knowledge, beauty, etc. Properties like blueness lack full reality because (I think this is how a Platonist would argue it) they can only apply to contingent beings.

Objection 3: In the Platonic worldview, a positive property is one which has existence and a negative property is one which lacks existence. It seems pretty clear, at least to me that the negation of having existence is the same as lacking existence. Your warm/cold example obviously doesn't apply, since you're defining positive as "useful toward an end". If either warmth or coldness is positive, it would be warmth, since warmth is the presence of heat, while coldness is its absence. But both properties only apply to contingent beings.

Objection 4: I can't think of any property, which a Platonist would consider positive, and which would imply the possession of a property a Platonist would consider negative. Perhaps you can. The power to commit genocide would be a positive property, in and of itself. It would only be negative when combined with the will to use that power (the will to commit genocide is negative because it's a dysfunction).

Objection 5: It seems pretty straightforward to say that the combination of two things that exist, is also something that exists. Or if not, I think there's a bigger objection to Axiom 3. The circularity part is a bit harder to reply to, but I can escape it by proposing a hierarchy of properties. Level 0 properties are simple, level 1 properties can contain combinations of properties on level 0, etc. The property of Godlikeness_1 would be the possession of all positive properties on level 0. There would also be a Godlikeness_2 property consisting of all purely positive properties from levels 0 and 1, and so on for any level n. I think this argument only talks about Godlikeness_1, but any being with that property also has Godlikeness_n, unless I'm not thinking straight.

Objection 6: Cultural acceptability differs between possible worlds, but not existence. It seems impossible to think of a possible world where darkness has positive existence and light doesn't, unless "darkness" in that world isn't the same thing we mean by darkness, or "light" isn't what we mean by light.

Objection 7: Here you're defining positivity in terms of preference, and you wouldn't run into the same pitfalls if you defined it in terms of being.

Objection 8: Ditto. Though I'll add that a being with all positive properties would rather have them than not, at least according to Platonic ethics.

[GabrielMirandaLima-hvoe]

If Diogenes of Apollonia was watching a religious person using this demonstration I'm sure he would say aloud "WELL, BUT I WOULD RATHER DEFINE NOT EXISTING AS A POSITIVE PROPERTY, I THINK IT'S WAY BETTER"

[Daetelus]

I'm trying to find the justification for theorem 1. No one seems to want to talk about it. And I don't understand why. Theorem 1 is the first thing I object to. I see no reason why I should be committed to it on the basis of the definitions, axioms, and intuitive notion of a positive property.

[Tartaggz]

The rebuttal to the argument at 7:51 seems to be the best one. I recognized the composition fallacy when looking at your previous video, and I love how the other flaw you pointed complements the composition. The circular problem with being god-like and having all positive properties is an amazing flaw to point out.
It’s like the problem with the paradox “this sentence is false.” If you’re then saying that the entire sentence is false, then you can make it so the statement reads, “[This sentence is false] is false”. It’s begging the question, and it in fact makes its own statement incorrect.
Similarly, saying that being god-like has all positive properties, and is a positive property itself, sufferers the same problem. Let’s say that a definition of positive properties made it so properties A, B, C, D, E, and F are the only positive properties. If being god-like (G) is also a positive property, then being god-like (G) requires it to have properties A, B, C, D, E, F, G. In other words, G is a property of G, which is inconsistent.

[randomnobody]

Sometimes it feels like you atheists are more dedicated to a specific religion (often Christianity) than I will ever care to be.


Objection 1 quite exemplifies this. Asking me to stipulate what is "positive" or "godlike" is like asking me to describe god. I do not know, do not claim to know, nor am i interested.
Godel's argument basically boils down to "if a all good/powerful/upright/insert synonym of positive here being CAN exist, it MUST exist". It doesn't need to specify what that being is, what it looks like, nor what its favorite color necessarily is, only that it necessarily exist.


If you think it's reasonable for say a Christian has the burden of proof when he claims god is a certain way, then surely you see why the burden of proof is similarly on athiest when you claim god does not exist. If you are not sure, then you are like me an agnostic.

[skepticedge]

Very informative, precise & to z point

[vadrian]

Your video is full of fallacies!
1. Axioms by definition are already universally accepted truths.
2. Accusing Godel of circular arguments, while ignoring the two types of circularity: virtuous and fallacious is misleading… All human reasoning is circular because you are using reason to justify reason…
3. An Axiom is Not a claim!!! See definition of axiom!!!
4. You are talking about the attributes of God, a necessary Being! Fallacy category error
5. God’s Omnipotence is excluding the possibility of genocide since God has only positive properties. You are ignoring the definition of God, the First Cause of everything! God is the Creator of life, and has the right to justice, since humans are responsible for evils in this world…
Again you are committing the fallacy of category…
6. You can find the definition of positive property on any dictionary. God as a necessary Being must have all the positive properties. Again circularity is invoked without mentioning virtuous and fallacious types
7. Objective morality from God, against subjective human morality! In some cultures it’s ok to eat your neighbor…
8. Suffering: Evil and Suffering is caused by humans, not God. The justice of God cannot be called suffering. It’s Justice !!!
9. Again, pain and suffering is Not God’s fault!!! It’s a human problem! When God created the world, everything was GOOD!!!
10. Godel’s proof for God is perfectly true and valid! The proof was verified using AI and computers and was found to be perfectly true and valid!!!

[sourcedrop]

I think there is subjective positive and objective positive and they don't always mesh.

For instance, lets say a fountain of youth exists and you find it and it makes you young again. Most would say that's good because it equals more life.

But what if you are dating an older woman and she's the love of your life, but now because you are young you can't be with her? That would be an ultimate negative brought on by an ultimate positive.

So while you could say that the fountain is god-like, that doesn't mean it's good for your life.

[pawelwysocki]

However, as for your objection to axiom 2 - being able to commit genocide is a positive property. It is the committing of genocide that is not positive.

[roderictaylor]

Godel's argument requires that a property cannot be positive unless it is possibly instantiated. That seems reasonable. A property that makes it metaphysically impossible to exist is not a property that would be better to have than not. But there is a price for this requirement. Before we grant any proposed property is positive, we must verify it is possibly instantiated. In particular, before granting being God-like is a positive property, we must verify the property of being God-like is possibly instantiated. In other words, we must verify it is possible a God-like being exists. But if we can verify it is possible a God-like being exists, we should forget about Godel's argument and go straight to Plantinga's argument which is far simpler, and has that as its only substantive premise.

[stevencorey]

All I heard was arguments from ignorance and presuppose. Just a bunch of empty claims.

[fatihoguzonder]

not regarding what is positive is. if a whatever a compulsory property exists in any of the possible worlds it is replicated in all possible worlds. If a super power such as all knowing, all good, all something is replicated all possible worlds should be similar or may be identical. So this makes multiverse (multiple worlds) improbable/impossible. Or all worlds that exist should be identical.

[TheHpsh]

well, one problem i have with the argument, is that i don't see that it follows that even if it was true it would be better if God existed in all possible worlds, that God exist in all possible worlds.
and i don't think it really helps even if God are defined as a ultimate being, because he would only be that, if he exist.
as i see it, this possible world part of the arguments, are not really needed in the argument, it is no real difference between using it, and just saying that it would be better if God exist, and because of it, God exist. it feels a bit hollow

[movaxh]

Axiom 3, essentially is a Russell's Paradox if you look closely.

[pawelwysocki]

As a person of faith, I've never liked the idea that one could prove the existence of God.

Jesus was always impressed by people's faith, not their logical prowess. And the Bible says explicitly that no one has ever seen God.

[mynameisChesto]

I said it on the last video and I'll say it again, positive properties are not what you refer to them as.

[aTownMike]

IMO, 'positive properties' corresponded immediately with 'being' (as per Edwin Holt), which constitutes any experientially taggable event as candidates (as per William James). Assuming 'positive properties' then as 'properties positive of experience' (primarily descriptive, barely evaluative vs the mostly evaluative 'intuitive' definitions of 'positive' used here), Godel's argument seems less shaky. At least, regarding the possibility of a God-Like entity, although (or perhaps intentionally) not to any particular entity (or even definition of 'entity') as defined outside logic.

[brysonyoung]

Dude - its not an argument about who exactly Moses was talking to on top of Mount Zion. Its an argument, deriving directly from Incompleteness, about the relationship of Logic and Metaphysics. Godel doesn’t define “positivity” because its not relevant to his postulate. Pick one. Let’s say “internal consistency of a logical proof” is the positive proposition of choice - is a consistent proof “more positive” than an inconsistent one? Yes. But why? Its very hard to say why - the justification for it is intuitive and immediate in such a way as to defy a strictly “logical” explanation. Nevertheless, that intuition is absolutely constituent of the proof itself (which of course is Incompleteness in essence). The internal strictly logical consistency of his proof “is” the proof, if you follow my meta. Of course he’s not proving that Jesus actually walked on water. What he’s saying is that there is a Transcendental aspect of rational cognition - the Good, the Complete, the Correct, the Whole, the Better - that is constituent of logical proof but can’t be defined by it. Its a brilliant summary of Kant’s ‘Critique Of Practical Reason’; or if you prefer something a little more current, Robert Pirsig’s ‘Zen And The Art Of Motorcycle Maintenance’. Cheers

[antoinnelamah]

to be fair you need a fairly high iq to understand modal logic

[randomnobody]

wow, "not all things that we attribute to god are considered positive"?
Once again i'm surprised by how dedicated some athiest (which I assume this gentleman is) to his one and true (christian) god.


Godel proved the necessary existence of A being who is godlike. He has not taken on the burden to describe what that being is. By forcing omniscience for example onto that being you are literally staw-manning godel in the most textbook way possible. He did not claim omniscience is positive, you did. You then proceeded to describe why omniscience doesn't seem positive not 5 seconds after. How absurd can a person be?