The Modal Ontological Argument: An Analysis

Here's your comprehensive guide to the modal ontological argument for God's existence!

OUTLINE

0:00 Intro & Outline
2:06 General structure of MOA
12:55 Representative argument
15:16 Simpler variant
16:17 Criticisms
26:43 Symmetry Breakers
32:59 Presumption of possibility
40:45 Conceivability
45:07 Deontic
56:12 Ontomystical
1:06:33 Motivational centrality
1:11:05 Godelian
1:27:25 Maximal God
1:33:07 Modal continuity
1:44:23 Desire
1:54:08 Open-mindedness
1:59:30 Explicability
2:06:39 Conclusion

RESOURCES

THE USUAL...

[MrAdamo]

Oh almighty algorithm, decider of popularity, we humbly ask you to bless Joseph Schmid today

[SteveMcRae]

This is brilliant and huge congrats with your work in SEP with Oppy and Rasmussen!

[marianoaguilar]

Hi, Joe, I am a Spanish speaker but I really enjoy your content. I wanted to present an argument against classical theism based on the communicable and incommunicable attributes of God and see what you think or how classical theists might respond. I apologize in advance if my English is not the best. Anyway, here it goes and I hope it makes sense:

Definitions:

- Incommunicable attributes (IA): They cannot have imitations _ad extra_ and are possessed only by God, such as infinity (in any form considered), essential eternity, immensity, absolute simplicity, absolute immutability.
- Communicable attributes (CA): They have imitations _ad extra_ (outward) and are also possessed by us, such as wisdom, will, active potency, freedom, life, knowledge.

Argument:

1. If we participate in God, then we must participate in all of God's attributes, because in Him, all His attributes are the same God (DDS), and we participate in God. For example, if we participate and have to some degree the Justice of God, we necessarily also participate and have to some degree the Mercy of God, since Justice and Mercy are the same in God (and Justive and Mercy are the same too), and so with the other attributes.
2. But if this is so, then we should also have, at least to some degree, incommunicable attributes, such as immutability or His creative power, for they are also in God.
3. But it is impossible for us to have, even to any degree, these attributes, for they belong only to God, being precisely incommunicable.
4. Therefore, it is impossible for us to participate in God in general, for as stated in (1), if we participate in God, then we must participate in _all_ of God's attributes.
5. But classical theism claims that we participate in God.
6. Therefore, classical theism is false.

[thestoiccorneryt]

Majesty of Reason, your deep dive into this topic is both thought-provoking and accessible.

[bonbon_nextlevel]

You sound very happy and jolly here. Glad to see it! ☺💖

[cathyharrop]

Joseph you may have broken my brain. I think I've learned two things.
1: Demand a symmetry breaker.
2: Figure out how it demonstrates P*.

Stopping for now.

[Capt.Fail.]

Hey Joe. Just wanted to say hi from someone who was at Purdue around the same time as you. Am only just now getting into more formal philosophy so it’s interesting to be hearing it from someone who was in the same place I was!

Thanks for the time working on this.

[jordanh]

Awesome Video Joe! The MOA is one of the arguments that has really peaked my interest. This is great content.

[julesmalory]

I've been thinking a lot about possibilities, possible worlds included. Based on some of those thoughts, I've got a criticism against MOAs (which tries to undercut the possibility premise). While the specific criticism in mind doesn't feature in the video, it's nice to see other points of view about MOAs --- and in great detail, too! Cool vid

[justus]

Would have enjoyed also seeing some symmetry breakers for the reverse possibility premise🤔

[Viod]

Thank you this is honestly a great video!

[joshuapena]

Joe deserves way more subscribers, guys. This stuff is awesome. Click the button and ring the bell!

[TitanOfClash]

Terrence Howard's 1x1 = 2 is a great rebuttal to the motivational centrality symmetry breaker.

[stefanmilicevic]

This is an amazing analysis. Thanks! What an interesting argument to analyze.

[bigsmoke]

damn i hope you get into a free will argument like this at some point. imagine a 2 hour video on the manipulation argument that would be awesome!

[roderictaylor]

5.1 The Presumption of Possibility

In analyzing this presumption, we need to distinguish between the idea of possibility and contingent possibility. A proposition is contingently possible if it is contingent; that is if it is true in at least one possible world and false in at least one possible world, or equivalently, if it is both possibly true and possible false, or if it is neither necessarily true nor necessarily false.

In formal modal logic, a proposition is possibly true if it is either contingently possibly true or necessarily true.

This can be confusing, as in common usage when we say something is possible, we typically are thinking of contingent possibility. In a discussion, I once said “It is possible 2+2=4.” Someone objected, saying, “No, it’s not merely possible 2+2=4, it’s necessarily true 2+2=4.” I explained that while in informal usage we might think of possibility as meaning contingent possibility, in formal modal logic a proposition is possible if it is either contingently possible or necessarily true. And assuming mathematical truths are necessary truths, while it is not contingently possible 2+2=4, it is necessarily true 2+2=4, and so in the language of formal modal logic we can say it is possible 2+2=4, as odd as that might sound.

With that in mind, when we say we should presume a proposition is possible absent a good reason for holding otherwise, are we thinking of necessity or contingent possibility? If we grant it is possible unicorns exist absent a good reason otherwise, is it because we think it reasonable to grant it is contingently possible unicorns exist absent a reason to do otherwise, or because we think it reasonable to grant unicorns exist and couldn’t possibly not exist absent a good reason for thinking otherwise?

I think the answer is obvious. If we grant it is possible unicorns exist absent a good reason otherwise, we are really granting it is contingently possible unicorns exist. Of course, as a logical consequence, we are also granting either it is contingently possible unicorns exist or it is necessarily true unicorns exist, but that is in no way because we think we should grant it is necessarily true unicorns exist absent a good reason otherwise. That would be silly.

With this in mind, we should replace this presumption with “The Presumption of Contingent Possibility” or “The Presumption of Contingency.” We should grant a proposition is contingent, absent a good reason not to.

And I think in this form, the principle is reasonable. Without it, how will we ever grant any proposition is contingent? There is no logical way to demonstrate any proposition is contingent. Perhaps every true statement is necessarily true, and every false statement is impossible. Perhaps the appearance of metaphysical contingency is illusory. Perhaps the universe is exactly as it had to be (the best of all possible worlds, as Leibnitz said). There’s no way to prove or demonstrate that’s not the case. Ultimately, the only way to argue a proposition is contingent is to argue it does not appear to be necessary (meaning necessarily true or necessarily false). So, I think we need this principle or at least something like it if we’re ever going to say, even provisionally, that some proposition is contingent.

The presumption of contingent possibility cannot be used to justify the main premise of the MOA. This principle tells us that we should assume it is contingently possible a perfect being exists unless we have a good reason not to. But we do have a good reason not to. It’s logically impossible it could be metaphysically contingently possible a perfect being exists. And I would argue it would be silly to say that since it isn’t contingently possible a perfect being exists, we should therefore assume it’s true and couldn’t be false a perfect being exists absent some good reason not to do so. The same goes for the main premise of the reverse MOA; we have a good reason to assume it is not contingently possible no perfect being exists, but that does not give us reason to assume it is necessarily true no perfect being exists absent a good reason not to.

But the presumption of contingent possibility does apply to the following argument:

Premise 1. It is contingently possible an omniscient omnipotent perfectly good being exists.
Conclusion. No perfect being exists.

The above argument is valid. If a perfect being is defined to be a necessary omniscient omnipotent perfectly good being, then if a perfect being exists it must be necessarily true an omniscient omnipotent perfectly good being exists; it cannot be merely contingently possible.

So, the presumption of contingent possibility tells us, absent a good reason not to do so, we should presume it is contingently possible an omniscient omnipotent perfectly good being exists, and therefore no perfect being exists.

Can we restore the symmetry? Can we come up with an argument that leads from the contingent possibility of some sentence to the existence of a perfect being? I came up with the following:

Premise 1. The proposition “A perfect being exists and Joe Biden is the 45th President of the U.S.” is contingent.
Conclusion. A perfect being exists.

This satisfies my requirement. If no perfect being exists, the sentence “A perfect being exists and Joe Biden is the 45th President of the U.S.” is impossible, not contingent, so the argument is valid. The sentence “No perfect being exists or Joe Biden is the 45th President of the U.S.” would also work.

Nonetheless, I don’t think this is satisfying at restoring symmetry. My example seems highly artificial. Perhaps we should modify our presumption to something like, “we should assume a sentence which does not contain any modal operators (directly or indirectly) is contingently possible, unless we have a good reason not to.” This may require more thought.

Edit:
For me, the argument from the contingency of an omniscient omnipotent perfectly good being to the nonexistence of a perfect being is an interesting, but secondary point. The main point I wish to argue, is that the presumption of possibility is better understood as the presumption of contingent possibility, and if this is granted then it is evident why it cannot be used to support the main premise of the MOA.

[bonbon_nextlevel]

Joe is THE GREATEST PHILOSOPHER right now 👏👏👏👏

[silverharloe]

I never understood "ought implies can" - I understand why "can't" defeats "ought", so I could get behind "ought requires can", but I don't see that having the force of implication.

[Sveccha]

H3O is called hydronium. Thanks for the upload! ❤

[Celestial-ruhy]

Supposing that the Necessary Being 'exists' and that it is complex rather than simple, do you think something that intrinsically exists in a contingent way, e.g. a human consciousness (supposing that it could persist after death), could "merge" with the Necessary Being, and thereby go from being essentially contingent to necessary (necessary within and by virtue of being a part of Necessary Being)? In other words, a transfer of modes from existing in contingent form to a necessary form while retaining distinctions. I hope my question is clear. Thanks for another great video!