Why was the US Navy mauled at Savo Island?

The Battle at Savo Island (1942) was a disaster for the US Navy, the question is why did it happen? A common explanation was that the US Navy was just bad at night fighting, but this seems a rather simplistic if not outright wrong assumption according to current research. After a short intro that provides the necessary context Trent Hone - author of Learning War - and Justin Pyke will discuss the various reasons for this major defeat in US Navy History.

Disclaimer: I received a complimentary copy of Learning War from Naval Institute Press for content production.

Cover design by vonKickass.

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» SOURCES «

Hone, Trent: Learning War – The Evolution of Fighting Doctrine in the U.S. Navy, 1898-1945. Naval Institute Press: Annapolis, USA, 2018.
Disclaimer: I received a complimentary copy of Learning War from Naval Institute Press for content production.

Mawdsely, Evan: The War for the Seas. A Maritime History of World War II. Yale University Press: New Haven, USA, 2019.

Symonds, Craig L.: World War II at Sea. A Global History. Oxford University Press: New York, 2018.

Dull, Paul S.: The Battle History of the Imperial Japanese Navy. Naval Institute Press: Annapolis, USA, 1978.

Morison, Samuel Eliot: Breaking the Bismarck Barrier 22 July 1942-1 May 1944. History of the United States Naval Operation in World War II. Volume VI. Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, Maryland, USA, 1950 (2010).

German Extended Translation (used for this video)
Potter, E.B.; Nimitz, Ch. W.; Rohwer, Jürgen: Seemacht – Von der Antike bis zur Gegenwart.

Naval Analysis Division: The Campaigns of the Pacific War. United States Strategic Bombing Survey (Pacific). Government Printing Office: Washington, US, 1946.

#BattleOfSavoIsland, #DisasterAtSavoIsland, #USNavyDisaster

[MilitaryHistoryNotVisualized]

Errors & Corrections:
* The statement that the Allied cruiser groups planned to combine is incorrect. They were to support each other but maneuver independently. Trent had the instructions to the destroyers in mind, which called for them coming together into a "striking force" and that influenced how he described the situation. He is grateful to the colleague who pointed this out.

[Drachinifel]

Looking forward to hearing more on the podcast!

[helmutthat]

Heads up to anyone who hasn't seen Montemayor's "Battle of Savo Island 1942: America's Worst Naval Defeat" video on this subject from 3 years ago. It is a very compelling account of the battle.

[csours]

The note about confusion during an engagement is very important, and I think it's one of the big problems with many counterfactual scenarios. If you lay out the battle on a map, then you can easily say "Why didn't they just do that". But if you take the individual experience of one particular captain or admiral, it's not like they have the top-down strategy map that you get in Starcraft or Age of Empires.

[andrewtaylor]

One rather sobering difference leaps out in comparing the US and Japanese Navies of the time. Savo Island was arguably the worst combat loss suffered by the US Navy in its history. A devastating failure with a loss of 4 Capital Surface Ships. With a loss of 1300 Sailors in total. The US’s total casualties at Savo were about 2/3’s of the losses from EACH Japanese ship lost in the various Leyte Gulf battles. Fuso and Yamashiro were Battleships that each only had 10 survivors out of crews of 1800-2000. How many made it off Musashi before she rolled over and exploded? It’s a horrifying contrast that you see throughout the war.

[yiggdrasill]

Thank you for mentioning australian forces. Most of the time we get ignored or called "allied" and left at that. It means a lot to me.

[michaelferro]

a night naval battle back then was akin to putting 2 opposing teams of gun fighters into a dark room and telling them to just fight it out. another travesty was our U. S. torpedoes were almost completely useless with faulty detonators and ran erratically, whereas the Japanese torpedoes were almost absolutely flawless and devastating!!! there's so many factors that hampered the allies ships and cost them the Battle. thank you guys.

[cavscout]

We didn't 'LOSE' at Savo Island... it was a tactical submergence.

Seriously though, thanks for doing this one. Always love the WW2 Pacific theater content, and glad there will be more! And Savo... sounds a lot like the Japanese got lucky while the US+allies force ended up in a perfect storm. Also, the US forces initially thought friendly fire as well.

[trauko]

Hey!!! Why am I visualizing graphics in "Military History NOT Visualized"? SCANDAL!

[stevew]

Do I recall right in that the US cruisers at one point were ordered to turn on their recognition lights to "avoid" friendly fire.

[TokioExpress]

Everyone jokes about how poor the Japanese performed in the Pacific War until they read about the horrendous casualties the Allies had to pay to win against them. The air attack on the Lexington at Coral Sea, the submarine attacks on Yorktown and Wasp, the disaster at Savo Island, the sinking of the Hornet at Santa Cruz. Many of the men who first faced off against the Japanese made the same grave assumption that the Japanese were a weak enemy, and those who survived will tell you they didn't think the War against Japan would last long. It wasn't just the Americans either. The Australians at Darwin, Java Sea and Sunda Strait. The British when they lost the Prince of Wales and Repulse, their defeat in the Malayan Campaign and during the Indian Ocean Raid.

I don't know why but I just find it fascinating that everyone forgets the humbling and blood soaked path to victory in the Pacific that our grandparents and great grandparents had to endure.

[andrewlee]

always so interesting, thank you for your research and work ^^

[raychristison]

Mike Carlton's history of HMAS Australia "Flagship" notes the dereliction of General MacArthur's headquarters in Brisbane as major factor in the defeat. Australian patrol aircraft had reported the approaching Japanese fleet through Brisbane. These reports were not passed on, leaving the naval forces unaware of the threat. (Having said this, I am aware that YouTube researchers almost never refer to Australian sources)

[ussenterprise]

Proof that the IJN is still a threat after Midway. Great video!

[dewittbourchier]

Oversimplified: The Japanese Navy was really damn good so of course they could, in the right circumstances, inflict sharp defeats on any opponents. The mobilisation of the United States was not overkill, fighting enemies like Japan or Germany on fair terms would have been the height of stupidity.

[wrayday]

The best oversimplification of the event is this.

U.S. Navy rolled a 1

[jefaus]

Defeat in detail can only really happen if one can surprise the enemy.

The Battle of Savo Island was an example of "Kantai Kessen" writ small. A decisive naval battle, at night,
attacking an enemy that was wholely unaware of of the presence of the enemy.

The comedy of errors of the allied force was what defeated them, and not so much the Japanese.;

[joelmccoy]

Admiral Mikawa took a lot of unused ordinance home with him and left a largely defeated enemy and a target rich environment with no apparent air assets opposing him. He thought he won the lottery but left all the transport ships unmolested. They all escaped to safety. The beached ordinance and supplies were used in the ensuing battles by Marines. He snatched a tactical victory from the jaws of a strategic victory. RADAR was still an unused wonder weapon. He will be famous in Japan forever.

[youraveragescotsman]

My assumption on it was just sheer confusion, lack of night fighting training, Admirals thinking it was friendly fire, etc.

Just complete chaos.

This comment was made before I watched the video.

[SergeantAradir]

So i have a question to all real and armchair-historians out there: How much do you think a battle can actually tell about a generals capabilities or asked the other way around: how much of a battle is actually the success of certain officers?
To explain that a bit: If you look at the Battle of Midway you see a bold plan on both sides that works better for the americans who manage through some real lucky breaks to execute their plan (sorta at least). But a lot of that seems for me to be pure chance and the effectivness of an air-strike for example seems to me much more reliant on stuff like machines, doctrine, training, support infrastructur, etc. not to mention luck, weather, etc. then to the skill of admirals sending out another wave or not. Yet it is always those "figureheads" that get most of the talking point. Especially in a sea-battle where you have relative few, relativly vulnerable units (when compared to infantry units at least), it seems often to be based much more on happenstance, then actual commanding.
Would love to hear some thoughts on that.