The Plausibility of Wittgenstein's Metaphilosophy | Timothy Williamson & Paul Horwich

UCD School of Philosophy presents: Philosophies of Philosophy - Celebrating 20 years of IJPS. June 17-21 2013

Timothy Williamson (Wykeham Professor of Logic, New College, Oxford University) & Paul Horwich, Professor of Philosophy, NYU - "The Plausibility of Wittgenstein's Metaphilosophy"

Timothy Williamson has been the Wykeham Professor of Logic at Oxford since 2000. His main research interests are in philosophical logic, epistemology, metaphysics and philosophy of language. He is the author of Identity and Discrimination (Blackwell 1990, updated edition 2013), Vagueness (Routledge 1994), Knowledge and its Limits (Oxford 2000), The Philosophy of Philosophy (Blackwell 2007), Modal Logic as Metaphysics (Oxford 2013), and over 180 articles. Williamson on Knowledge, edited by Patrick Greenough and Duncan Pritchard (Oxford 2009) contains fifteen critical essays on his work and his replies.

Paul Horwich, Professor of Philosophy (BA Oxford 1966, MA Yale 1969, PhD Cornell 1974). His principal contributions to the subject have been a probabilistic account of scientific methodology, a unified explanation of temporally asymmetric phenomena, a deflationary conception of truth, and a naturalistic use-theory of meaning. He has received fellowship support for his work from the National Endowment for the Humanities, the National Science Foundation, and (currently) the Guggenheim Foundation. He has been on the faculties of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (73-95), University College London (95-00), and the Graduate Center of the City University of New York (00-05). He has also given courses at UCLA, the CNRS Institut d'Histoire et Philosophie des Sciences et Technique, the University of Sydney, the École Normale Supérieure, and the University of Tokyo. His main present project is a monograph on Wittgenstein's meta-philosophy.

[bezonshroff]

'The obvious' is elusive, we learn....for this gem alone, the discussion is praiseworthy

[ianhruday]

Williamson did a good job! There are a lot of comments about his speaking style, but I take it if you're already interested in the issues its not important... Turning up the speed also helps.

I think Horwich can effectively criticize some areas and projects in T-philosophy, but in order to make a general critique he has to do T-philosophy and he does it badly. Any general critique requires Horwich to demarcate T-philosophy and diagnose whats going wrong in a way that doesent threaten other areas of inquiry. Its hard to see how he can do this without employing the same kinds of idealizations, cherry picking of data, over generalizations and other methods he claims to find problematic. In this critique, he can be seen as presented with the same dilemma he gives T-philosophers. If he is too loose with his data he doesn't connect with his target. If he is more faithful to the phenomena of T-philosophy, his critique looses force, and the T-philosopher will have plausible responses to his criticism.

I think Horwich errs on the side of overgeneralizing about T-philosophy. Although his critique doesn't work, it can be reformulated as a skeptical challenge to T-philosophers.

[arts_ambassador]

Thank you for sharing this discussion. I'm looking forward to reading Professor Williamson's book "Modal Logic as Metaphysics", especially after hearing the points that he raised here. I understand that he is a most respected academic in his field. I find Paul Horwich very interesting too. (I'm a bit surprised that some of the comments here are of the kind that one associates with pop music videos and entertainment; but if philosophy can expand its audience, we are all better off).

[geraldbalzano]

Please add closed captions to this! Thank you!

[Karollenart]

what matters is thought not fluid language, it can be only nice addition

[hectorramage]

This comment section is quite depressing. It is filled with people who seem to have studied very little philosophy but have been (rather embarrassingly) seduced by the mystique and cult of personality surrounding Wittgenstein, and have thus taken it upon themselves to declare Horwich victorious. None of these cultists seem familiar with Wittgenstein beyond the usual one-liners, which, presented without context, are reduced to pseudoprofound deepities. If you have a modicum of intellectual good faith, read Williamson's review of Horwich's book, which he's largely repeating in this talk.

[AustinStarr]

the umms are nuts making, no matter how brilliant this guy is.  he's unlistenable.

[McRingil]

1:44:40, Horwich`s response pins down exactly what is wrong with his conception of philosophy, he insists on it being a priori, but it is a relatively recent development to think that

[edwardwebb]

I gotta go on this, 20:34-20:56. I suppose as inconclusive as the results of the 1WW.

[ChrisSmith-yhbq]

The first speaker may know his stuff but he cannot impart it.

[dj]

I am really not sure what Horwich means by "theoretical philosophy", once we start peeling off all the conceptual layers of the five basic preconditions that figure in his 'definition' of it. Of course, intuitively it is clear that the target of his Wittgensteinian attack is the idea that there are these kinds of deeply mysterious properties of the underlying reality of things, identifiable by the archetypically philosophical concepts such as truth, knowledge, consciousness, etc. But, as indicated by Williamson himself (as well as one other member of the audience in the Q&A section of the discussion) most of what he says about these traditionally philosophical problems is highly 'theoretical' in nature, not very different from the kind of inquiry one can find in contemporary science, for example in fundamental theoretical physics. Most physicists today would probably subscribe to this or that version of realism when trying to elaborate on their understanding of how theoretical models in their own respective areas of research relate to what is philosophically termed the 'objective world', or reality. The oft-quoted (and largely misinterpreted) dictum 'shut up and calculate' - which in the meantime became the metaphorical divine law of the gospel called instrumentalism - is not only problematic for the philosophically inclined in the physics community, but has for quite some time now been negatively contributing to a halt in the process of making the next major breakthrough in foundational physics (here of course I have quantum mechanics in mind). And the objection that Horwich is actually implicitly endorsing the kind of theoretical philosophy that he is arguing against is actually stronger than it seems at first. For example, his minimalist account of truth is all but a highly sophisticated piece of philosophical theorizing (or theoretical philosophy?), even if it is designed to be critically at odds with any kind of substantial philosophical theory of truth. But then again, how much theory is enough theory when we are talking about philosophy? And what exactly is 'theory' in the philosophical application of the term? It is interesting to wonder how many 'theoretical philosophers' today - assuming they don't have any qualms when it comes to accepting the label in question - would actually be willing to stick to the kind of substantialist view of philosophy that Horwich finds deeply irritating. Hell, one can even make the argument that Plato's conviction that there was this underlying reality hidden behind illusory perceptual experiences of things should be read as a primitive exposition of a theoretical conception of philosophy. Even Aristotle inherited the term 'theory' more or less intact from Plato, despite his harsh disagreements with his theory of Ideas. It is not clear what exactly they understood by it, but they certainly believed philosophical reflection is able to capture - at least to a certain degree - some vital aspects of the general functioning of nature and the human mind that are otherwise unattainable by other means. Of course, one can say that their assessment of the role and value of philosophy was appropriate for the historical context in which they lived, but a lot has changed in the meantime, we have made a lot of progress in philosophy. This is true, but still the questions they raised and the concerns they had about some of the basic solutions are still as perplexing today as they were when they were originally formulated. It seems that philosophy is always under attack, this is nothing new (I guess 'beating the dead horse' phrase assumes new meaning when used in this context 😂 In any case, Williamson's fight for the autonomy of philosophy may be misguided, but it certainly has solid roots in the past history of the discipline.

[daniellanglois]

I note, if it's relevant, that Wittgentsein never discussed, in so many words, his 'metaphilosophy', such as if he had said 'my metaphilosophy'.

[avellopublishing]

'Modal Logic as Metaphysics' by T. Williamson is reviewed in the Avello Publishing Journal.

[JonSebastianF]

I guess this is what it looks like when analytical philosophers really disagree :P

[boxbanger]

I didn't realize he was debating! "I therefore predict that most Wittgenstein scholars will find Horwich's interpretation unfaithful. Thanks very much." That was the most clear thing he said the whole time (39 minutes in)--it was like a linguistic bomb dropping...

[Feedinggoldfishhouseflie-wpjx]

I think Tim's saying that he can easily imagine a scenario when he is 'not sure he feels pain' is specious. I mean - his quale is about as normative as a quail with three feet and 2 heads. Everyone knows whether they are in pain or not. He is being facetious Perhaps Paul should whack him over the head with his new book and see whether he feels that or whether he is 'not sure'. It is so ridiculous what Tim says. He sets the facile tone for his arguments from the outset when he denigrates Paul's perfectly serious ideas to things like 'calling T philosophy is all rubbish'. I frankly think people like Tim are like those who like to write hurtful poetry like 'The Tree in the Quad'. I know I am hurt by such nonsense poetry that claims a nonsense (imo the God-created reality of the tree for the observer is existent in the mind of the God-created observer - but it is still existent) - just like Tim would know that he was hurt if he was whacked over the head by Paul's book.

[marcmars]

"Caseez"? "Exerciseez"? Gimme a break, Tim.

[alibilgeozturk]

İyi ki Timoth Williamson görüşlerini kitaplaştırmış. Yoksa konuşmaları hiç çekilecek gibi değil.

[lesliecunliffe]

Before attempting to give insights into Wittgenstein's philosophy. it would be a good idea if Williamson grasped the significance of research into pedagogical styles. His own style of pacing around like a caged tiger distracts the listener and thus prevents him from being effective. The best communicators stay still when they are speaking.

[blobblob]

Williamson's "argument" is terrible, painfully unconvincing.