Free Will Incompatibilism: The Consequence Argument

Are deterministic laws of nature compatible with free will? According to Peter van Inwagen's "Consequence Argument," the answer is "No." The past and the laws of nature guarantee what the future will be. And the past and the laws of nature are not "up to me." And what results from them is also not "up do me." But my actions result from them. So my actions are not "up to me."

[LetsGetLogical]

Of course Van Inwagen thinks we have free will but this video puts forward his consequence argument so clearly and persuasively, I fear a bunch of viewers will shrug and conclude we don't have free will! Nice work—a complex argument presented simply.

[stephenlawrence]

I think it is possible to extend the consequence argument to indeterminism. The step to make is to think how we could have done otherwise if determinism is true. We find there are two possible ways.

1) We could have had a different past prior to the choice.

2)The laws of nature could be different.

Now this helps us see the problem better. To have done otherwise circumstances out of our control would have had to have been different.
And that we can apply to indeterminism and get the same result.

[CasualPhilosophy]

I guess a lot depends on how you unpack "up to me"

[boxfox]

Like replaying a record, Duh'h !

[DannyHouk]

Dig this video. Did you catch the show Devs? It was an entertaining sci-fi spin on these ideas.

[marvinedwards]

First, the premises of the argument are false. From the moment of birth, the past and the laws of nature cease to be entirely external influences. You see, Junior happens to be a distinct package of those laws of nature acting with a will of its own. And from that point forward his present actions and his present choices will become part of the past that will causally determines the future within his domain of influence.

For example, the newborn immediately begins a negotiation for control with its physical and social environment. The newborn will cry out for its feeding at 2AM, immediately changing the lives of its parents.

Junior is not a passive object controlled by external forces. Junior is the source of natural forces acting upon other objects in the world within his reach. And parents realize this as they repeatedly pick up his toys thrown from his crib.

A world of perfectly reliable cause and effect does not change who and what Junior is. Junior is a center of causal agency. What goes on inside him can affect what goes on outside him. He is as much a part of the past and the laws of nature, as any other object in the physical universe.

When he is old enough to make decisions for himself, his deliberate actions will be up to him, and no other object in the physical universe can be said to control his thoughts or actions.

Free will is a choice we make for ourselves that is free of coercion and other forms of undue influence (mental illness, hypnosis, manipulation, etc.).

Second, your definition of determinism is incorrect with regards to possibilities. Determinism may safely assert that there will be one, and only one, ACTUAL future. However, determinism cannot assert that there is only one POSSIBLE future. Possibilities exist solely within the imagination. No one can drive across the possibility of a bridge. They can only drive across an actual bridge. However, we cannot build an actual bridge without first imagining a possible bridge. And we can have as many possible bridges, and as man possible futures, as we can imagine.

Every possibility that we can imagine is considered "real" if it can be actualized if we choose to actualize it. If we have the skills and resources to build the bridge then it is a real possibility, even if it never gets built in reality.