Peter van Inwagen Against the Compatibilism of Free Will & Determinism: The Consequence Argument

I describe Peter van Inwagen's argument against the compatibilism of free will and determinism, called the consequence argument. He concludes that free will is incompatible with determinism.

[polarski]

thanks you just saved me a couple hours of reading

[marvinedwards]

But Peter van Inwagen's argument is indeed touchable. His arguments, in steps (1) through (8) simply define determinism as the belief that all events are reliably caused by prior events, due to the past, P0, being untouchable, and the laws of nature, L, also being untouchable. Yet he does nothing to demonstrate that free will is incompatible with such a universe. Instead he assumes that since we have no control over the conditions at some prior point before we were born, and we have no control over the laws of nature, by which all natural objects and forces operate, that this must mean that we have no control over our own choices and actions.

But isn't each object that exists a unique package of the laws of nature? A volcano erupts, wiping out a village. The volcano is a force of nature. Babe Ruth hits the baseball, with such force and accuracy that it flies over the outfield fence. He too is a force of nature.

A person decides to rob a bank. Is it all of nature that robs the bank, or is it the robber, the specific piece of nature, that decided to commit the crime? The robber made that choice deliberately, through rational thought, which is a natural function of his natural brain. Like Jesse James said when asked, "Jesse, why do you rob banks?", "Because that's where the money is."

Determinism is certainly correct to assert that all events are reliably caused by prior events. These prior events go back as far in time as anyone can imagine. And, there's nothing we can do about the past. However, it should be pointed out that we actively participate in creating our own past by everything we are presently doing in this moment. And it is also the case that we will actively participate in creating our own future by the plans and choices we are making right now, in the present moment.

It is correct that there will be only one, single, inevitable, actual future (after all, we have but one past to put it in). But it will also be inevitable that, within the domain of human influence, we ourselves will choose that future from among the many possible futures that we will inevitably imagine.

And, yes, everything that we imagine and everything that we think and feel will also be causally necessary from any prior P0 that we choose. But it will also be inevitable that it is us, and no other object in the universe, that is doing the imagining and the choosing.

And, coincidentally, that is exactly how the events appear to us, that we are doing it. So, we are not having any illusions about what is going on. It is really us, and we are really doing it. This is an empirical truth, and it is untouchable.

This may come as a surprise: freedom is deterministic. Every freedom that we have, to do anything at all, requires a world of reliable cause and effect. Without reliable causation, we cannot reliably cause any effect. And every freedom we have, to do anything at all, requires the ability to cause some effect.

So, the notion of freedom itself implies a deterministic world. Therefore there can be no such thing as "freedom from causal necessity". The notion suggests that to be "truly" free, we must be free of the very thing that enables every freedom we have. The notion itself contains its own contradiction, creating a paradox. So, the philosophical definition of free will as "freedom from causal necessity" is a bit of silly nonsense.

Fortunately, there is another definition of free will: a choice we make for ourselves that is "free of coercion and undue influence". This is the definition that everyone understands and correctly applies when assessing a person's responsibility for their actions. It requires nothing supernatural or metaphysical. It makes no claims to be uncaused. It simply does its job of distinguishing a deliberate act from a coerced act or an insane act or an act caused by some other extraordinary influence.

Causation never causes anything. Determinism never determines anything. Necessity never necessitates anything. These abstract concepts are not entities that go about in the world causing events, deciding what will happen, or necessitating our choices or our behavior. Such a view would be a "reification fallacy", and would present a false view of what is really going on (a delusion).

The concepts of causal necessity and determinism are use to describe the behavior of the actual objects and forces as they interact to bring about events. The objects include everything from photons to galaxies, and each living organism, and each member of an intelligent species.

Yes, that's actually us, one of those objects that goes around causing stuff to happen, and doing so according to our own goals, our own reasons, and in our own interests. We get to choose what we will do.

And if our choice is inevitable, then it is equally inevitable that it will be us that is actually doing the choosing. The fact of causal necessity does not change the fact that our own choosing is causally necessitating our own choices and actions.

So, you see, freedom is deterministic, and free will is a deterministic event. And that is the real compatibilism.

[alexjoneschannel]

Calvinist: God decreed the fall of man
Calvinist: It was Adam's and Eve's fault
Calvinist: You're responsible for their sins
Everyone else: wtf

[Swifter]

Imagine believing in libertarian free will.