Peter van Inwagen: 'An Argument for Incompatibilism'

Van Inwagen's first version of the consequence argument for the incompatibility of free will and determinism

[opoleboy]

Excellent explanation of argument thank you. I have a class on it today, and was a little put off by its logical/propositional presentation in the text. Once again thanks great to listen to you. You have a nice voice, pace, and clear structure of thoughts.

[danwylie-sears]

This seems like a completely unreasonable criterion of free will. In this universe, you didn't; therefore, you couldn't have? No: in a counterfactual universe indistinguishable from ours up to the present -- in particular, in a universe in which you still count as you -- you did. There's nothing more than that, that free will could possibly be expected to require, and still count as free will. Any more stringent requirement is either simple nonsense or an ersatz "free will" concocted to prop up a prior commitment to incompatibilism.