Dr. Robert C. Koons | Neo-Aristotelianism and the Kalam

For our first episode, we interviewed Dr. Robert C. Koons on metaphysics, his Kalam, and more!
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Find Dr. Robert C. Koons' work here:

Timestamps:
00:00 Introduction
00:49 Neo-Aristotelianism Overview
2:38 Powers, Laws, & Natural Kinds
6:00 Universals & Particulars
7:33 Form, Matter, and Hylomorphism
9:56 Substances, Mereology, & Minds
12:31 Trope Resemblance Nominalism
15:50 Natural Kinds & Teleology in Biology
21:31 Substances & Mereology Again
26:06 Classical Theism, then some Quantum Mechanics
33:04 Reading Aquinas' 1st & 2nd ways, then Existential Inertia
38:19 Some Philosophy of Time, then some Modal Metaphysics
47:09 Kalam (contra Morriston, Malpass, Schmid, Dana, etc)
1:28:35 Woman?
1:30:03 Abortion (its morally wrong)
1:31:51 Outro

For more on Kalam Cosmological Arguments and Causal Finitism, consider:

Some notes from Koons' analysis of objections to his Kalam:
-Successful transmission of the signal isn’t an additional stipulation, nor does it involve anything extrinsic to each “patch”. It’s a consequence of the definition of the active and passive causal powers of each Reaper.
-Can “logical possibility” be a constraint here? Yes, but everyone concedes that a series of grim reapers is logically possible – the impossibility only emerges when we stipulate that the series is beginningless, and when we add certain metaphysical necessities about powers. The PP is supposed to tell us that if certain conditions C are met, then some scenario S is metaphysically possible. We can’t build the metaphysical possibility of S into our condition C without rendering PP completely useless. It would just tell us that if a scenario is possible, then it’s possible. The objectors haven’t yet offered a version of PP that has real force and rules out all these paradoxes.
-The argument from branching actualism commits a mathematical fallacy. Premise two is false because, if causal finitism is false, then we could have a world with multiple, infinitely long spacetime continua, each linearly ordered by the earlier/later relation. So, our own infinite past could branch off from the actual world at an instant in one of the earlier continua. It’s only if we adopt causal finitism that we have good grounds for ruling out such non-standard temporal ontologies. Along similar lines, we could posit a time-infinity (i.e., divine eternity) and have different infinite pasts branch off from that moment.
-What God can’t do (because it is metaphysically impossible) is create an infinite future through which there runs a temporally-backward causal regress. That would be a violation of causal finitism.
-On the foreknowledge question, Dr.Koons goes a little further than Pruss does. Since God is outside of time, speaking of ‘foreknowledge’ is a misnomer. And Dr.Koons would say that God’s knowledge of a contingent fact is simply identical to that fact, and so there is no question of either a causal or even an explanatory relation between them. If we think of ‘explanation’ as a relation between true propositions, then Dr.Koons would be inclined to say that God’s knowledge of p explains p, and not vice versa.
On God having an infinite number of reasons, Dr.Koons further clarifies (via private messages) he would reply that God always acts on the basis of a finite number of reasons. There are an infinite number of reasons that God could have acted on but didn’t. God does what He does because what He does is good, and the goodness of His actions always has a finite explanation.

[MajestyofReason]

Thanks for the excellent video! Here's a brief comment on Koons' response to the endless future paradoxical variant. First, Koons overlooks that such an infinite chain is simply a *consequence* of the possible endless future + the patchwork principle + individual localized theistic possibilities (like individual instances of divine revelation), *not* an *additional assumption* which might be discharged to avoid the paradox. So, then, given that a paradox results, we must either reject the possibility of an endless future (yikes!), reject the patchwork principle (which would undermine Koons' argument), or reject theism (since the individual possibilities of divine revelation would be possible under theism).

Second, the endless future paradox doesn't actually require infinite causal (or dependence) chains, as we can construct versions of the paradox that only involve one causal node, God, ordaining that each future x is F iff none of its future x's are F. This, too, can be argued to be a consequence of individual theistic possibilities + the patchwork principle + the possibility of an endless future.

Third, the endless future variant doesn't assume God is temporal or has future-directed intentions in the way we do. It only requires *temporal revelations* . And any Biblical theist should grant that God has made temporal revelations, i.e., revelations which are themselves contained in time. And also, any theist should grant that God has intentions about what happens in the future of *our* timeline (whether or not it's future *to God* ), and that's all you need to run the future-oriented paradoxical variants.

Fourth, on the branching actualism point from my Phil Studies paper:

(a) I think the thrust of our reply remains unaffected even in light of Koons' point about multiple infinite pasts: in order for Koons' argument to succeed, *Koons* would need to *rule out* a branching actualist view which *doesn't* involve multiple infinite pasts (and also doesn't involve these as potential outworkings of the causal powers of actual things). Since he does no such thing, his argument still faces an undercutting defeater.

(b) Additionally, if we’re using as our framework world a world with multiple infinite pasts, then Koons’ argument, at best, could only allow us to conclude that it’s impossible for there to be a world with multiple infinite pasts. It doesn’t follow from this that a single infinite past is impossible.

(c) Finally, branching actualism + multiple infinite pasts *still* conflicts with the patchwork principle as stated in Koons' article, since branching actualism does not allow the *entirety* of *all* of the infinite pasts to have been completely different, and yet the patchwork principle entails the possibility that the entirety of all of the infinite pasts is completely different. So, branching actualism still conflicts with the patchwork principle.

Fifth, Koons says nobody has provided an independent argument for the possibility of infinite causal regresses. But this is simply untrue. Stephen Maitzen has published several arguments for the *actual* existence of an infinite past, which would plausibly involve an infinite causal regress Likewise, in the branching actualism paper, Malpass and I offer several independent arguments for the possibility of an infinite past (and hence, plausibly, the possibility of infinite regresses; in fact, our points apply mutatis mutandis to causal regresses). For instance, infinite pasts are perfectly conceivable, and conceivability is widely taken in philosophy to support possibility. Likewise, an infinite past differs from a finite past merely in degree, and when x is possible and differs from y merely in degree, we plausibly have some reason to think y is likewise possible (see Pruss and Rasmussen for a defense of this principle). Thus, since finite pasts (and finite causal regresses) are possible, we have reason to think infinite pasts (and, likewise, infinite causal regresses) are possible. So Koons is simply mistaken that no one has provided an independent argument for the possibility of infinite causal regresses.

Finally, Koons suggests adding provisos in the patchwork principle that respect causal powers and perhaps other causal principles: roughly, we can infer the possibility of the patched-together world *provided that* such a world does not violate any casual powers and perhaps other casual principles. But if Koons is allowed this dialectical manouevre, then his opponents should equally be allowed an even *more* independently motivated proviso: roughly, we can infer the possibility of the patched-together world *provided that* such a world does not instantiate a narrowly logically impossible (i.e., contradictory) structure. But then Koons' original argument is undermined, since his original patched-together world instantiates precisely that.

[breezyx]

Awesome first episode, Dr koons is the best.