The brain is not a computer. Gödel's incompleteness theorem and brain operation - with Anil Seth

Subscribe if you want more conversations on Theories of Everything, Consciousness, Free Will, God, and the mathematics / physics of each.

[WayneJohn-fqcn]

This dude trying to make a logical argument against the reliability of logic is the most mental gimnastics things I have ever heard 🤣

[hansheymans]

The big difference: the brain is dynamic, open and "infinite", a (classical?) logical theory is static, closed and "finite".

Very, very informally, the GIT says that every formal system has infinitely many blind spots. The fact that we can "see" some of these "hidden truths" is usually blown out of proportion, since the observer can always be replaced by a formal meta-system (see automated proofs of GIT).

If we admit "growing" theories, the difference between theory and life gets smaller. In fact, we are dynamic theories, with infinitely many blind spots, but no truth should be in principle unobtainable.

[ex-cursion]

I feel like Joscha Bach has spoiled me and set the bar too high here. Comparing Anil and Joscha speaking on this topic doesn't even seem fair.

[Havre_Chithra]

My idea is that Godels theorem suggests that human consciousness cannot prove, via a system of formal logic, certain things about itself. The brain is not purely computational but it has the ability to do computations/formal proofs. So it clearly has implications for the mind.

[PhilosophicalTrials]

Prof. Seth is a brilliant neuroscientist, but I’m not convinced that he has engaged properly here with the actual Penrose argument. For example he says that Goedel’s work shows that some systems cannot prove some of their axioms, which is not true (any formal system trivially proves all its axioms) and then he does not really present the anti-mechanistic proposal.

Nonetheless, I agree with his sentiments and final conclusion on the topic. I think the Lucas-Penrose arguments have nothing interesting to say about *actual* human brains (not idealized finite machines etc.). They should not be used, as Penrose does, to make radical claims about the fundamental nature of physical reality or natural selection.

[grantmoe]

it should be made illegal for anybody to cite the incompleteness theorems, with the only exception being logicians. i've lost count how many times poseurs cite it to either sound intellectual or to prove some quack theory, you don't prove something with a mathematical theorem without the mathematical rigour.