Regarding the Modal Ontological Argument

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My Twitter: @MartymerM81
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All logical arguments for the existence of "God" are exactly the same: ' "God" has to exist, otherwise this argument won't work.'

KeplersDream
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logic done well reflects reality-
it never *creates* reality

ericvulgate
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Wouldn't definition 1 at 7:57 end up with everyone being a maximally excellent being? Bill and Ted will be pleased.

Forest_Fifer
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I reject the modal ontological argument right from the definitions--I reject an objectively "wholly good" being can exist as morals always require a value judgement, and are thus subjective.

I also reject omnipotence as incoherent as defined by theists.

munstrumridcully
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To be honest, after years of watching videos where theists' arguments for god are debunked, it just seems so boring nowadays. The fundamental problem that I find is that people are trying to argue/logic a supernatural being into existence... but a logically consistent argument for something is not necessarily evidence for it, is it? What I see is not people trying to examine the world with the scientific method, but rather people trying to convince as many people as possible that fairy tales are real with word games.


Perhaps that is harsh to some, but frankly the subject matter has lost its appeal to me. Come back when you've captured god in a lab.

def
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God is something that exists, therefore god exists.

Also for every “maximally” great being, I can think of one greater, my being is the same as yours and can beat yours in a fight if needed be.

...ok? I didn’t know you can define things into existence, but good to know.

DarthAlphaTheGreat
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This breaks down at Premise 3, because a maximally great being, existing in all worlds, COULD NOT exist in this one. Why? Evil. If the "tri-omni" problem is to be solved, it can't be done by the kind of God that monotheists envision, it just can't. Even if evil is a test that we have to pass, it's entirely unfair to us, which means that that God cannot be maximally good, or else It would at least make the test fair. Besides, if we're talking about the Abrahamic God, "he" already would have set us up to fail by putting two people, who were functionally children, into a garden with the fruit that would make them aware of evil in the first place. In other words, God WANTED them to fail. If that kind of God is all-knowing, "he" would have known that they would fail anyway, so why bother with the test at all? You're a teacher, Marty: if you knew the grade each of your students would get on any test you gave them, would you even bother creating the test? If not, you're already more efficient (and good, quite frankly) than the Arahamic God.

ActiveAdvocate
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Interesting timing. I just finished watching Rationality Rules's video on the Ontological Argument. I get done, I go back to the YouTube homepage and the first video is this one. My first thought was "I didn't know Martymer 81 did a video on that. How did I miss it?" Then I saw "2 Minutes ago" I guess that explains how I missed it. :D

ajhieb
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That was one of the most concise, clear, and educational breakdowns of a god argument I've ever heard. I've known the cosmological argument was bunk for a long time but I couldn't quite put my finger on where the breakdown occurs. Your video nailed it, getting directly to the fulcrum point where the apologist goes from good faith arguing to self-serving manipulation. Outstanding job, thank you so much for this video.

realdjungleskog
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One thing I would have added is that modal possibility just means “self consistent.”

AntiCitizenX
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I always "grant their argument"
I treat it like their hypothesis. Then I ask that they do experimentation, observation, and make sure they attempt to falsify their hypothesis. when they inevitably fail, I let them know I remain unconvinced and remind them you don't choose what to believe, you do or you don't.

Chance
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I'd reccomend the article "does conceivability entail possibility" within the book conceivability and possibility by Clarendon Press Oxford. It goes into detail of the various kinds of ways conceivability can mean possibility and in this case it seems to be the distinction between prima facie conceivability and ideal conceivability. Where prima facie is conceivability with just a regular person (a kid might think it's possible to violate pythagoras theorem because at the surface it doesn't seem like there is a contradiction, they don't know enough) and ideal conceivability is conceivable through an ideal observer (someone who has no capacity for error and that has all the relevant knowledge to adequately assess the topic). There's also the distinction drawn between conceivability where it is conceivable because it doesn't present us with a logical contradiction and conceivability where one can imagine a possible world where such a state could be, that is often two very different things. It's a really interesting article that analyses lots of ways that the world possible could be interpreted.

Like even granting the definition of possible meaning there is a possible world, how would one distinguish a possible world from an impossible world? So you are still stuck with having to define possible.

jhonjacson
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Oh, yeah? Debunk this:
Premise: God exist
Argument: if God exists, God exists
Conclusion: therefore God exists
My argument is perfect

arnouth
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I've talked with some theists in person who used a version of this argument, though not phrased in a formal way. I don't bother with in-depth philosophy or anything, most people don't follow that. When I get served the "it is *possible* that god exists", I ask if they mean possible in the sense that you can *imagine* god exists or in the sense that there is an *empirically grounded reason to believe* that god exists.


Dark matter & energy are my go to examples of the latter, because they are something about reality we know next to nothing about, but we can still tell that *something* is there with a high degree of objectivity.

TheTdroid
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I'm re-watching your old content, and finding out points I missed in my previous lack of philosophical understanding.
This is the best take on "everything logically possible" omnipotence argument I've seen, and I totally missed it on my first go around.

Xgya
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Hell is sometimes defined as a realm completely separate from God, so:
1) God is supposedly a maximally great being.
2) Hell is completely separate from God, meaning that he doesn’t exist there.
3) If God does not exist in all possible realms, then he is not a maximally great being.
There are actually several conclusions, being:
4-a) Therefore, God does not exist.
4-b) Therefore, Hell does not exist.
4-c) Therefore, neither God nor Hell exist.

vereornox
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Imagine that a god could exist

Therefore God exists

Airtight

Altorin
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I cant be the only person who thinks this argument is idiotic? From the first time hearing it up to now, its never striked me as an intelligent argument, just a leap in logic.

For me its like saying.
1. Its possible Harry Potter exists
2. Therefore Harry Potter exists

Im amazed anyone thinks this is a solid argument. Its not slightly convincing

nicosmind
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The easiest way to point out how this argument is flawed is to simply point out the fact, that like any argument for god's existence that posits traits to god prior to establishing god exists in the first place, is question begging and fallacious by default.

Only things which exist have traits. I contend with the proposition that god exists. To say god has trait X, Y and Z as a response to that to set up an argument is meaningless. If he doesn't exist, he has no traits.

Granted the point of the exercise is to demonstrate that god must be a feature of reality because the opposite is logically impossible or incoherent, the problem is that the argument is a nonsequitor in that regard.

While you might, on the surface, appear to make a syllogism that demonstrate god must exist by virtue of his traits, the fundamental problem is that while I might accept for the sake of argument that said traits would entail god, the fact is that the real burden would be to demonstrate that the state of reality necessitate god having said traits.
If it isn't necessary for god to have said traits (it isn't, because it's logically possible that no god exists), then the fact that the traits would necessarily entail a god is an impotent conclusion.

More clearly put :
Even if I grant that being maximally great would entail existence, there's no reason to necessarily accept that god is maximally great, because the alternative, that he simply doesn't exist, is still on the table.

To say reply and say "Well, god is maximally great BY DEFINITION" betrays the ultimately hollow nature of this argument.
Definitions only become descriptive post observation. The definition used for god, since his existence is in question, is not descriptive. It's prescriptive.

We don't say that dogs are the way they are by virtue of how we define them.
The only category we generally treat the way apologists treat god, are concepts.
Democracy is the way it is, purely as a matter of definition.
You would not argue that democracy exists the same way as dogs do, and you would not say that the fact that we defined and now act out democracy gives it the same epistemological quality as dogs, rocks or stars.

Herein lies the ultimate conceit and idiocy of religious apologetics.
Treating the existence of something thought of as a concrete, treating it like a concept and engaging in verbal gymnastics that only appear to make a lick of sense to people who can't see that the rabbit is no longer in the hat.

It's all just pointless word games.

hian
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I love your videos bro. Hope to see more in the future!

TeamSkeptic