Metaethics 5 - Subjectivism 2

In this video, I examine two universalist forms of subjectivism: ideal observer theory and (more briefly) divine command theory.

[ChPonsard]

I found it amusing to hear you give objections to ideal observer theory by crafting a more ideal observer!

It actually seems like a virtue ethics stance to try to adopt an attitude in which we think about what an ideal observer is, and how we can try to embody that ideal.

[gabrielpanisson]

I always thought of the ideal observer as a mere theoretical tool for explaining why our moral values should be 'these' and not 'that'. In this sense, I've always thought of it as an objectivist view, not as an actual subjectivist theory. Now I'm having second thoughts about that.

[kravitzn]

Why would a god-like being care about what humans do? Do we humans care about what ants do?

[joehodson]

Not saying I subscribe to ideal observer theory but would like some more info on your view as to why we should dismiss a metaethical view on the ground that it has normative implications - surely it is a fallacy to reject an argument on the basis of its conclusion rather than its merits?

[e]

Your videos are extremely informative.

[robinharwood]

“God’s nature is such that he would not command the torture of children” is not a satisfactory defence.
Could God’s nature have been be different, so that he would command the torture of children? (I am not suggesting that his nature could change, but that it was always such.)
If we say “Yes”, then it is just luck that he is a kind God. This makes morality based on his nature arbitrary.
If we say “No”, then some quasi-logical/ethical principle constrains his nature. God is not sovereign, and morality is based not on God but on the principle that makes him kind.

[adamthornton]

What about a combination of ideal observer theory, and individual subjectivism; i.e. saying "Slavery is wrong." would mean something like "If I were to be directly confronted with the real reality of what slavery is like, then I would feel morally repelled by it."? Is there a name for theories like this?

[Tschoo]

Have you ever thought about sharing your videos on reddit? I think you might find a bigger audience there!

[markkuykendall]

So emotivism is "Divine Command" theory except that all sentient beings have the authority rather than a single uber-sentient.

[italogiardina]

Its hard to understand why I would not trust the judgement of a professional astrologer on the grounds of interest in the field as a studies of religion as astrology is for example on the subcontinent a practice dating from Vedic times and China from early dynasties. So it seems the ideal observer is a person who has designated powers assigned through a cultural set of values like Asian values or Western values or African values in the case of voodoo. Science has peer review to set the value and ideal observers are cited as Nobel laureates. The ideal observer about morality seems to function through a similar peer review mechanism where people in the justice department or academics on criminology are cited as what ought to happen once society witnesses acts of horrific violence. These institutionally activated persons don't claim people ought to behave in a better way but how to mitigate moral harms through detection of persons who might be predisposed to act in ways that are vulnerable to amoralism on the most violent end of the spectrum. It seems there is no one ideal observer but rather an ideal observer institution that has the methodology to be an ideal observer although may fall short of the task. Institutions act in a manner not attributed to conventional persons yet have the tone and omniscient charism when beamed through mass media via the state.

[abadjpyo]

very impressed by you understanding the nature of God point for morality. However, I do not think that moral oughts would be arbitrary if that were the case, in that God acts not according to random whim, but his nature.

I have a question. I understand that subjectivist and emotivist belief systems are ultimately arbitrary, regarding claims of moral objectivity. Is that right? For the subjectivist position, I'm assuming moral truth is not objective, but imaginary. I'm aware that a subjectivist would claim otherwise, but without good reason.

For the emotivist, just emotion.

[saimbhat]

Kane B. I think you didn't present a good defense for religious morality. Not that religious morality is any special, but you didn't strongman it, given that you started it with stating that you disagree with it.