Metaethics 2 - Emotivism

In this video, I examine emotivism. I look at A.J. Ayer and C. L. Stevenson's defences of emotivism, and then outline a number of objections to the theory.

[aidanclare]

Underrated series. I feel like this is one of those rare playlists that more people should see. You explains these concepts so well. Well done.

[anthonylearnsguitar]

Hi, I just want to express my gratitude to you for making this video. I was reading Miller's Contemporary Intro to Metaethics and it was honestly quite technical at times. Thanks for simplifying the core of the arguments and various objections. Appreciate it, keep making videos!  

[philp]

Zappa AND free jazz within one minute? Hell yeah.

[elcaricaturable]

Nice explanation. Concerning the Frege-Geach Problem, I think moral statements can be similar to statements about game rules. For example, you can say: "In chess, you cannot win by taking the king, " what this really means is that the rules you use to play chess and the rules you suppose most people use to play chess imply that you cannot win by taking the king. Of course, some people may use other rules and they can disagree with you. Hence, it is not an absolute truth, it is just a social convention you happen to agree with. That doesn't mean it is not important.

[NS-woze]

Thank you for your insight. You have helped me to rethink and understand this subject.

[thisaccountisdead]

Thanks for putting this video together. It really helped me out. Although I only came to your channel because of your latest dating video - I'm just kidding, sorry... ...Although actually I first ecountered the dilemma of the Frege-Geach Problem discussed in this video in relation to issues with transgender people at the moment - so I don't know whether this is relevant to your dating quest? Cheers.

[cuntcant]

Thanks for the video! Very informative.

Didn't get the «If emotivism is correct, then the meaning of moral statements changes in unasserted contexts» part though. Why is that?

I don't get why we can't paraphrase the aforementioned argument:
P1) If I boo murder, then I boo paying somebody for murder.
P2) I boo murder
C)I boo paying somebody for murder

Thanks in advance to anyone who replies

[maxmusti]

18:00

It's rather like this:

1. I am disgusted.
2. I ask myself: Why am I disgusted ?
3. Then reason comes in. Not before that. Now disgust is an emotion that comes about when I am worried about my hygiene. Is this a reasonable reaction in this context ? Of course not. Why would I be worried about their hygiene ? I would maybe worry about their soul if I were to be a christian. But being disgusted is thus not right. It's better to pitty them. This makes it more likely to save his soul because it generates helping behaviour.

[rekhatripathi]

Thankyou so much for your channel and its videos on Philosophy. It's been a great help, thankyou again and best wishes for future progress 👍😍

[lincolnpeters]

Are all definitions not defined by what they relate to?(ie circular)25:25

[yungpesto]

Such a helpful video, thanks. One question, would you not define guilt as a moral emotion? Referring to your slide around 25:00.

[igorwysockiwysocki]

Dear Kane B, and how do you find Gibbard's (1998) take on the validity of moral inferences? He resorted to those possible worlds being a combination of facts and norms and tried to propose a sort of semantics that would account for the apparent validity of inferences. Are you aware of that? I vaguely remember that was a rather obscure theory and I DO remember Sinnott-Armstrong purportedly demolished it in his "Moral Skepticism". Best of luck!

[maryzhen]

thank you for the video, I have a question.
can we apply the Jorgenson's Dilemma to other emotions?
P1: I kick the baby if I am angry
P2: I am angry
C: I kick the baby

in this example, we have no problem of whether anger is an emotion: it clearly is.
and since emotion can't be true and false, this argument expresses nothing. (really? I think in this example, being in a mental state of anger can be true or false)
Yet, we don't conclude that anger is not an emotion.
so why does this Dilemma damage emotivism?

[sopheebolgz]

Your videos are super helpful, thank you!

[zbigniewsuszkiewicz]

emotion starts to be seen as moral in specific social context - see Lisa Barett

[localman]

I don’t really understand the Frege-Geach problem. I think you could just substitute “murder is wrong” in each of those examples with “licorice tastes bad” and you could make the exact same argument, even though it’s obvious that that proposition is expressing an attitude.

[italogiardina]

It's not clear that responding to someone playing free jazz as being wrong is bizarre given ostriziazatiton is an implicit null operator placement for the exclamatory explicit utterance 'you're wrong'. This can be of no problem if a person chooses another interest group but it would be buzzer if that person stayed in the group advocating dislike for free jazz and the get what other members claim is justified forms of exclusionary behaviour like the credulous stare which could be quantified statistically through political community penalise through proximity of member to member operations within a cohort of participants in the game which in this case is like free jazz or not like free jazz. So emotivism accounts for a broad range of disagreement as push-back through self evaluation operations within in- group dynamics (new groups are ideal like cancer groups) that go under the radar of speech acts. Moral emotions count as a non moral emotion as it (whatever the emotional like to dislike binary) operates in a group to excite a leader who equivocates into making a speech act that is an expression of group sentiment as in all in favour say moo (group think conjures invalid statements through leader but is a sound argument as it expresses true sentiments of the group at a point in time) and that is a non moral emotion which is democracy. The principle of deference to a leader gets rid of the moral burden on members as an internal contradiction.

[Hecatonicosachoron]

Interesting and instructive video, thank you for making it and posting. I do have an issue to raise wrt the embedding problem - why is cognitivism to be opposed at all costs by the emotivists? In other words we can consider the following argument

If I feel elated I jump on the spot; I feel elated; therefore I am jumping on the spot.

Now there is little doubt that there the second premise has an emotive meaning that is lacking in the conditional (or any other composite proposition incorporating it); however in addition to expressing an emotion that proposition also describes the fact that I have an emotion. In that way it can be used consistently in arguments. In fact, any we can construct a declarative statement out of a statement of any modality and use that to suit our purposes. I believe all this is similar to objection 3 in the video; but it seems that the most serious objections to emotivism can be resolved by watering down the commitment to non-cognitivism, but without abandoning the idea that a the most distinctive aspect of ethical terms is their emotive nature.

I also do not see how claiming that ethical claims function simultaneously as expressions of attitudes and beliefs about attitudes contradicts the verification principle; for one may simply witness one's own emotions by simple introspection and so might have knowledge of whether they arise or not in particular situations.

[ivarjohansson]

Great videos! Do you have an email for further discussion?

[cecilyontheweb]

This was really helpful. one question related to Jorgenson's dilemma. is it true that an argument can't be VALID if it's propositions aren't truth apt or is it simply that it can never be sound?