Japan’s Commercial Jet Failure

After six delays, 10+ years of development, and nearly $9 billion (1 trillion yen) spent, Mitsubishi announced in 2020 that development on its Mitsubishi Regional Jet or the SpaceJet would be frozen.

Since then, the program has yet to be revived. Mitsubishi Aircraft, the subsidiary developing the plane, has cut staff and is now insolvent. It currently operates with a skeleton crew.

It is a tough break for Japan's first indigenous commercial aircraft in nearly half a century. In this video we look back at what happened to the Mitsubishi Regional Jet.

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[Fey]

I shall compliment on the deep research made for the subject. As someone who works in this industry allow me to make a few observations:
1- The decision to not use composite materials has more to do with technical issues rather than supply chain issues. This was publicized at the time through a technical paper on composites by some specialists at Mitsubishi.
Carbon composite is not the panacea everybody seems to think when it comes to building strong lightweight structures. It makes sense on a large span structure like a Boeing 787 wings, but on a much smaller regional jet, geometric constraints becomes a hurdle. Smaller wings with ailerons, engines, winglets, flaps, slats, spoilers and fuselage junction all much closer to each other than on a larger airplane, makes it difficult to calculate load paths precisely, begging for more composite laminates to be applied to compensate for that uncertainty. In fact it is possible that with technologies of those days, a composite regional jet would weight almost the same as an aluminum one.
Another reason to not use composite structures might be a commercial decision. Small regional jets are not operated just by large legacy airlines who have plenty of maintenance infra-structure with professionals trained on the latest technology. It is not uncommon for these jets to be operated by small local airline even in undeveloped countries without knowledge of how to fix a composite damage.
2- While it is very true supply issues posed an obstacle to Mitsubishi due to its lack of financial influence like those of Boeing or Airbus, this problem is very present for Bombardier and Embraer as well. One cannot use this as reason for its many program delays which were mainly lack of technical knowledge in certification.
3- Some people call it hubris, others call it lack of international perspective. Either way, in my opinion the directors at Mitsubishi should have hired much more foreign technical consultants at the program inception for lower cost rather than inflating at the end of the program. It is imperative for any aircraft manufacturer to have rapport with the certification authority from early stages to discuss how they intend to test and prove their product is safe. By 2016, Mitsubishi was in desperate mode having spent lots of money building an uncertifiable plane, and they would bleed much more money hiring lots of engineers who got laid off by Bombardier, to try to save it. Problem is those foreign engineers were not interested in concluding the project so fast in order to keep receiving top dollar salaries for as long as possible. Finally program managers at Mitsubishi made a crucial error in delegating many of the certification procedures to foreign parties without making the effort to learn themselves how to do it.

[drscopeify]

I think the issue is that Mitsubishi went in too big all at once. Honda is taking a much smarter approach making small business and executive style aircraft and from there they can expand from a solid foundation. Companies like Embraer and Bombardier started small as well.

[pepoqoio]

Imagine how frustrating it feels to work for a aircraft program, invest 15 years of your life for something that will never sell.

[ArnaudMEURET]

This “wiring documentation” issue is typical of Japan’s mind-boggling reliance on paper and unscalable obscure internal processes. So many stories are circulating among expat engineers about “antiquated methodologies from the 1980s” that were actually newly formed in the last 5 years.

[keitatsutsumi]

This sounds like completely inept pre-planning for the project... I don't understand how they could so severely underestimate the development of a new airplane, and even more so the required supply-chain sourcing for that airplane. Did they just not do enough research and consultation??

[L-estroilluminato]

Wish the best for MHI. I’m an aerospace engineering student in Montreal and we know that they acquired our CRJ program primarily because MRJ was struggling. Hope CRJ can bring them a better future.

[juliussokolowski]

Great analysis. I really wondered what happened to that whole project. Just one thing, we don't call them "main wings" and "rear wings". It's just "wings"... that thing in the back is called the "horizontal stabilizer". That vertical one is called.. supprise, supprise... the "vertical stabilizer" or just "fin"...

[stevedimartino]

I wish this company best of luck they suffered enough and they need a huge break now, good luck guys all the best👍

[miraphycs]

yes this thing was stuck in bureaucratic regulatory nightmare. So this thing will never really fly. But then the same regulatory board allowed the 737 Max to certify and fly so it makes you wonder....

[stevens]

I worked for Honda a long time ago and let me tell you, I was hoping since 2006 when Mitsubishi announced this program that they would succeed. We need new competition besides Boeing in this world. I like to see Japanese companies get more success.

[primzilledingyv]

such a beautuful plane and it will not be used by airlines.Never saw a more good looking regional jet than the Mitsubishi

[Trevor_Austin]

When the project was started the aircraft envisaged was already too small. A regional airliner needs to be 80-120 people. Be quick to load and unload, quick and easy to clean, not burn too much fuel, have HUGE lockers and not weigh too much. Low take-off and landing speeds really help. High cruise speed is not important but good airbrakes are. At six to eight flights a day a few cheeky, short visual approaches saves tens of thousands every day. This elegant aircraft had none of these attributes.

[andrebalsa]

Really good video and analysis. Thank you for producing it.

[johniii]

The bottom line, is they didn't have the internal capability to manage such a project. They are better off being a supplier rather than trying to design and build and aircraft from the ground up.

[oadka]

Its crazy to think that in the aviation industry, China outdid Japan. But the lack of documentation at such a big company is very hard to stomach, given that even student design clubs insist on sufficient documentation. One can only imagine how broken the program management must have been. This has parallels with the Saturn V not having welding documentation because the welders simply had no time to do so.

[yohannessulistyo]

The MRJ really tried to combine the best of CRJ (of Canada's Bombardier) and E-Jets (of Brazil's Embraer).
E-Jets has "stacked double bubble" fuselage design, allowing passengers to stand upright in the cabin, and male passenger to stand comfortably while peeing in the lavatory. The lower half of the bubble left enough room for under floor cargo hold. The drawback is of course, the bigger fuselage area footprint, meaning greater form drag, resulting fuel efficiency penalty. Airlines however, could still recover some revenue by utilising the ample cargo space for extra revenue.
CRJ has a very slim fuselage, initially intended for private jet cabin (Bombardier Challenger series). The cabin is very cramped, but its smaller fuselage frontal area, makes it more fuel efficient. The drawback is of course, there is not enough underfloor let alone overhead baggage space, so, they have to utilise a chunk of the rear aft section of the aircraft.
MRJ has CRJ's slightly modified single bubble fuselage (leaving no underfloor cargo space), but tall enough like the E-jets for passengers to stand in the cabin. The baggage hold is to the rear of the aircraft, just like the CRJ. They aim to get E-jet's pasenger satisfaction while getting airline's approval for CRJ's fuel efficiency.
The major problem is of course with the material and electronics that discussed in this video. Boeing struggled massively with 787, its first composite-majority plane. It was delayed for 3 years, and still experiencing delivery delays due to production problem to this day. Airbus is also experiencing paint and coating problem with its sophisticated Airbus A350 (something that Boeing 787 also experienced in lesser degree - at least for Air New Zealand) thanks to some problems with its composite material too. The new Chinese COMAC C919 has to let go quite a lot of composite parts, and gets quite a weight penalty as a result, it couldn't get further than 5, 000 km unlike its contemporary rivals.
Mitsubishi definitely choose the very ambitious undertaking indeed. Embraer already had a headstart with its E-Jets, and now struggling with its E-Jets E2 iteration, because most of its E-Jets are still brand new and turns out to be quite reliable no airline is seeking replacement yet. Bombardier regional jets went bankrupt over its CS-series, despite government subsidy, and the program was sold to Airbus, rebranded as A220. The CRJ program was sold to Mitsubishi, and the Dash-8Q400 series back to DeHavilland Canada.

[Neeboopsh]

you are cranking out fantastic content.

[ScottGammans]

What a shame. Such a beautiful machine. The wiring debacle just blows my mind. Great video!

[RM-elgw]

Excellent. Love all your videos! Your narration is great.

[francesconicoletti]

Sounds a lot like Mitsubishi management went into this not knowing what they didn’t know. If they understand how much they needed to get up to speed on modern aircraft development they could have piloted with a much smaller aircraft, got their design systems sorted out developing that and then gone full scale.