Willard V. O. Quine - Two Dogmas of Empiricism

Quine's 1951 paper Two Dogmas of Empiricism is well-known for attacking the analytic-synthetic distinction and for being one of the most influential papers in analytic philosophy. In this video, I explain the argumentative (or rather: non-argumentative) structure of Quine's paper, consider on what grounds distinctions can be attacked, clarify the relation between Quine and Kant, explain the empiricist background against which Quine is working, and explain why the article could have so much impact.

[maxgravenstein]

0:00 - Introduction
6:45 - Why Quine Isn't Encountering Kant
16:20 - 6 Ways to Attack a Distinction
21:43 - Quine's "Special" Attack on the Analytic/Synthetic Distinction
23:40 - Disingenuous Structure of Two Dogmas of Empiricism
32:39 - What is Quine Doing in Sec. I-IV
34:24 - Section III: Explanation of Interchangeability Salva Veritate
37:49 - Intensional vs. Extensional Languages
43:16 - Second Dogma of Reductionism
49:14 - Empiricism Without The Dogma
56:24 - Summary

[Phi]

What had impressed me most when I first read the paper (as an undergrad) was Quine's attack on the idea that individual empirical propositions could be verified/disproven in an isolated manner.
I had never thought that idea could be challenged.

[sharon]

I've been checking your lectures on the Leiden University channel and it's really nice to see your own space now. Your lectures are very helpful. Thanks so much!

[jorgemachado]

I'm really glad you created a channel. You lessons are amazing

[nicholasmichaelravnikar]

Wonderful treatment.

I find it interesting that Quine emphasizes “truths” where Kant emphasizes “judgments.” I appreciate you bringing this to light.

FWIW - I would argue that all ethno-nationalists are racists, but not all racists are ethno-nationalists.

[aifutrivitch]

these videos really help with getting through philosophical ideas. thanks a lot!

[harlowcj]

Thanks for summarizing Jay Dyer's favorite paper.

[filozofiapoprostu]

Thank you so much for your lectures, they are extremely helpful and really pleasant to learn from! Many thanks :)

[Aristos_Arete]

So interchangeability can only be achieved when there is an equality of extension among subject and predicate then. For example: if we take two subjects 'bachelor' and 'unmarried man', and a predicate, 'has eight letters', the predicate's extension would be a word itself, and thus only the subjects which have eight letters in their words will fit the predicate and so interchageability can be achieved. Because obviously the refferent of the predicate is the number of letters in a word. Also, interchangeability has in itself implied the notion reciprocity, so this fits well.

[MaartenVHelden]

I am curious and see some loose connections I hope you might want to elucidate a bit, or make suggestions on how to elucidate them myself. 1) The web of believes concept seems to resonate with Lakatos' research programmes in the sense that he also speaks of core concepts and peripheral concepts in a scientific theory, that need to change somehow to fit empirical findings; 2) the concept also seem akin to the neural network theories in cognitive neuroscience and AI; 3) The idea that the structure of believes needs to be changed in order to fit empirical data seems reminiscent of Piagetian concepts like accommodation in his theories of cognitive development. I am wondering if Quine was having these kind of concepts in mind when he invented the concept of web of believes?

[richardjosephson]

Hmm; I thought "creature with a heart" vs "kidney" was pointing out the semantic distinction as in "he has allot of heart" which makes sense, wherein "he has allot of kidney" wouldn't

[jordanh]

Thank you so much for these lectures, they are awesome!

[stephenwarren]

Awesome discussion ... extremely helpful!

[quintoncarroll]

Could you summarize in a short paragraph how Quine addressed the analytic-synthetic distinction?

[martinbennett]

Have I understood correctly? - Quine thinks that all a priori understanding is analytic, true by definition, and that the property of being analytic inevitably involves circular reasoning, for which an empirical observation is required to escape the circularity.

This would seem to me to invoke a particularly restricted definition of a priori, which ignores that the certainty of some kinds of knowledge is increased by further observations whereas other knowledge which could be categorised as synthetic a priori do not become more certain with more observations. An example of the latter would be that the interior angles of a triangle add up to a straight line: without knowing or understanding the proof, repeated observations might indeed make this seem more certain, but with the proof observation is superfluous. I would like to know whether Quine addresses this distinction.

[garylovan]

Enjoyed the talk! I am still confused about Quine's big idea in section 6. I can avoid saying (not judging?) that the person who was to clean my apartment failed to do so after coming home to find my apartment messy only by assuming other facts: for example, someone (improbably) came into my apartment and messed it up after the cleaner had done his work. Is this a clear illustration of Quine’s idea? It seems to depend on “alternate facts” (subject to refutation as single claims), not alternate meanings or concepts. As such it is hard not to assume that there is a ‘fact of matter’ here. The terms – my apartment, clean, messy, etc. – seem to be shared, seem impossible not to share.
'Is my niece married (a lesbian union)?' I say she is; my friend says she isn’t, because as an evangelical Christian for him a necessary condition for a union to be a marriage is that it be between a man and a woman. Now here the truth depends on the meaning of marriage, and that meaning is only intelligible in a larger web of beliefs; both my friend and I would have to make major changes in our belief webs to change our position. That example comes to mind thinking about Quine.
My problem: I have always had trouble applying Quine’s idea to factual matters, since the meaning of ‘my apartment’ and ‘to clean my apartment’ can’t really mean different things without losing touch with reality altogether (e.g. believing we live in The Matrix). Of course there is vagueness with what it means to have cleaned my apartment; but in the example, the cleaner apparently did not show up at all: either he did or he didn't. Yes, that depends on other beliefs, I guess: there is a world of objects, etc. I could believe all conscious life is a dream, and thus my belief that there is a fact of the matter here does depend on beliefs that are not even in principle testable - is that what he means?

[quintoncarroll]

You have been so helpful in my philosophy of science nursing class. I wish you could Zoom with me an my classmate just to say hello.

[christofeles]

Did Putnam or Rorty appreciate the flimsiness of Quine's argument against the analytic-synthetic distinction?

[williammcenaney]

All events have a cause? Does that mean that someone or something causes a group of event or that event in the group has some cause or other? If it means that the group has a cause, some group members, might be uncaused.

[AdrienLegendre]

In quantum physics, all events due not have a cause. There are probabilistic outcomes that do not have an underlying cause.