Quine's Demonstration of the Circularity of Analyticity

This video looks at part of Quine's famous paper "Two Dogmas of Empiricism" particularly focusing on the critique of the circularity of analyticity.

This series looks at whether the necessary vs contingent, analytic vs synthetic, and a priori vs a posteriori distinctions actually can map onto each other and if they are even useful with the arguments of Immanuel Kant, W. V. O Quine, and Saul Kripke.

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Information for this video gathered from The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, The Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy and more! (#Language #TwoDogmas)

[muazhassan]

It saddens me that this channel doesn't have more subscribers- keep up the great work!

[raffae]

The statement about Bubacar uses the word 'widower' (by which I mean it makes reference to the concept signified by the word). The statement ”the word 'widower' has 7 letters” refers to the word 'widower' and not the concept denoted by the term. Isn't it ingenious and perhaps fallacious to equivocate the two uses of the word when not only do they express different things, they also refer to different things? In other words, in the counterargument are we really interchanging 'widower' and 'man whose spouse has died' salve veritate?

[lilli]

Helped a lot with my understanding of this paper, thank you!

[isac]

Although I don't always agree on your approach to exposing some of the theories or with your own views, I do feel impelled to express how much I admire and respect your will and effort to share this content in the platform.
It is of great value to expand the reach of questions and thoughts, and I think it is immensely honourable of you to have dedicated your time and mind to offer your contribution.
Thank you so very much, as someone benefiting from your great work 🌺

[kingj]

"Two Dogmas of Empiricism" is really clear and well-written --would recommend

[rhythmandacoustics]

Analyticity = the use of symbols to simply and divide concepts. An extension of Synthetic argument showed by demonstration such as a Triangle is defined as a polygon having 3 angles and 3 sides, which is showed by drawing a triangle, which is synthetic since you have drawn it to show it.

[clumsydad]

I didn't realize until now how it appears Wittgenstein and Quine had similar ideas on language and the limitations of what can be clearly and unambiguously stated, which is extremely little if anything.

[brainbodybites]

Yes we can, because on a conceptual level the distinction between analytic and synthetic statements just can’t be diluted like that. Consider an example, (1+1=2) is an analytic statement based on concept i.e pure math whereas at the same time, (1 drop+1 drop= Another bigger drop) which is a pure fact, you see. Quoting Strawson here- Quine has oversimplified the distinction between the nature of two statements than really it is, can’t hold water for practical purposes.

[wynlararinue]

Can we define synonyms as words that can be used salve veritate when not referring to themselves? Words are referential, and a word can either refer to itself or it's designated object. Let's call these two usages natural and self-referential. The word bachelor naturally refers to an unmarried man, but in apposition with the word 'word', it becomes self referential. So in the sentence, "the bachelor is tall", 'bachelor' refers naturally to an unmarried man. But in the sentence, "the word bachelor has eight letters", 'bachelor' refers to itself. The word 'word' thus has the special property of being able to change a word from functioning naturally to self-referentially. So we can say that words are synonymous if, when used naturally, they can be swapped salve veritate. Is there any problem there?

[danienglish]

Brushing up on philosophy and wondering if any philosopher (of language in particular) has addressed explicitly that, in a sense, all declarative statements can be considered synthetic as language is (by definition) arbitrary?

Thanks for your work on this channel!

[luisesparza]

Quine said there are two kinds of analytics, by it´s logical form: all mice are mice, no birds are non-birds and synonymy, all bachelors are unmarried man. But doesn´t "all dogs are animals" get to be analytic as well? dog´s extension it´s covered by animal´s extension, but doesn´t happen this in the other direction, but that doesn´t matter meanwhile the statement is "all dogs are animals" and not "all animals are dogs", the first one get´s explained by it´s own concept, right? therefore, analytic. I might be wrong, but why Quine did recognize only "by it´s logical structure" and "synonymy" statements as analytic? i don´t think dog is a synonymy for animal, belongs to it, just that.

[robertwilsoniii]

Quine didn't understand situational context, and couldn't handle the possibility that everything is subjective or conventional besides sense perception -- but it is.

[qnu]

Quine should define what he means when he says "define" or else Im afraid I will not be able to understand him.

[viio]

Structuralism offers the best resolution in that it defines analytical reasoning between cultural patterns and cognitive behaviors. I say bachelor and cannot mean ‘unmarried woman’ because a woman is not a man. Therefore we create a new word which is widow.

[epiphaniesjuxtapozed]

this is why you don't always let zero into your vocabulary

[MrDidgeridooo]

Easy solution: Two words that have an actual extension (not support words like "and", "but", "though"... ) are synonymous if their extensions are identical.
If we describe something by using statements containing different words with an extension of their own like in Quine's example, they are synonymous if the extensions of these individual words are also identical. And if not, like in the case of hearts and livers, they do not share synonymy while the statements that contain them can still have the same extension.

[davidgamble]

You said this article is available for free online. I only find paid versions. Help? Thanks.

[StephenPaulKing]

A system of minds that can somehow come to agree on the implications of semantic content might offer sufficient support for analysity and many other concepts, but this proposal requires a degree of fortitude that Quine did not demonstrate... Why not go back to earlier theories of mind and ontology proposals and reevaluate them given our modern understanding? We can revive Leibnizian Modads and Cartesian dualism IFF we can fix their ontological support. Entire classes of Theories of the World that rest on irredeemable ontologies can then be rendered into the circular file.😎😇

[shikhardwivedi]

Don't you think 'has a heart' and 'has a kidney' are intensions since they define the properties of a human being?

[williammcenaney]

There's another problem with defining "brother" as a male sibling. Human females with gender dysphoria believe they're men. So, a female with gender dysphoria may think she's a brother. If dictionary writers redefine "brother, " that word will get a new sense.

Since I'm an an analytic Thomist, so I usually agree with St. Thomas Aquinas. I'm also an essentialist. I believe people, places, and things have essences or natures. They have properties that make them what they are. For example, a dog's essential properties cause that animal to be a dog. An object's essence distinguishes the object from everything else. Dogs descend from wolves, but dogs aren't wolves.

Though Quine believes there are necessary truths, I wonder whether he thinks there are essences. Since he believes logically necessary truths are actual, he must know how to define "logical necessity." Since he's an empiricist, he may disagree with me when I say logical necessity is a metaphysical property.

Either way, I suggest the law of noncontradiction is a metaphysical principle. You can produce a liar sentence when you treat the LNC as a merely semantic principle. "I am lying now" is a liar sentence. It represents a proposition that's true if and only if it's false. But Aristotle and St. Thomas Aquinas avoid that paradox with another definition of the LNC. They tell us nothing can simultaneously be and not be in the same respect.