Why I'm not a quasi-realist

[KaneB]

I probably should have edited this one down. Couldn't be bothered. You'll just have to watch it in 2x speed!

[porteal]

you've got the hegel hairdo in this one

[orangereplyer]

I think the problem is with the implicature.

For the deflationist, speaking literally, I think the problem is with the implicature.

For the deflationist, speaking literally, the statement "A star is made of an ideal gas." means same as the statement "It is true that a star is made of an ideal gas." But the implicature is different.

When you say that X is true (and you're not just using true as a useful quantifier, as in "everything she said is true"), you're "stomping your foot", so to speak, which you wouldn't want to do when idealizing. So the pragmatics of true might not be deflationary, but its semantics might be.

That's not something I found in the literature or anything; it's just a response I thought of.

[sethlee]

Hey! I’ve really enjoyed your content and it's helped me deepen not only my philosophical understanding and worldview but also my academic ambitions (neuroscience and psychology)! I've seen that a lot of your content/lectures tend to be heavily focused on naturalism, empiricism, and philosophy of science (and _maybe_ pragmatism? I only assume so based on your talks on instrumentalism haha! Correct me if I'm wrong on anything!), which is really nice for me since, I’m strongly a naturalist, and your content on empiricism has developed my empirical world outlook! I was once a scientific realist, but now I’m mostly an instrumentalism/pragmatism since it makes the most sense, for me, when making analytical assessments, accurate predictions, and empirical results at my work, as I'm currently a therapist at a children’s psych hospital, and I've had to familiarize myself with Steven C. Hayes’ functional contextualism (mix of pragmatism and contextualism) philosophy to guide patients through acceptance and commitment therapy. And your content on instrumentalism and empiricism has _also_ helped me to deeper understand my practice by quite a bit! Thank you for your wonderful content!

I also enjoy that you make great lectures and meditations on such topics as cosmology, misanthropy, pessimism, modal logic, agnosticism, skepticism, and many others. But that has got me thinking that you don't seem like you’re much into rationalism, existentialism, or idealism (of course, I could be wrong). So, I was just wondering, what are your views on topics such as dialectics or phenomenology? I’m mostly asking because, recently, I’ve finally gotten around to beginning to understand G.W.F. Hegel and his content almost seems like it’d be a topic you’d lecture on haha! Dialectics, particularly Hegelian dialectics (applied to naturalism rather Hegel’s idealism), has played a major role in my line of thought thus far, and since empiricism plays a major role in the Hegelian dialectical process, I was wondering what your thoughts were, since you seem to strongly favor empiricism! Thank you!

Also, I know you did a video on Galen Strawson’s panpsychism, but I haven't been able to get to that one quite yet, so I was curious if your favor panpsychism or materialism, since, as far as I know, both are equally as empirically verifiable.

[orangereplyer]

Also, what you said about the politician is kind of how I feel about non-reductive physicalism and some compatibilists 😅

[HudBug]

“If we didn't disapprove of slavery, then slavery wouldn't be wrong.”

I’m not really sure how this could even catch the realist intuition that this is false. If in some hypothetical world everyone, including the slaves, didn’t disapprove of enslavement, why would a realist claim it is wrong?

[eapooda]

Hey Kane do you think you could make a video SOLELY dedicated video for Companions in Guilt?

[Giantcrabz]

Colorblind amateur philosopher here. Not quite sure to do about the Mary's Room / qualia problem. Maybe it cannot be solved in language

[Farumert]

Didn't you have a discord btw? Or is it just me?

[Zagg]

“Because that’s the way that we do things here, now”. Where “we”, “here”, and “now” refer to a group, a place, and a time.

[exalted_kitharode]

Yeah I listened conference about Sellars where discussants pointed out that deflationists must direct their efforts on adequate account of assertion, which they mostly don't, something along these lines.

[yuriarin]

I want to stop at 16:00 to comment that a lot of deflationists-esque philosophers like Blackburn and Huw Price have been influenced by Rorty and Davidson. Rorty explicitly said he wanted to ditch any notion of philosophical discussion trying to get 'something' right', he didn't believed there was anything for philosophers to get right about. That's why he named one of his philosophical papers volumes 'Philosophy as Cultural Politics', he saw philosophy as a sort of literary genre where we concern ourselves on how to make apparently conflicting vocabularies and conceptual tools compatible, to find compromise, happy redescriptions, etc. So yeah, to some guys philosophers should become 'sort of' politicians.

[philosophicalmixedmedia]

Political theory often observes that assertions within authoritarian structures are subject to a hierarchy of truth. In such systems, truth is determined not by empirical evidence or objective merit, but by the pronouncements of those in power.

This creates a quasi-realist environment, where the political system operates as an absolutist state with top-down control. Individuals within this state must constantly gauge their position relative to others. If they perceive themselves as lower in the hierarchy, their own beliefs, even if objectively true, cannot be validated within the system.

This means that even if someone demonstrates a truth through meritocratic means, their findings may be dismissed if they are not in a position of authority. Thus, to survive and thrive within an absolutist state, individuals must adopt a quasi-realist stance, aligning their beliefs with those of the ruling class.

The more convincingly a subordinate embraces this quasi-realism, the better their chances of improving their own standard of living and that of their family. This acceptance of subjective truth extends beyond object facts and permeates interpersonal relationships, creating a social realism where individuals prioritize maintaining the appearance of conformity over pursuing objective truth.

In essence, living within an absolutist state necessitates a compromise on personal beliefs and a prioritization of social standing. This can lead to a distortion of truth and a suppression of individual expression, as people adapt to the demands of the system to ensure their own well-being.

[ihossi]

Kane, your hair at this length is perfect.

[benayakoren]

It seem to me that moral discourse is somewhat similar to legal discourse, in that people are playing a word game that sounds like propositions, they feel like they are making propositions, but they wouldn't sign up to any concrete physical or metaphysical interpretation of what exactly they are saying. So that noncognitivism is wrong because they do mean to assert, but error theory is wrong too, because the sort of fail to refer. But it also not quite true that the speech us meaningless, since it is pronounced with intention and received accordingly. There seem to be something spatial with that sort of speech, as if the game itself is the meaning.

Did I just declare myself an uneducated pragmatist?

[sethlee]

Oh, and just one last question (sorry for so many, I'm just always curious) - since you seem to align with pessimism, nihilism, and skepticism, what are your thoughts on (secular) Buddhism? I know you're an egoist, which can go against one of the main doctrines of Buddhism (kinda) depending on how you look at it, but Hume’s _bundle theory_, as you’re most likely very well aware of, is incredibly similar to _non-self_, _impermanence_, and the _five aggregates_ . Hume’s definition of causality also reminds me, vaguely, of Buddhism’s doctrine of _dependent_ _origination_ (as well as the _karmic cycle_, if one were to interpret that in a secular deterministic way) -- I figured I’d ask since Buddhism sort of has a foundation in pessimism ( _suffering_ ), nihilism ( _emptiness_ ), and skepticism ( _the_ _unanswered_ _questions_ & _the_ _imponderable_ _questions_ ), as well as its ties with Humean philosophy.

To me, personally, I find Buddhism, when extracted from its religious metaphysics, offers an interesting philosophy and subsequent lifestyle which embraces pessimism, nihilism, and skepticism as a means to obtaining peace and liberation, plus I think it utilizes the concept of _faith_ in a very unique and unorthodox manner when compared to other “spiritual” or “religious” traditions, as in, instead of faith in God or faith in the Divine, but has a rather pluralistic use of faith, such as faith in one’s growth on the path, or faith in the unknown. Also, for me at least, it seems very compatible with naturalism, pragmatism, and empiricism. Would love to hear your thoughts! Thank you! Sorry for the long questions!

[InventiveHarvest]

Are you objectively saying that quasi-realism is false, or are you just saying that you don't like quasi-realism?

[samsklair]

I have no understanding of different theories of truth (or idealisations in science), but would there be a difference between asserting a statement and entertaining a hypothetical? Like the difference between saying something is actually the case and just imagining if something were the case and what would follow from that. If so, could you say that idealisations in science are more like entertaining hypotheticals for pragmatic reasons? I may have just completely missed the point but it was just a thought I had.

Also in terms of fictionalism being simpler than the complex semantics of quasi realism I guess I would grant you that if I thought fictionalism made sense but I don't personally understand how it does. If I'm not mistaken, the fictionalist says that if moral properties were to exist they would be these weird mysterious things and that even though they don't actually exist its still useful to pretend they do. But if they are so weird and mysterious, it's not clear what we're even supposed to be pretending. For example, I don't think unicorns are real but I can imagine what they would be like if they were, I could engage in a fiction with unicorns. But I have no idea what a 'human right' would be like if it actually existed. I have no coherent conception of this entity called a 'human right' that somehow gives everyone categorical reasons for action, so I don't really know what to imagine.

[Liliquan]

The quasi-realist as politician makes alot of sense.

[hss]

The move towards quasi-realism is just the result of the acknowledgement that one can engage in a moral discourse. There are no concessions involved, besides maybe a commitment to some basic account of truth which could resemble the Tarskian model-theorethic approach (I don't think its unthinkable that, for example, certain ethical claims could, in the same way as approximate scientific claims do, "correspond" in some sense to some features of some another possible world, if I may use a Kripkean-Lewisian metaphor, so an antirealist about science shouldn't have a problem with attributing truth to moral claims, although they don't tell us much about the world in case of our world, it seems).

I think it would be harmful for philosophy (and perhaps for our everyday lives) to consider moral discourse redundant. If one commits oneself to the claim that stealing is wrong, one should be reminded, if one does steal for one's own benefit, that he's inconsistent with his views. Law also operates in deontic claims and I don't think there's anything inflationary or controversial about the claim that the question of whether one's actions agree with the law or don't is intelligible.

Considering that these cases already in my opinion involve the assumption that moral claims have propositional content beyond the assertoric force (using a Fregean-Dummetan term), I think a radical variety of antirealism about morals is unsatisfactory and even somehow paradoxical. When an antirealist says that ethical or scientific theories are merely 'good guesses' and that there's no guarantee they will converge on the capital-T truth, and thus the whole notion of a capital-T truth is unintelligible, he already speaks in a semi-quasi-realistese. I mean: If there's no content to a moral claim, one can't say he believes it or that there could be or couldn't be some agreement about it - these notions wouldn't make any sense if they were merely descriptions of the popular opinion or whatever. We just don't have to mythologize objectivity.

Your antirealism furthermore seems to me like a kind of reductive empiricism which dissolves all modal claims and turns them into descriptive claims (often about the present). This, again, harms moral discourse because it seems to imply that disagreeing with the popular opinion is equivalent to being wrong (I don't think you mean to say that but you provide an account that is simply flawed in this way). Instead of mythologizing metaphysical objectivity, we get to mythologize the popular opinion. All of this for preserving a kind of descriptivism.

I don't care if we get to satisfy any realistic intuitions, I'm an amateur philosopher. But if it's a real advantage for professional philosophers, I think it's not a bad idea to do it in addition to the aforementioned pros.

Sorry if I missed some points of your rant, I was watching your video in the background.