Trent Horn on the Future Like Our's argument: Arguments Against Abortion

A Revisited Response to Trent Horn @TheCounselofTrent from Nathan Nobis

Trent's "Opening Statement":

An Introduction Video

The “Humanity” Argument Against Abortion

A “Personhood” argument Against Abortion

Arguments from Personal Identity Against Abortion

The Future Like Our’s Argument Against Abortion

The Impairment Argument Against Abortion

Concluding Thoughts

Notes, with the arguments and responses stated:

[Yeatlova]

Hi thanks for the reply. However, i think your incorrect here. I think there is biological continuity between a fetus and the person who experiences later. Even if we are to reject animalism, many philosophers argue human organisms think and experience derivatively, in virtue of their experiencing and thinking part(whatever that may be). Moreover, some philosophers think the organism thinks derivatively because it constitutes us. But if these accounts of identity are true, and animalism is false, there is still the sense the animal experiences a FLO in a derivative way, and if this is true then there is continuity between an experiencing organism and a fetus, albeit in a derivate sense. Just as its true to say you've harmed a cat if you remove its leg. it can be the case sometimes that what is true for parts of the organism is also true for organism itself. here are some other examples: It is true to say the man is strong in virtue of his muscles. It is true to say the car honks in virtue of its horn. It is true to say i walk in virtue of my legs. It is true to say i see in virtue of my seeing part.

More importantly, i think this psychological account of FLO you've given is mistaken. Suppose we had a case of a child with dementia, in that they are not psychologically connected to their future since they may not remember what they are doing currently. there is little desires or psychological interests retained. Is it not clear killing them would still be wrong because it deprives them of possible valuable future experiences?


Next, it is unclear to me you've argued why the typical non psychological account of FLO is wrong, so we could accept the psychological account as a sufficient, but not necessary condition for why killing is wrong.

I dont think rejecting animalism is correct. if there is an animal typing this sentence, and i am not the animal, then there is another being present typing this, but thats absurd.
In the past you've given the thinking brain parallel argument:

Premise 1′: There is a human brain located where you are.
Premise 2′: The human brain located where you are is thinking.
Premise 3′: You are the only thinking being located where you are.
Conclusion’: Therefore, you are a human brain.

but this too runs into the problem of too many thinkers. For we have no good reason to accept P2, and if we did this would run into epistemic problems. Why should we think the brain is thinking, when the brain is part of the animal, and by virtue of the brain, the animal has all the necessary conditions and structures to think? in other words, if the brain and animal both have the necessary structures for thinking, why dont they both think? additionally, if there is only 1 thinker, which one is it? how could i ever know if i was the brain or the animal?
My solution is to say i am the animal, and the brain processes my thoughts and experiences, i think because i use my brain to think, but i am not identical to the brain. Just like how i use my walking part(legs and feet) to walk.

You've also brought up brain transplant cases saying "According to animalism, this patient is not you: identity is a matter of biology, not psychology. You are the animal with the illness but no brain, since this biological organism continues to live the same biological life that you were living before. Your brain is joined up with a different animal living a different biological life."

but it could be the case my brain is the farthest my animal could be reduced too since it controls my bodily functions and maintains my bodily unity. So if you removed my brain and transplanted it, i would exist in the new body, since i can be parred with a brain.

Lastly, these psychological views suffer from the teletransporter cases:

If you copied my atoms and destroyed my original body and produced 2 new people with my copied atoms, where am i? For both of these people are psychologically connected to me.

The best response i've seen here is to add a no branching condition. But this seems ad hoc. and if it works, why cant the animalist add something similar to the brain transplant thought experiments. it would also imply if we copied my brain states and applied them to another brain i would die!
there seems to be no good reason we should accept the no branching condition.

The point is made more clear when we consider what would happen if we split my brain and transplanted each hemisphere into different bodies that are psychosocially connected. Where am i? if i go out of existence how is this the case? do i only survive if 1 of my hemispheres is alive? how can that be?

[dirkvalentine]

Hey thanks for the video. I appreciate the clarity and visual. Tbh on the fence about abortion. I’ve also heard that this argument’s literature has shifted toward the “correct” interpretation of A future like ours. I’ve seen some claim there is an equivocation on the term “future of value” when he really might mean “a potential future of value” And if so, the argument is challenged because people do not in general have rights to what they need to meet their potential. Also heard some objections based on identity… I’m a bit of an arm chair philosopher on the topic, any places I might go to research further?

[NathanNobis]

BTW here is a version of Marquis's original essay. You can search to see what he says about children:


If his view likely has the striking implication that it's not wrong to kill babies, he surely would have discussed that.

[NathanNobis]

The Future Like Our’s Argument

12. Killing us is prima facie wrong.



13. Killing us is prima facie wrong because it deprives us of our valuable futures (a “future like our’s”).



14. Fetuses have valuable futures’s like ours.



15. Anything with a valuable future like our’s is prima facie wrong to kill.



Therefore fetuses are prima facie wrong to kill.



Therefore, abortion is prima facie wrong.

This argument is philosopher Don Marquis, who interestingly argues that arguments like Trent’s “humanity” and (I think) “personal identity” arguments fail:

One objection to this argument:

To have a future like our’s, a being needs to have some psychological connection to its future: it’s not just that there are potential future events “out there”. Embryos and beginning fetuses don’t have that, since they lack psychologies: they’ve never had any kind of mind: so they don’t have a future like our’s.

Trent’s response: newborn babies aren’t psychologically connected to their futures either. [Update: so does Trent think that Marquis’s argument cannot explain why it’s wrong to kill babies? If so, then Trent presumably thinks that Marquis’s argument is not a good argument? Or would Trent want to combine Marquis’s argument with animalism? If so, see the previous video on animalism!]

Response: really? Babies have minds; they are aware of things; they know who different people are. People talk about playing music to the fetus in utero and getting reactions, and then the baby has a reaction when born: that’s memory. A baby is not like a mythical 10-second memory goldfish. Babies are quite different from embryos: babies have minds: they are conscious and feeling; they exist over time, which is how they are able to learn things, etc.

Comments:

Marquis’s arguments are most popular – meaning often thought to be the best – among philosophers. Not popular among most real-life abortion critics.

Why’s that? Perhaps because his views can support euthanasia; could support some abortions (in cases of an extremely bleak future), and can be adapted for positive results for animals too.

Again, Trent advocates for asphyxiating / gassing rats and reports that few people would find that problematic. How would the rats feel about that? What would there experience be? Golden-rule: how would you like that if that were done to you?

There is lots of interesting discussion about Marquis’s arguments. Check it out!