Why Property Dualism has no interaction problem!

This video proves why Property Dualism does not have a fatal interaction problem like Substance Dualism, and exposes the irrational thinking of an anonymous person named Monistic Idealism.

[WorldviewDesignChannel]

I don't see how property dualism helps, unless we say that the one substance has *basic capacities* to enter states exhibiting both sets of properties. But this same move is open to the substance dualist -- to posit basic capacities of causal interaction. The deeper problem, it seems to me, is that spatial objects lack any capacity to make or produce conscious states on their own, but instead occur *within* mental states (like in dreams).

[danielhager]

So you have to posit two distinct ontologies? That is far from being parsimonious

[mosemobuckland]

@Eclectic Media What's your stance on materialism, do you reject that as well, or are substance dualism and idealism the only views that you reject?

[christianidealism]

What music did this play? It's dope

[MonisticIdealism]

Hey, more of my comments have been automatically deleted on my argument from mental causation video and I don't think it's right for me to be censored on my own video. People can't even see my responses to you so to make it more visible for the audience I'm suggesting we start over. Start a new comment thread on my argument from mental causation and include any and all criticisms you have and I'll respond there

[maxmax]

I have come to agree that property dualism does not have an interaction problem like substance dualism might. However, I do still think overdetermination, and consequently epiphenomenalism, is a real threat. But even this can be solved provided we are willing to sacrifice causal closure of the physical, - which is fine with me because mental properties can contribute causes where there are gaps in physical causation.

Then again, I'm not so sure about property dualism in general anymore. I've become very pessimistic about finding a single complete solution to the mind body problem, - me currently sitting on some frankenstein of a metaphysical theory.

[legron]

Idealists confuse "having an experience in your dream" with "having an experience". Those are not the same, any more than meeting Joe Biden in your dream is the same as actually meeting Joe Biden. Dreaming that you are having a certain experience is not the same as actually having that experience.

To express the point in logical terms, nothing that follows the operator "in my dream..." can be licitly derived from it. It's the same as "in this story...". You cannot derive "Sherlock Holmes existed" from "in this story Sherlock Homes existed", obviously. The same logic applies to dreaming.

[tomcollector]

"This video is exactly why people could give a flying wick about philosophy" - Eclectic Media

[legron]

It's not true that consciousness is a property of the brain. It's a property of sentient *animals, * not parts of animals. It is animals, not brains, whose behavior warrants describing them as "conscious" or "conscious of...". There is nothing that a brain could do that would warrant ascribing consciousness to it.

So, it is nonsense to speak of consciousness (the property of being conscious) as an "emergent property of the brain", since the brain is not conscious. It is the animal whose brain it is that is conscious.

I might just add (since it's a common confusion that people fall into) that "consciousness" is not a thing. The word came into existence by adding the suffix "-ness" to the adjective "conscious" (just as "happiness" came from adding "-ness" to "happy"). Obviously, adding "-ness" to an adjective does not generate a new entity. Talk of "having consciousness" is just misleading short-hand for talk of "being conscious"; it's not talk of possessing an entity called "consciousness" (since there is no such entity; it's a philosopher's fiction). Therefore, the very question "What kind of thing is consciousness?" makes no sense, since consciousness is not a kind of thing. It's like asking "What kind of thing is happiness?".

[ob]

Property dualism, substance dualism, emergence, epiphenomenalism, idealism, eliminativism, neutral monism, and physicalism are all false.