PHILOSOPHY - History: Locke on Personal Identity #3

Part 3 of 3. What makes you the same person as the little kid growing up a number of years ago? Is the identity of a person tied to the persistence of a body or a soul or something else entirely? Can we even given any explanation at all of the persistence of a person? Michael Della Rocca (Yale University) explores some of the puzzles and problems of personal identity that arise from the revolutionary work of the philosopher John Locke.

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[filthyhypocrite]

I'm glad I found this. Being naturally sickly, I miss a lot of classes, and this has really helped me understand, and excel on essays. Thank you so much :D

[ThePROBOWLA]

this was a helpful lecture, i think another lecture on david humes personal identity will be greatly appreciated...

[miffylu]

Omg! This video indeed saves my exam! And just to say, I like the use of fake-hand effect! It helps catching my attention, I find it quite interesting when the hand is sketching...! :)  Hope there's more video like this awesome clip. 

[plasmaballin]

I think Locke's view is very plausible, but we need to change how we think about continuity of memory. Rather than saying that for A to be identical to B, one of them must remember everything that the other is doing, we should definite continuity of memory to simply mean that their memories continuously morphed into one another over time. That way, we avoid the breakfast problem where even losing a tiny memory threatens personal identity. We would have to lose all of our memory at once to become a different person.
The branching problem can be solved with worm theory, though that leads to some more questions that we would have to figure out.

[Bubu]

Even though C doesn't remember being A, i think B's memory of "being A" creates a continuity. This might not fit in locke's theory, but i think B remembering A, and C remembering B is sufficient to say that C is the same person as A. The person protects its identity by remembering a part of the past, which remembers earlier. As long as my memories are connected to each other, I am the same person.

so i rather think this is the solution than a problem. what do you think?

[Kolwynm]

This series was fantastic, really helped me out, thank you so much!
I'm really hoping I find incentive for checking out all the remaining videos, like schoolwork,  otherwise I may have to take out some time on a weekend to binge them.
Keep up the good work! There's nothing cooler than what you're doing, truly!

[grixtraselespejo]

The primary text reading for those problems would be really useful

[MudithaMaths]

Interestingly, people who have complete amnesia have a different sense of personal identity. They think they are not the same people, but other people 'know' that the person has not changed.

It is known today that out memories can be faulty. So I think we cannot escape reality and evidence. It is not enough that I remember what happened yesterday, I should be able to substantiate it with evidence. If the consequences of all the things we did yesterday suddenly vanished today, we will start doubting our personal identity. So Locke's idea of memory is insufficient.

Further getting a consensus on multiple people's experiences reinforces our belief in our consciousness. This is very important, I feel, to weed out people who extend this theory beyond death and life. Some might say that even if we die, our consciousness might remain. Then it is no different from Descartes' soul.

On the other hand, the ship of theseus problem is a little different from this one. We are assigning identity to things other than us. It is the problem of impersonal identity over time. We can apply this idea to dogs, cats and so on. As long as we cannot discuss and come to a consensus, then the assignment of identity for such object is purely functional.

[JaKsoN]

Do adress this if you can wireless philosophy : I am not a philosophy student but I had a doubt regarding the 3rd BR problem. If at any point we split the memories of a person into two different people (B and C), why are they not identical? If Obama’s consciousness can enter another body but regain his original personality and be the same human atleast, why can’t both B and C be same (even though they have different/similar bodies)? Of course after some time (or even immediately) both B and C experience different environments (except if they are in control rooms) and develop different identities, but that will only be because the original identity (A) has been added with different memories and actions after the brain splitting. So, why are B and C not considered the same identity before the addition of memories? Couldn’t Locke’s theory be valid, because the two identities, B and C, are identical until their memories start to differ after they are conscious or atleast outside the controlled environment?

[ChloeAnnRocks]

This was so helpful even being seven years ago. Thank you!!!!

[ptnxplct]

Because of the Brave Officer problem, I disagree with Locke's theory. I also disagree with the materialist theory - our bodies are constantly changing. So that leaves the "soul" theory, which makes perfect sense except that there's no evidence of soul. So I have this nihilistic view that identity is an illusion.

[Mikaeljuni]

Now am ready for my philosophical problems and analysis exam coming up next tomorrow 😀... Thank you.

[bradleyfarrant]

Why does the Branching Problem work if we don't yet know if it is possible to split a persons brain and apply it to two different bodies? Maybe this is impossible because Lock's view is correct? Or have I missed something?

[OnceMoreBob]

is there a reason you don't bring up the ancestral relation? It's kind of related to this. Especially the brave officer problem

[woodyfentress]

Wonderful BReakdown. I'll remember that I watched it so I'll still be me when I remember but when I forget then I'll be a new person but I should want that person to check this out too. Who should I tell to remind that person to watch this? And will they still be them when that time comes? 😛

[nefisefedakar]

Thanks for these great lessons I wish it continued..

[JohnKennethCalaycay]

can someone tell me who conceptualize both Breakfast problem and Branching Problem? Ive been searching online for ages, cant find anything about the author.

[AJ-wefl]

In the Brave Officer Problem, you said that C = B because C remembers the actions of person B. However, earlier in the video, you had stated that according to Locke, for the same human being to also be the same person, they must also remember the memories and state of mind of the earlier person. If person C does not remember remembering person A, does that not mean that Person C was never truly equal to person B?

[noabinnendijk]

In the branching problem, what makes B and C unidentical? Why can they not be A?

[huhgo]

Great series! Thank you very much. I'm currently writing a paper on personal identity in regard to Alzheimer's, but I don't really get why, in the third problem, B nor C can be identical to A according to some philosophers. Is it just because both their claims are of equal value and that therefore neither one can claim being identical to A, or is there more to the argument?