The Battle of the Somme reassessed | Prof Gary Sheffield

In this presentation by Prof Gary Sheffield, we take a fresh look at the 1916 Battle of the Somme.

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[Battlefield_Sleuth]

My Grandad is quoted in Middlebrook's book about wondering why the Cavalry never took advantage of the gains at Montauban. It's intriguing to hear that Haig thought the same and Rawlinson failed to take advantage of the opportunity. What would've been the story if the Reserves had pressed on to the empty Bernafay Wood and then captured High Wood and Trones Wood, maybe Guillemont, Longueval & Delville Wood? How many lives were lost as a result of Rawlinson holding back reserves and these positions not been capitlised from eneny disarray? As Prof Sheffield says, we will never know but its a fascinating thought and amazing my Grandad wondered the same 50 years ago.

[giovannipierre]

Yet the Somme campaign would see those 'improvised cadres' of the BEF's citizen-soldiers grow in skill and confidence, whilst, in a bloody contest of attack and counter-attack the old German Imperial Army was destroyed. In all 97 German Divisions were drawn into the fighting over the course of four and a half months. Some were withdrawn and then, of necessity, sent back into the cauldron. It was on the Somme that, as Prince Rupprecht of Bavaria lamented, "what still remained of the old first-class peace trained German infantry [was] expended on the battlefield." (21) As the British and French bludgeoned their way forward, the Germans fought desperately to regain every yard of lost trench. Seventy-eight German counter-attacks were counted in the first two weeks of September alone, many of them repeat assaults on positions from which they had already been bloodily repulsed. German losses on the Somme are generally estimated at between 500, 000 and 660, 000. Allied (French and British) losses in the same battle are placed in the region of 630, 000.(22) The Germans, having already been through the horrors of Verdun and the Brusilov offensives, could afford such losses far less than the British, for whom the Somme was the first major offensive of the war. The damage inflicted on the German army was not just physical but psychological. When Thiepval fell, a German soldier commented; "...it was absolutely crushing... every German soldier from the highest general to the meanest private had the feeling that now Germany had lost the first great battle." (23)

In 1928, the German Reichsarchive produced a series of monographs on the Somme, which passed this verdict on the battle;

It would be a mistake to measure the results of the battle of the Somme by mere local gain of ground. Besides the strategic objectives, the British and French followed out a definite plan of exhausting the power of the defenders by the employment of great masses of artillery in constantly repeated attacks. Although ... the casualties of the Entente were numerically greater than ours ... this grave loss of blood affected Germany very much more heavily. Quite apart from the facts that its very loss narrowed down the limited possibilities of replacing it, and that the war industries drew off into their service able-bodied men in a constantly increasing measure, the battle of attrition gnawed terribly into the vitals of the defenders. The enormous tension on all fronts compelled the Supreme Command to leave troops in the line until they had expended the last atom of their energy, and to send divisions time after time into the same battle. In the circumstances, it was unavoidable that the demoralizing influences of the defensive battle affected the soldier more deeply than was proper in the interests of the maintenance of his fighting spirit and his sense of duty. Still more serious was it that, as the demand for self-sacrifice greatly surpassed what could be expected of the average man, the fighting largely fell on the shoulders of the best of the troops, and not least the officer. The consequences of this were a frightful death-roll of the finest and most highly trained soldiers, whose replacement was impossible. It was in this that the root of the tragedy of the battle lies. (24)

Even as the battle was being fought, this erosion of the fighting quality of the German army was being noted. Prince Rupprecht of Bavaria recorded in his diary that "the old experienced officers and men decrease steadily in numbers, and the reinforcements incorporated in masses have not enjoyed the same soldierly instruction and training, and physically are mostly inferior."(25) More recently Holger Hewig has echoed the same themes of damage to morale and the loss of irreplaceable veterans, noting that not only did the Somme witness "the first instances of blatant fragging..." in the German army, but also that it had "lost its last small-unit leaders: it would never be the same instrument again."(26)

Charles Carrington concluded that the Somme was

where the British army fought it out with the German army, and established their superiority, inflicting casualties which Germany could ill afford. The result is patent. In August the German government dismissed Falkenhayn, their Chief-of-Staff, who had failed in attack at Verdun and failed in defence on the Somme … In September, their worse month for casualties, the new leaders, Hindenburg and Ludendorff, conceded defeat by planning a strategic withdrawal, though, with their usual tenacity they clung to their positions until the winter gave them a short respite before retreating. The German Army was never to fight so well again, but the British Army went on to fight better. (27)

The pressure applied by both Haig's BEF and the French on the Somme was, thus, a vital part of the process of wearing down the German army, the process of 'destroying its arms' and 'breaking its will, ' the process, in short, which was the prerequisite of ultimate victory.

[giovannipierre]

Britain was committed to an attack at the Somme by the Chantilly Agreement 1915 along with simultaneous offensives by Italy and Russia. Haig would have liked to have delayed the attack until August when more artillary would have been available but Joffre shouted at him in a meeting ‘that the French Army would cease to exist’ if he left it that long.

The attack on the Somme helped save the French at Verdun. The Somme meant more and more German troops had to be transferred to fight the British and Empire forces. This drastically reduced the ability of the Germans to undertake offensive operations. Von Falkenhayn had underestimated the ability of the British to launch an attack and when Haig ordered the British over the top, the Germans were unprepared. In order to salvage the situation on the Somme, the Germans had to move badly needed forces out of Verdun. Some four divisions were transferred from the assault in order to help defend German positions on the Somme.

The German advance lost steam in the Summer of 1916 and were reduced to only local offensives. The commanders in Berlin were forced to use most of their strategic reserves on the Somme and the units in Verdun were starved of any reinforcements. The fighting in Verdun was intense and many German divisions became badly depleted and were unable to receive the reinforcements they needed. This prevented them from continuing with their offensive. The transfer of German units from Verdun meant they were eventually forced to adopt a defensive posture.

Even with the negation of 500, 000 German soldiers on the Western Front, the French still almost lost the battle. Their army was being bled white and was almost broken as a fighting for force, even with the Somme drawing off German reserves that would otherwise have been used to almost certainly destroy the French Army in 1916.

The large battles of 1916–17 inflicted heavy damage on the Germans.The Somme-all five months of it- was seen as a marginal yet very costly, bloody victory. It changed the momentum against the Germans. The Germans retreated to the Hindenburg line sooner than they had planned.Ludendorff described it as ‘a heavy blow.’ If the weather hadn’t intervened the German Army might have cracked on the Somme. Ludendorff certainly feared it would.

Together with Verdun and The Brusilov Offensive, The Somme, led to what historian Martin Kitchen called a ‘silent dictatorship’ in Germany when Hindenburg and Ludendorff took over and began to warp German strategy to its detriment.

[paulmadryga]

"Bad history is a very dangerous thing indeed."

Truth, that.

[nickjung]

Years ago I had a conversation with a Royal Engineer involved in the removal of unexploded ordnance in France. He had gained the impression that over 30% of the shells fired failed in some way, either falling short or failing to explode. If his view is correct, one must wonder what the effect would have been, for example, on the Somme, if manufacturers had paid more attention to quality and less to profits!

[giovannipierre]

Funny how the ‘Butcher Haig critics’ never mention the Hundred Days.


John Terraine:

‘The toughest assignment in modern British military history (i.e. since the creation of our first real Regular Army, the New Model) has been high command in war against the main body of a main continental enemy. Three British officers have undertaken such a task and brought it to a successful conclusion: the Duke of Marlborough, the Duke of Wellington and Field-Marshal Lord Haig.

And in that Final Offensive, which ended with a German delegation crossing the lines with a white flag to ask for an armistice, the British Armies under Field-Marshal Sir Douglas Haig captured 188, 700 prisoners and 2840 guns. All the other Allies together, French, Americans, Belgians, captured 196, 500 prisoners and 3775 guns. In other words, the British took just under 50% of all the prisoners and just over 40% of all the guns.

That was the achievement of the British Citizen Army; I have called it, more than once, the 'finest hour' of the British Army. There has never been anything like that '100 Days' Campaign' of continuous victory in the whole of our military history. In the words of one who served from 1916 to 1918 and died only recently, Professor C. E. Carrington:

In our thousand years of national history there has been one short period (1916-1918) when Britain possessed the most effective army in the world, and used it to win decisive victory.

The most sinister of all the delusions within the trauma was to lose sight of that.

What was the position of Haig's army on that day? It amounted to nearly two million men of the British Empire - the largest land force in the Empire's history. And they had just reached the end of a 'Hundred Days' Campaign' as glorious and decisive as that of 1815 which concluded the Battle of Waterloo - but infinitely less known.

It was, in fact an unparalleled achievement in the history of the British Army, revealed by the stark statistics. And this was done in nine successive victories which were largely instrumental in bringing the war to an end in 1918 - and a consummation that Haig was determined to bring about.

These victories should be as famous as Blenheim, Ramillies, Oudenarde, and Malplaquet or Talavera, Salamanca, Vittoria and Waterloo.

Instead, they are forgotten and unknown, so I will list them now:

The Battle of Amiens, 8 August 1918 ('the black day of the German Army');

The Battle of Albert, 21 August (the day on which Haig told Churchill 'we ought to do our utmost to get a decision this autumn');

The Battle of the Scarpe, 26 August;

The Battles of Havrincourt and Epehy, 12 September (the approaches to the HindenburgLine);

The Breaking of the Hindenburg Line, 27 September - 5 October (35, 000 prisoners & 380 guns taken, the British Army's greatest feat of arms in all its history);

The Battle of Flanders, 28 September;

The Second Battle of Le Cateau, 6 October;

The Battle of the Selle, 17 October;

The Battle of the Sambre, 1-11 November.

These were Haig's victories, handsomely acknowledged by Marshal Foch:

Never at any time in history has the British Army achieved greater results in attack than in this unbroken offensive .... The victory was indeed complete, thanks to the Commanders of Armies, Corps and Divisions, thanks above all to the unselfishness, to the wise, loyal and energetic policy of their Commander-in-Chief, who made easy a great combination and sanctioned a prolonged and gigantic effort.’

In 1918, the British Army was the only Allied army capable of mounting a massive and sustained offensive.

[MM-ntiz]

I respectfully disagree with Professor Sheffield, I think Haig’s reputation is most associated with/ tarnished by the Passchendaele campaign - especially the last two months.

[Digmen]

Regarding Haig, I am not a great detractor of his.
But he did not cover himself with glory on the retreat from Mons. He let Smith Dorrien down several times.

[Digmen]

Regarding Haig I always wondered how he and Rawlinson could ever command an attack, as they both had different ideas, Eg Haig breakthough, Rawlinson Bite and Hold

[rogerbourke]

I also wish to inquire about this gentleman's earlier life and his academic qualifications. What, exactly, allows him to call himself a "military historian" at all? None of this information seems to appear on his Wikipedia page.

[Digmen]

It was reported that the artillery barrage had failed to destroy the German barbed wire.
And yet the Generals still sent their men forward.

[danbernstein]

If I understand this correctly, Prof. Sheffield is saying that the reason the British failed at the Somme is that they didn't launch a cavalry attack?
He must be a graduate of the Black Adder School of Military Studies

[CC-fiij]

Maxse and the adjoining French broke through the lines in the southern section (where, incidentally, the guns were used in greater concentration along with a creeping barrage modelled along the lines of the French... effective pollination of better ideas by receptive soldiers like Allan Brooke whom appreciated what he could actually learn from Britain's allies).

Why didn't Haig deploy his massed calvary here?

Sheffield blames Rawlinson, but I've heard Jon Rosebank put the blame squarely on Haig.

[gandydancer]

42:40 The idea that Jutland had anything like the claim to significance that the Somme has is utterly ludicrous, and Sheffield's assertion that the dismissal of any such claim has the significance he attributes to it is ridiculous as well. It was a lost opportunity to remove the High Seas Fleet from the equation, but the High Seas Fleet was anyway not all that weighty a factor. Maybe it kept the Baltic invasion or effective blockade option off the table, but that's about it.

[PMMagro]

Haig made terrible misstakes and seemed to learn little from each "the first few times". We are talking both over time and thousands upon thousands off dead here.
Sticking to the "usefull cavalry" idea long into WW1 probably makes most people just shake their head..But what whould be very interesting whould be to know how much political and diplomatic preassure was put on Haig to do many offensives and when to do them etc. In 1914 the Britrish where relucant to counterattack at all. My impression is that by 1916 with the horrific losses of 1915 and Verdun 1916 to preassure to attack/take the initiative (at any cost) must have been extreme. Also in 1917 after the French mutinies...

[wuffothewonderdog]

Haig is tainted for me because he did his selfish best to discredit Smith-Dorrien, who proved he was the better battlefield commander by his competent actions in the most difficult of circumstances at Mons and Le Cateau. Haig connived with French to denigrate Smith-Dorrien until his disgraceful dismissal. Would the war's course have been different if Smith-Dorrien had succeeded French as C-in-C, who knows, but he had an infantryman's affinity with his troops that cavalrymen like French and Haig did not, and so I believe the horror of 1st July would have been avoided.

[seanmoran]

The War for Civilisation I didn’t believe in it then and I believe it less so now
J.R.R. Tolkien circa 1960s

[fallguy]

Wonder if it was someone from the Navy that decided that the Battle of Jutland was the battle that won WW1?

[seanmoran]

Smith Dorrien seems to have been badly treated at the time
Political and personal reasons seem to a reason
As I understand it Smith Dorrien pushed for Calvary marksmanship over lances
Haigs appointment appears to be based more on political reasons than on merit

[davidminer]

Why defend Haig ? Too many British lives were thrown away & horrendous numbers of wounded troops, because the attack made to assist the French was mismanaged. There is no glory in this action - just using foot soldiers & artillery to try to bludgeon a hole in the enemy line for months was a moronic strategy (even though it also cost the enemy large losses).