Foreknowledge & Free Will

In this video I summarize an argument that aims to show that divine foreknowledge precludes human freedom. I then summarize six responses to the argument.

Here is a form of the argument that does not rely on the transfer principle.
1. God believed 1,000 years ago that I would raise my hand at t.
2. If P1 and I am free not to raise my hand at t, then it is my power to do something such that, were I to do it, either (i) God would have had at least one different belief 1,000 years ago, or (ii) God would have had at least one false belief 1,000 years ago.
3. It is not in my power to do something such that, were I to do it, (i) God would have had at least one different belief 1,000 years ago, or (ii) God would have had at least one false belief 1,000 years ago.
4. Therefore, I am not free to raise my hand at t.

To explore this argument in more depth, check out the argument map I've created linked below, as well as the link to my interview with Dr. Taylor Cyr.

[FreethinkingMinistries]

Good video, Jordan! I need to take lessons from you on how to make animated vids. I love it! With that said, I am writing a script for a video for my YT channel that will be responding to, interacting with, and answering some of the questions raised in your video. I hope to record it soon. I'll keep you posted.

Keep up the good work, brother!

[lightshiner]

Well done video! I've never heard the foreknowledge argument presented that way and it's very interesting. I think I've always proposed the "dependence" solution. I think God knows what we'll do because He knows the free will choice we made in advance. So I'm not really convinced the past is fixed.

[danielboone]

This is amazing! I love the argument map document!

[alanrhoda]

Ockhamism and Dependence are basically the same thing. Ockham's soft facts are "soft" because they *depend* on future events.

[DryApologist]

This is a great breakdown! I think dependence and timelessness can be combined to deny the first premise. 1. God timelessly knows all that is *happening* across space/time (so the timeless view). 2. God's knowledge of the events depends upon what is happening across space/time as the events happen (so the dependence view). We would not have the power to change what God *knew* (since He is eternally in the state of knowing the events as they are happening within space/time), but we do have the power to change what God timelessly *knows*. 3. This is not open theism because God already knows the future since He already sees the events occurring (though it would perhaps deny a counter factual truth value to the events).

[Iamwrongbut]

I wish I could’ve chosen whether or not to watch this.

[mikeschmoll]

We are in the sphere of creation and act according to that sphere
-> freely

God is in the sphere of creator and acts according to that sphere
-> freely

We are responsible for the actions of our sphere and not for the actions in God's sphere.

How these two spheres work out together is beyond my understanding.

[OriginalWinProductions]

I would just side with Robert M. Adams and deny God has beliefs about anything. Rather, I think that to speak of divine knowledge is to speak of God's causal power in making things intelligible to any and all contingent beings that could, would, or, do exist, so long as it is derived through reliable belief-forming cognitive mechanisms. God knows all things because he has this illuminating power regarding all possible propositions.

While the problem can be reformulated about whether or not God can make our beliefs about the future into knowledge by providing illumination, however at this point, I'd just embrace a hybrid Timeless and Ockhamist view. Say we expand soft necessity to include views partly about the past, and partly about the future to even include facts partly about eternity. Since the fact "John prophesied x will choose y in the past, with God's power in eternity". It seems to fit the mold as a soft necessary fact.

[jazzmankey]

The free will skepticism view is not a problem unless you equate accountability/responsibility with human freedom, which the Bible does not do. God holds man accountable for his actions, even though God himself has decreed all human actions.

“A man’s steps are of the Lord; How then can a man understand his own way?”
‭‭Proverbs‬ ‭20‬:‭24‬ ‭NKJV‬‬

“O Lord, I know the way of man is not in himself; It is not in man who walks to direct his own steps.”
‭‭Jeremiah‬ ‭10‬:‭23‬ ‭NKJV‬‬

“You will say to me then, “Why does He still find fault? For who has resisted His will?” But indeed, O man, who are you to reply against God? Will the thing formed say to him who formed it, “Why have you made me like this?” Does not the potter have power over the clay, from the same lump to make one vessel for honor and another for dishonor?”
‭‭Romans‬ ‭9‬:‭19‬-‭21‬ ‭NKJV‬‬

[LeafSouls]

I think the solution is combination between Semicompatibilism and Free Will Skepticism.


We do not need free will, the only thing a thiest needs is to prove that god being fair towards us, meaning no actual true free will in the actual sense of the word is required.

Instead what we need to respond with is god simply gave us the choices that we would have made, hence he is still being just towards and we remain moral agents.

But this is not real free will, we couldn't have chosen otherwise but god is still just because these are the decision that we would have made regardless of any actual other choice that should have been present.


Hence we do not have free will, we only have the decisions that we would have made no matter what regardless of other possible decisions and that is only fair and just, but that does not qualify for REAL free will.

[tesfayerobeletesfaye]

The argument for theological fatalism commits a fairly common logical fallacy which is identified by scholars like Plantinga and Wierenga!

Necessarily if God foreknows x, then x will happen.

God foreknows x.

Therefore, x will necessarily happen.


It is like reasoning:

Necessarily, if Jones is a bachelor, Jones is unmarried.

Jones is a bachelor.

Therefore, Jones is necessarily unmarried.

But Jones is not necessarily unmarried. He just is unmarried. He is perfectly free to be married; no necessity compels him to be unmarried. The valid form of the argument would thus read:

Necessarily, if Jones is a bachelor, Jones is unmarried.

Jones is a bachelor.

Therefore, Jones is unmarried.”

If this is fallacious argument logical fatalism is wrong and we don’t need a solutions!

[whatsinaname]

I still don’t get how knowing someone it’s about to do something makes it so that action is not free. I’ve played chess matches where I easily predicted my opponents next 3-4 moves, but I didn’t in any way force my opponent to make them.

[yourfutureself]

Why do you call the fifth view 'semi'-compatibilism and not just soft determinism or standard compatibilism?

[joop]

Imagine you are standing infront of an icecream truck. There are only 4 possible outcomes: youll choose either: vanilla, chocolate, strawbarry or banana.

In order to say that you can choose between all four options then each of them must have a chance of being chosen higher then 0%

If thats the case then there cannot be true propositions about which 1 you are going to choose. For the existence of such a proposition would cause the probabilities of 3 of the options to drop to 0%.

But if there are no true propositions about which flavor youre going to choose then how can God know which 1 youll choose?

How can God have foreknowledge if the universe is truly indeterministic?


But what if we dont start with the presumption that we have free will, what if we start with the presumption that God has foreknowledge.

God knows youll choose chocolate and hence the proposition "you will choose chocolate" is true

But the truth value of this proposition causes the probability of any other flavor being chosen to drop to 0%

Why? Because if x will not occur then the chance that it will occur is 0%

[redbearwarrior]

What about Jonathan Edwards view? I think he would except both premises and the conclusion, but that the conclusion is still compatible with free will because free will is the ability to choose according to our nature, inclinations, desires and motives. Which is compatible with not being able to do otherwise. Maybe it is in the options you gave and I missed it. Which is totally possible 😂 but still great video! Keep up the good work.

[shrader]

Maybe I'm confused but I don't agree with the assumption that knowledge of something forces it to happen.

For example if I know of a choice I made a year ago or even a day ago, it cannot change I know what happened. However if I was free to make the choice at the time, my knowledge of it now wouldn't change that fact.

If we're able to go back in time.and tell someone 1000 years ago, their knowledge even though accurate doesn't constrain my choice. I (hypothetically) freely chose and they just knew about it, whether in the past or the future.

Otherwise I Enjoyed the succinct and visual explanations.

[richardbersch]

The conclusion is a non-sequitur. The whole argument seems to ascribe causality for foreknowledge. If God knew one thousand years ago that you would choose, I repeat, choose to watch this video today...then God believed it because He knew what your choice would be in your future. There is actually some relativity going on here in that from your perspective YOU made the choice today, from HIS perspective you made your choice 1, 000 years ago. But back to ascribing causality for foreknowledge. Let's say I'm in a long line waiting to buy tickets. My wife goes twenty people ahead of me to hold a friends place in line while they use the restroom. She says that in ten minutes she will return. I believe she will return in 10 minutes...and she returns in 10 minutes. Do you want to argue that she did not choose to return in 10 minutes because I knew 10 minutes before that she would return?

[MyContext]

The argument is unsound due to ANY comment about "God" is necessarily assertion, since such is not sustained as anything other than belief. Thus, IF one denotes the argument as sound, it is ONLY in the sense of a "if this were the case" with the attendant notions predicated on that supposition.

I reject the idea of free will due to it seems that every decision that we make is predicated on prior states of affairs.

The moment I understood that we are not free, I had more consideration for the developmental state of the individual since each individual is actually comparable to an AI system with all the attendant issues of bad data (misinformation), bad algorithm (misunderstanding), and/or faulty processing (mental illness). Thus, in the removal of an individual, the issue becomes whether they can be remediated for a return to society or is permanent removal the only option for the well being of society.

[phillwithskill]

What about source incompatibilism/source libertarianism?