The Compatibilism Controversy

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Recently, my boss at Trinity Theological Seminary, Dr. Braxton Hunter, made a guest appearance on Cameron Bertuzzi’s Capturing Christianity YouTube channel. Hunter offered what he takes to be the greatest argument against Calvinism. Hunter provided a case as to why the Calvinistic view of exhaustive divine determinism (EDD) cannot make sense of God’s inspired Word. He also made some claims about a view advanced by many Calvinists known as "compatibilism." His remarks caused a firestorm on Facebook. In this video, I seek to clarify the situation.

Here's the Capturing Christianity link featuring Dr. Braxton Hunter:

Post recording reflections:

Peter van Inwagen warned that "Whatever you do, do not use ‘compatibilism’ as a name for the thesis that moral responsibility is compatible with determinism. This can only cause confusion. If you must have a name for this thesis, invent a new one." Many have ignored his advice and have unwittingly muddied the waters by ignoring his words of wisdom. In fact, it seems that some (not all) continually strive to keep the water muddy. The danger is that if one comes to affirm the not-so-controversial definition of compatibilism — that some kinds of ‘freedom’ are compatible with determinism — then the controversial definition — that moral responsibility is compatible with determinism — gets smuggled in below the radar (completely undetected by the layman).

There is an official label associated with this technique. It is known as the Motte and Bailey fallacy, which is a form of argument and an informal fallacy where an arguer conflates two positions that share similarities (in this case, freedom and moral responsibility). The first is modest and easy to defend (the “motte”) and the second is quite controversial (the “bailey”). The arguer advances the controversial position (in this case, the “bailey” is that moral responsibility is compatible with EDD), but when challenged, they insist that they are *just* talking about the more modest position (in this case, the modest “motte” is that some kind of freedoms are compatible with EDD).

With that said, to strive for clarity moving forward, I agree with Peter van Inwagen and encourage my friends who are seeking to argue that moral responsibility is compatible with determinism (instead of mere "freedom") to “invent a new term.”

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#Compatibilism #Determinism #Libertarianism #FreeWill #FreeThinking #TimStratton
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Post recording reflections:

Peter van Inwagen warned that "Whatever you do, do not use ‘compatibilism’ as a name for the thesis that moral responsibility is compatible with determinism. This can only cause confusion. If you must have a name for this thesis, invent a new one." Many have ignored his advice and have unwittingly muddied the waters by ignoring his words of wisdom. In fact, it seems that some (not all) continually strive to keep the water muddy. The danger is that if one comes to affirm the not-so-controversial definition of compatibilism — that some kinds of ‘freedom’ are compatible with determinism — then the controversial definition — that moral responsibility is compatible with determinism — gets smuggled in below the radar (completely undetected by the layman).

There is an official label associated with this technique. It is known as the Motte and Bailey fallacy, which is a form of argument and an informal fallacy where an arguer conflates two positions that share similarities (in this case, freedom and moral responsibility). The first is modest and easy to defend (the “motte”) and the second is quite controversial (the “bailey”). The arguer advances the controversial position (in this case, the “bailey” is that moral responsibility is compatible with EDD), but when challenged, they insist that they are *just* talking about the more modest position (in this case, the modest “motte” is that some kind of freedoms are compatible with EDD).


With that said, to strive for clarity moving forward, I agree with Peter van Inwagen and encourage my friends who are seeking to argue that moral responsibility is compatible with determinism (instead of mere "freedom") to “invent a new term.”

FreethinkingMinistries
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IMHO, compatibilism destroys the concept of duty (doing what you know you ought to do, which is usually the _weakest_ of any competing set of desires one may have, and involves self-sacrifice).

To claim that people only do what they want to do the most reduces Man to the level of a beast, operating only on instinct.

And thus no more morally accountable than a beast.

Maybe that’s the idea…..🤔

Mark-cdwf
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It cannot be emphasized enough how crucial it is to lay out clear definitions for substantive dialogue. Thanks Tim!

tony
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At minute 4:65 Braxton says
-quote
Christian Determinism says ultimately Determinism is TRUE….it’s just that God is Determining everything…….and Calvinists will say yes it is choice, but that is a choice that is determined by God.

DW:
The question is – per the doctrine of decrees - what *KIND* of choice is really available to the Calvinist?

Is he granted a choice to BE OTHERWISE than that which is infallibly decreed?
Is he granted a choice to DO OTHERWISE than that which is infallibly decreed?
Is the future OPEN to him - such that multiple options are OPEN and available? - such that CONTRARY CHOICE and the ABILITY TO REFRAIN between one option and the other is available to him?

I believe the Calvinist is using the word “Choice” as a replacement word for “Inclination”.

Per the doctrine – what is granted to the Calvinist – is infallibly decreed “Inclinations” at any TIME-T.

At the foundation of the world - for every future human event and every future human impulse – there are “Inclinations” available to the THEOS from which to select. And logically prior to the decree - the selection of a specific “Inclination” also entails the rejection of all ALTERNTIVES from that which was selected.

However after that divine choice is made - and FIXED by decree - when TIME-T rolls around for that given human event - there is ONLY ONE SINGLE PREDESTINED RENDERED-CERTAIN “inclination” granted existence.

All ALTERNATIVE “inclinations” for that given event are excluded by the decree.

Thus the creature is given NO CHOICE about what impulses or inclinations will come to pass within the brain. And no ability to refrain from having that impulse/inclination infallibly come to pass within his brain.

Given that as the case – I don’t see how anyone can argue the Calvinist is granted the function of CHOICE on the matter of anything

dw
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Isn’t our inherent desire for joy/satisfaction the motive to everything we do or don’t do (as opined by Blaise Pascal)? E.g., When I eat the taco I subconsciously decide that taco would bring more joy than other menu items or not eating at all. When I abstain from eating the taco, I subconsciously decide there is more joy and satisfaction in eating healthy. If I sin, I am subconsciously believing the lie of the enemy or my flesh that the sin will bring me more joy and satisfaction than abstaining. When I refrain from sin, I am believing the truth of God’s word and Spirit that it will bring me more joy and satisfaction to obey God. (In other words, the immediate sacrifice of the “joy” and “satisfaction” promised by the sin is outweighed by the joy and satisfaction of pleasing God and abiding in His Spirit.)

ChadRStevens
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Incompatibilist all day, erry day! For life!

PresbyterianPaladin
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I have a sinking feeling that Compatibilism is the Christian version of "LackTheism". Oh Dear

Jamie-Russell-CME
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New term for compatibilism: libercompatibilism (compatible libertarian free will) -God determined that I would freely choose to invent this term within my nature and post it here and I am fully responsible for the consequences.

But that’s a contradiction -how can someone freely choose to do something determined by someone outside of himself?

I don’t know. All I know is that God is the only one who can actualize a universe that He saw every single detail of before He actualized it and it is playing out exactly as He saw it before He actualized it.

Also, God knows everything I’m thinking always at every moment in and out of time. No one will ever know what God is thinking at any moment in or out of time.

tubelvr
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@Freethinking Ministries So from the chat I commented that “if” Calvinists are wrong (which they are) then they are not brilliant at all but quite the opposite and actually foolish.

This was in response to you saying something about a brilliant Calvinist.

…what needs to be clarified is what specifically is causing you to call them brilliant?

For example there are brilliant atheists whose brilliance has absolutely nothing to do with atheism; but rather they’re say a brilliant mathematician, or a brilliant piano player.

But if you arrived at your conclusion of them being brilliant in regards to any conversation related to Calvinism then they most definitely are NOT brilliant.

Instead one could say, “I know a Calvinist who is brilliant at math.”

But to just say you know of a brilliant Calvinist, what exactly does that mean?

What is his brilliance tied to?

Is the brilliance tied to anything related to Calvinism?

Or is his brilliance tied to something completely separate from Calvinism?

apilkey
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I'd love for you to have a conversation with Pat Flynn of "philosophy for the People" on free will. I think you would have an interesting conversation, as he affirms libertarian freedom, but denies Molinism.
Keep up the good work.

VACatholic
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Thank you for this. I have heard you explain why you think free will and determinism are compatible in the past, and I never got. I still don't get it. I need to listen to this again, as you had a lot going on in it, and I only dabble in philosophy. But one of the things I do get and which always annoyed me is the two different definitions of compatibilism. I think this will help my conversations going forward with lay compatibilists so that we can actually define our terms.

troymulberry
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Okay, I just listened again, and I think I am following the concept of our specific concession of compatibilism. If God created me to like chocolate cake, then when I choose chocolate cake I was free to follow my desires. Therefore my freedom and God's determinism are compatible. At least, I think that is what you are saying. However, isn't that still just determinism and not actually freedom? This is where I get hung up.

troymulberry
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It should be obvious, especially for intelligent thinkers, that exhaustive determinism is completely and forever incompatible with those being determined making actual free choices that would lead to them being accountable for their actions. There shouldn't even be a need to explain why.

I think the reason we DO need to explain, and the reason that explaining with sound arguments often doesn't seem to have any effect, is that to get to the point where one affirms divine determinism, and believes it and teaches it, they've had to suppress the truth of scripture, and of their own conscience, and they are now being handed over to futile thinking. It's a very dangerous place to be. It's a place where contradictions and logic don't matter, and where solid biblical teaching cannot sway you from your theological commitments.

Calvinists are trapped by their ideology, and drowning.

christian_gamer_guy