Free Will is Impossible (1/3): Introduction

Is free will impossible? In this 1st part of 3, I introduce the "free will problem" that faces libertarianism, namely, the problem that either determinism or indeterminism is true, and whichever is the case, both seem to imply that we don't have free will. In this introduction, I lay some groundwork for parts 2 (Determinism) and 3 (Indeterminism & Conclusion). [Music: Daft Punk, Adagio for Tron.]

[kendogbsc]

I think the Schopenhauer's quote (or possibly Einstein's misinterpretation of his) sums it up as nice as possible. I've been having an almost word to word phrase in my head ever since I started thinking about this matter (or so I want to believe), and still wondering why it is not enough for some, or many people to realize the impossibility of free will or that whether the determinism is true or not doesn't really affect that idea. (And I just realized how silly it sounds) I can't decide whether I should have some room in my head for the other possibilities though. After all, what I can think of is very limited and it can be flawed. I don't think I really have any choice over whether I will stay skeptical or not though... cause I can't choose what I choose!

[buddhismphilosophyscience]

When it comes to the PSR, I guess I may agree that a principled distinction between what "requires" explanation and what doesn't may not be possible, but a principled distinction between what turns out to have an explanation and what doesn't may be drawn on the basis of epistemology. I'm not sure there is any objective property of requiring, or calling out for, explanation
So for example, you can figure out if an event has a causal explanation by empirically investigating whether there is a sort of event that might serve as a cause of the event to be explained
I believe empirical research has failed to show that the first moment of the Universe's existence, assuming it began at the Big Bang, is the sort of event for which a plausible causal explanation is available
But I worry that I'm overlooking some inextricable link between epistemology and explanation that makes such an inference unjustified
perhaps I'm using circular reasoning or something

I would actually take seriously the idea that nothing has an explanation, i.e. that everything just is as it is