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Nietzsche's Metaphysics? - Galen Strawson
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§1 Eleven claims (These are referenced throughout the lecture.)
[1] There’s no persisting and unitary self.
[2] There’s no fundamental (real) distinction between objects on the one hand and their propertiedness on the other.
[3] There’s no fundamental (real) distinction between the basic or basal properties of things and the power properties of things.
[4] There’s no fundamental (real) distinction between objects or substances on the one hand and processes and events on the other.
[5] Reality isn’t truly divisible into causes and effects.
[6] Objects aren’t governed by laws of nature ontologically distinct from them.
These claims are central to Nietzsche’s metaphysics. He also holds that
[7] there’s no free will as ordinarily understood
(although I won’t say much about this), and that
[8] nothing can ever happen otherwise than it does — a position which is often called ‘determinism’, although the name is not apt in Nietzsche’s case.
Finally (for now) he inclines towards the ancient—but also very modern—view that
[9] there is a fundamental (non-trivial) sense in which reality is one
and towards what is arguably the most plausible—although difficult—view of the nature of reality, i.e. the hard-nosed stuff-monist view that
[10] reality is suffused with—if it does not consist of—mentality in some form or sense.
One reason for attributing [10] to him is his recurrent attraction to the idea that
[11] everything is ‘will to power’
for it seems that to endorse [11] is already to endorse [10] in some form, to say that everything is in some respect mental, to deny that everything is a matter of power or force conceived of in some wholly non-mental way.
Here, I propose, we have the core of Nietzsche's metaphysics.
/ / /
“My route to panpsychism was through Nietzsche ... He emphasizes this notion of the will to power [which is] ultimately a drive that underlies what we see as matter. [It’s] not consciousness, absolutely; but it is a form of sentience which underlies everything.”
- Peter Sjöstedt-Hughs
/ / /
Keynote speeches and special session given at the international conference 'Nietzsche on Mind and Nature', held at St. Peter's College, Oxford, 11-13 September 2009, organized by the Faculty of Philosophy, University of Oxford.
[1] There’s no persisting and unitary self.
[2] There’s no fundamental (real) distinction between objects on the one hand and their propertiedness on the other.
[3] There’s no fundamental (real) distinction between the basic or basal properties of things and the power properties of things.
[4] There’s no fundamental (real) distinction between objects or substances on the one hand and processes and events on the other.
[5] Reality isn’t truly divisible into causes and effects.
[6] Objects aren’t governed by laws of nature ontologically distinct from them.
These claims are central to Nietzsche’s metaphysics. He also holds that
[7] there’s no free will as ordinarily understood
(although I won’t say much about this), and that
[8] nothing can ever happen otherwise than it does — a position which is often called ‘determinism’, although the name is not apt in Nietzsche’s case.
Finally (for now) he inclines towards the ancient—but also very modern—view that
[9] there is a fundamental (non-trivial) sense in which reality is one
and towards what is arguably the most plausible—although difficult—view of the nature of reality, i.e. the hard-nosed stuff-monist view that
[10] reality is suffused with—if it does not consist of—mentality in some form or sense.
One reason for attributing [10] to him is his recurrent attraction to the idea that
[11] everything is ‘will to power’
for it seems that to endorse [11] is already to endorse [10] in some form, to say that everything is in some respect mental, to deny that everything is a matter of power or force conceived of in some wholly non-mental way.
Here, I propose, we have the core of Nietzsche's metaphysics.
/ / /
“My route to panpsychism was through Nietzsche ... He emphasizes this notion of the will to power [which is] ultimately a drive that underlies what we see as matter. [It’s] not consciousness, absolutely; but it is a form of sentience which underlies everything.”
- Peter Sjöstedt-Hughs
/ / /
Keynote speeches and special session given at the international conference 'Nietzsche on Mind and Nature', held at St. Peter's College, Oxford, 11-13 September 2009, organized by the Faculty of Philosophy, University of Oxford.
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