Free Will “in the superlative metaphysical sense”

Can we be ultimately responsible for what we do? No one denies that we can be the proximate cause of our actions. I made this episode because I wanted to. But merely being the proximate cause of an action is compatible with determinism – no determinist in their right mind would deny that I made this episode because I wanted to. So is there a deeper sense of responsibility that can be attributed to human beings? One which absolves God, the world, ancestors, luck, and society of what we choose to do?

This deeper kind of responsibility, which Nietzsche disparagingly called “‘freedom of the will’ in the superlative metaphysical sense,” and which is often ascribed to human beings by the religious, arguably requires one to be causa sui – to be the ultimate cause of oneself. Since this is impossible, we can be sure that we do not possess the kind of responsibility that so many seem convinced we have. You can’t be radically self-creating in a way that gets you beyond a compatibilist notion of responsibility.

It’s unclear whether our lack of ultimate responsibility for our actions is a problem for libertarian free will. Do libertarians unanimously impute this degree of responsibility to humans? No – some do, some don’t. Regardless, the attacks on free will “in the superlative metaphysical sense” from Nietzsche and Strawson convincingly show that our responsibility for our actions is quite limited.

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"The causa sui is the best self-contradiction that has been conceived so far, it is a sort of rape and perversion of logic; but the extravagant pride of man has managed to entangle itself profoundly and frightfully with just this nonsense. The desire for ‘freedom of the will’ in the superlative metaphysical sense, which still holds sway, unfortunately, in the minds of the half-educated; the desire to bear the entire and ultimate responsibility for one’s actions oneself, and to absolve God, the world, ancestors, chance, and society involves nothing less than to be precisely this causa sui and, with more than Münchhausen’s audacity, to pull oneself up into existence by the hair, out of the swamps of nothingness."

Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, sec. 21 (tr. W. Kaufmann)

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/ timestamps /

00:00 Introduction

01:09 Free will in the superlative metaphysical sense

03:53 Narrowing down the options

08:39 Nietzsche

09:58 Strawson's Basic Argument

14:07 Final thoughts

[josephtnied]

The challenge for the proponent of libertarian free will is, show how "randomness" (in the sense that the state of something IS NOT the necessary result of the prior state) and "determined" (in the sense that the state of something IS the necessary result of the prior state) are not a true dichotomy. Since neither random nor determined allow for libertarian free will, there must be another option; however, as far as I can tell there can't be any other option and it's an open challenge to hear what that is and how it would work.

I would also posit that "randomness" (in the sense that the state of something IS NOT the necessary result of the prior state) is impossible; this is because there's no way for a change to occur if it doesn't have a reason/cause, which is what "randomness" in this sense would require.

This has cosmological implications. If randomness is impossible, and determinism is necessary, then in order for any specific event to become actual, every possible event must be actual (because in order for some specific events to occur and not others, randomness would be required). I would propose an cosmology in which all logically possible worlds are actual, with the grounding behind it all being "logic" itself.

[caricue]

If you are trying to find out how nature works, you can't start with a search for responsibility. Nature does not do ethics or morality, so your search is doomed if you base your enquiry on any of these premises. If you just look at nature, you will see that creatures move through the world with knowledge and intention. A mind is required to generate the various behaviors that are expected to reach the desired goal, so it isn't unreasonable in the general sense to attribute the authorship of these various behaviors to the individual from whom they emerge. This may or may not fit into your search for "ultimate responsibility", but it is a pretty good description of reality, and reality always wins.

[dustinellerbe]

This applies to god as well. It is bound by its nature and abilities. Do you agree with this?

[CosmoPhiloPharmaco]

What a coincidence. I was reading about Nietzsche these days. I read Russell's critique of him. Russell said Nietzsche's contribution to metaphysics or epistemology is virtually zero, and his only 'contributions' to philosophy is in the area of ethics (which Russell proceeded to beat very badly/without pity). I've heard Jordan Peterson praising Nietzsche's intellect, but I don't understand why. I rarely see Nietzsche's name in any relevant/serious philosophical discussion.

The only thing Russell said was interesting about Nietzsche are his prophecies (of his book "Thus Spoke Zarathustra") which were fulfilled.

Indeed, my personal problem with Nietzsche is that he is supposed to have laid the foundations of post-modernism -- the movement that denies truth, science and reason. As Michael Huemer said in one of his books, "I hate relativism, and you should hate it too."

[jaskitstepkit]

From 1 being no free will exists and in 10 libertarian free will exists where are you ? I think people do not have 100% freewill but they have enough to be responsible for their actions.