Leo Strauss: Ancients v. Moderns II

Drawing some big ideas from Strauss's "Natural Right and History" and "What is Political Philosophy?" this concluding video on Strauss attempts to draw some insights for our current political world from Strauss's criticism of modern political thought's over-reliance on formula, mechanics, and "scientific" planning. This over-reliance can lead to an unwarranted faith in "isms," rendering us incapable of actually solving problems.

[silverskid]

Some thoughts/responses...
Re: idea that "Strauss is a supporter of the old idea of moral absolutes (with Socratic humility) which may morph into an attack on critics of traditional morality."--

I think Strauss was defending what he took to be the way of life of the ancient Socratic philosopher rather than any substantive set of beliefs that might be put forward as *absolute.* Any absolute principle is, by definition, not open to Socratic interrogation or the humility principle. So Strauss understands Socratic and Platonic philosophy as emphasizing the questioning process ( dialectic) rather than any seeming conclusions reached in the dialogues. The conclusions are always capable of being questioned, and nothing is beyond further questioning (this includes Plato's theory of forms which is criticized harshly in Parmenides). So rather than "absolutes with Socratic humility, " it is a search for absolutes which may, nevertheless, not be attainable. The ideal ancient philosopher believes that there is an objective moral and ontological order, but does not believe it is accessible to Reason in any "completed" form. All conclusions are tentative, not absolute.

Thus he writes, “[T]he problems are always more evident than the solutions. All solutions are questionable… Therefore, the right way of life cannot be established metaphysically except by a completed metaphysics [whose possibility he denies], and therefore the right way of life remains questionable” (NRH, pp. 122–123).

Indeed this is why he spent much of his career puzzling over the incompatibility of Reason and Revelation ("Athens and Jerusalem"). Neither can refute the other, but it is the absolutism of revealed religion (e.g. dogma) that threatens to terminate philosophical questioning in favor of a complete revelation. Strauss explicitly denies that we can have a "completed metaphysics" without treating philosophy as a kind of revelation of the absolute (e.g. Hegel). Revealed religion, however, remains a live option for the religious even though it can be neither refuted nor vindicated. The religious option allows for faith in first principles and ultimate truths, but faith is not knowledge. The latter is established by way of Reason through inquiry, not reliance on Revelation. But Strauss takes seriously the claims of revealed religion even though those who give assent to them cease to question their own presuppositions and premises as a good Socratic philosopher would. He writes, "The genuine refutation of orthodoxy would require the proof that the world and human life are perfectly intelligible without the assumption of a mysterious God" and goes on to deny that any such refutation can be made. We're left with what he calls the "theological-political predicament." Theological bases for authority, though not philosophical, cannot be refuted or ignored.

So the Ancients/philosophers see Reason as the *search* for universal truths even without any clear knowledge of them. (I think this is what you mean by "absolutes with Socratic humility?") The Moderns (e.g.Enlightenment thinkers) exaggerate the powers of Reason so as to make disappointment about its prospects inevitable. The "isms" you mention are all, originally, put forward as absolutes, not as the theses of moral relativists. Marxism emerged as an alleged "positive science" and not "one among many possible valid perspectives" ala relativism. Liberal Democracy emerged as a (supposedly) rationally grounded theory of rights, not arbitrary exercise of power, and so on. Only later is it clear that all these "isms" cannot be true, that they contradict one another and that each badly exaggerates its basis in "Reason" and its status as "absolute." Nietzsche can be thanked for making the absurd claims of modern reason apparent, thinks Strauss (e.g. "[T]he critique of modern rationalism or of the modern belief in reason by Nietzsche cannot be dismissed or forgotten. This is the deepest reason for the crisis of liberal democracy."- 3 Waves of Modernity). But Nietzsche also rails against Ancient rationalism, and Socrates in particular (see The Problem of Socrates in Twilight of the Idols). Strauss, on the other hand, thinks the ancient Reason of Socratic philosophy was open-ended and *not* absolute. He thinks Nietzsche is dead wrong about Socratic rationality being hyperbolic. He also thinks that Nietzsche brings about nihilism by making history a more basic category than rationality, which in Nietzschean historicism is merely a product of historical contexts and can appeal to nothing beyond them for validity. Thus Nietzsche relativizes *all* rational categories to historical ones. Further, both ancient and modern Reason as sources of agency, thinks Strauss, get replaced by the will to power-- i.e. to the *non-rational* affirmation of power and domination uber alles (though, I don't agree with that interpretation of N, personally). Strauss sees as problematic the exorbitant claims of Modern reason not connected to the Socratic quest for knowledge of the transhistorical Good. But rather than say "farewell to reason, " he wants Moderns to in some sense (not made quite clear) to tap the resources of Ancient philosophy and rationality to overcome what he sees as the plague of nihilism and relativism.

In short, the "Reason" of the Moderns seeks categorical truths beyond realistic attainability, and this "will to truth" (Nietzsche) exposes the vacuity and contingency of foundational moral claims. Relativism and nihilism result from hubris and overconfidence in Modern Reason gone awry (reason not tethered to the Socratic quest for the True and Good). The choice, then, is not moral relativism or absolutism as some interpreters of S have suggested, but an open-ended commitment to *something like* the ancient task of philosophizing in *search* of moral truth as opposed to rejecting its very possibility out of hand (via radical skepticism and/or relativism).

Some potential problems: Personally, I'm not sure Strauss is right in holding that Plato makes no universal or absolute claims that lie beyond further questioning (this is at least debatable). Some possible Platonic claims of this kind might include that the Good is one and not many, beyond sensible knowledge and outside of time. Are those in doubt? It seems they are presupposed as Truths in the definition of philosophical Reason as Strauss understands it. Socratic Reason is aimed at discovering the nature of these very Truths (i.e. the essence of The Good which, once understood conduces to just and harmonious life in the Polis). Philosophy is search for such fundamental Truth first and foremost. To search for something only makes sense if it exists. If the "The Good" is a chimera than Straussian philosophy is empty jest. Why is Strauss able to defend the supposed existence of The Good against the skeptic anymore than he can defend the truths of Reason over Faith in revelation (which he admits he cannot do)? Did the Ancient philosophers really all uphold a belief in universal Truth and Goodness? What about the Academic skeptics (e.g. Carneades) who thrived in Plato's academy after his death? Empedocles, Epicurus, and Lucretius who said that all is just atoms in the void? Strauss' is a very selective understanding of "Ancient" philosophy. Why not make Pyrhronian skepticism the standard rather than the Socratic dialogue as Strauss interprets it? But in that case the "problem" of relativism and radical skepticism would be seen as always-present and daunting rather than a modern pathology.

[johnmckeown]

I never cease to be amazed at how little I know.
I heard an expression lately, certainty is their crown of thorns.
I'm beginning to see what he meant by that. As always thank you

[robgilbert]

Super helpful - I'm doing a critical comparison of Strauss and Oakeshott with regard to Hobbes, and your video just locked in for me the notion that we have two moral absolutists confronting the first modern political philosopher (I think....) Cheers!

[roxynoz]

Excellent video as always, the modern political right has been transformed into modernist while the left is post-modernist.
Strauss talked about the three developmental stages of a political ideology saying the last stage was positivist. From my perspective, the only positivist right-wing movement was fascism.
I find this quite interesting because people like to categorize the right as merely reactionary's but in truth the most radical right-wing movements in the 20th centuries wanted to produce the "new man" that was more eugenic and what they thought would be more superior

[azeeznasser]

Great lesson for me thank doctor Laurie J

[thehustle-withchris]

Please cover Jungian ideological possession. Thanks.

[ScottyRawdy]

It's like words are being said out of order or just thrown out randomly. This isn't how people talk. People who pretend to be intellectual, use this tactic of doubletalk to trick others into thinking the person double speaking is intelligent.