Graham PRIEST: Fictional objects, fictional subjects

Seminar at the Center for Logic, Language, and Cognition (LLC), University of Turin (28 February 2019).

ABSTRACT. Much human mental activity is intentional. The mental state of a subject is directed to (intends) an object. This essay is about these two poles of intentionality. The most notable thing about the object pole is that is can be a non-existent object or state of affairs. This is most obvious in acts concerning fiction. To understand such states we therefore need non-existent objects. These objects may not actually have the properties they are thought of as having; but they have them in the scenarios intended: in the case of fictional objects, the fictional scenarios. Turning to the subject pole, the subject itself is a kind of object. Most Western philosophers have taken it to be an existent one; but many Buddhist philosophers have held it to be a non-existent one. The self is simply an illusion produced by a bunch of neural processes. That of which we have an illusion is a non-existent object in a fiction the person tells about themself.

[louisrouille]

Unfortunately, there are big sound problems in the video and, at some times, Graham Priest's voice simply disappears. It's borderline comprehensible at these times. I do not know whether that is fixable...