Relativism and Truth

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0:00 - introduction
2:26 - correspondence theory
12:08 - coherence theory
15:31 - pragmatist theory
20:36 - deflationary theory
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Relativism:

Nelson Goodman's worldmaking:

KaneB
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Your chosen topics are getting more and more interesting.

SC-gwnp
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Your correspondence theory form of relativism doesn't work as it would be objectively true that if you carve out the world a specific way, a certain state of affairs are objectively the case. Also with the example regarding flatness, you can argue that one object is only flat relative to some other object but this objection fails when taking into account something that is truly flat or relative relations such as "Object X is flatter than Object Y". I would also say that things that are not said are implied in sentences such as "This table is flat" depending on context which makes it the case that it is objectively true that the table is flat depending on what I mean.

yusucc
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Imho relativistes MUST identify all conjoined assumptions. The sky is blue is true relative to the colour palette of specific wavelengths of light, relative to time of day, or overcast, or from which point on earth or altitude.

The reason it's important for relativists to specify is because relativists only argue truth from all others based on those very assumptions others have. It's their whole schtick to find holes in assertions. That's their defining feature.

Objective truths exist but they're all dependent on language and interpretation. It doesn't mean objective truth doesn't exist, it means objective truths exist within languages which are capable of being very well designed and defined. The truth that there are words is objectively true based on every and all definitions, and definitions are ipso facto evidence of words, thus I've presented you with an objective truth confined to language. It is not the case that physics directly caused words, words are emergent properties of life forms which emerged from physical laws. But words exist is only true after words are produced and defined, not at the big bang but some time necessarily afterwards.

This to me is the common sense distinctions of real truths, and the point of being so pedantic is an exercise of thought, not a practise for debate but rather a tool to analyze assumptions which may seem trivial but wind up being pivotal to the context in which communication is occurring. Often we don't even consider other interpretations unless we intentionally and deliberately stop to consider every little dependency our truth (or another's) can be dependent upon. Sometimes that matters and most times it's overlooked without practise using the tool. It's not useful to use it to argue unless one finds that context is broken to a supposedly absolute truth being presented.

paxdriver
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I am also watching this video while lying in bed.

saimbhat
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I agree with relativism in conjunction with the 'worldmaking' idea but I don't think our choice of context changes the nature of external reality. I see it more like adjusting the focus and aperture on an optical device like a camera. Each perspective makes certain propositions true and precise while making others vague or even inexpressible altogether. Changing perspective won't change any true propositions into a false proposition with the same meaning (but it may make previously true propositions into ill-defined sequences of symbols).

rogerwitte
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I'm not really familiar with the anti-realism vs realism debate in the philosophy of mathematics but I've always intuitively been against some kind of mathematical realism on similar grounds to your "drawing a circle around the table's atoms" argument.

If you have a group of x number of trees, you could 'draw a circle' around any number of trees and create a lot of different combinations describing all sorts of formations. And behind each of these formations, there would be a corresponding number (eg: there are 8 trees in this 'drawn circle'). What's more is that we don't have to limit this set to integers. We could reasonably imagine drawing this circle and getting half a tree, or two and three quarters of a tree.

This seems to go against mathematical realism for me. It seems more reasonable that rather than mathematical entities being independent of our minds and ready for us to discover, these formations are constructed by us. I just find the latter causal explanation more intuitive. But maybe I've misunderstood what mathematical realism entails, or there might be various forms (I imagine there are).

komba
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A little Rortian birdy told me that truth is what your contemporaries let you get away with saying :D

Catofminerva
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Neurath's objection to correspondence is that we're only ever comparing statements to statements. What corresponds to what? Some statement of fact to some statement of experience. Correspondence theorists say we correspond our descriptions to "reality" but reality is just another linguistic representation. What do you mean by reality? Well, I mean some set of statements which includes the claim I'm saying corresponds to reality!

DigitalGnosis
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William James' understanding of the pragmatic theory of truth quite clearly fits with relativism as you say. I still dont understand Dewey's or Pierce's understanding of the pragmatic theory of truth. The concept of the end of enquiry or even his occasional claim that it is fated to be agreed upon seem very mysterious to me. A group can be fated to agree upon something while it is wrong. Think of the inculcation of values or the creation of substantive similarities; people can share the same background beliefs or practices and thus be fated to arrive at the same conclusion to something even if it isn't true. This occurs in political arguments all the time; on social issues it is extremely common and pronounced. This is why republicanism and political perfectionism are good and necessary; one needs to shape the citizens to arrive at certain conclusions to ensure stability of the regime.

macattack
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A pet peeve is the conflating of epistemological relativity and ontological relativity. The relativity of simultanaity in physics makes this conflation for instance, but I figure that's cos Bridgeman and the operationalists insisted on it. How we perceive the world may well be warped without the world itself being warped haha

absupinhere
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Good video, however, some objections:

Correspondence:
Given an object x that is a set where each member is some fundamental substance (like atoms, or pixels of perception e.t.c depending on materialism or idealism respectively) then one can construct a new object x* by adding or removing one member of this set. This just creates two objects where the proposition "x is F" is true (corresponds to reality) but " x* is F" is false (does not correspond to reality), making it "relative", but only insofar as two actors A and B have a language problem that makes them think they're talking about the same thing but are actually talking about different objects. Clearing this confusion shows that the correspondence is objective.

Coherence:
"I can create two sets of beliefs that are coherent, explanatory and simple", has this actually been done? Has this been demonstrated or is it an asumption? As a constructivist (in the philosophy of mathematics) I believe this needs to be demonstrated.

Pragmatist:
What's not to say that rational actors converge on a single set of propositions? There are reasons to believe this can be the case Consider a set of n subjects that update their beliefs in a rational way(like for example, Bayesian updating). If all actors do this, then Aumann's agreement theorem indicate that their beliefs converge.

kattenelvis
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My own pragmatic theory is that; truth in general as a schema for navigating the world, is useful (for humans at least). It is very plausible that truth is simply a byproduct of language, as well as the development of our various predictive capacities. In this sense, our (i.e., all humans) pragmatics are all the same (e.g., we must identify objects in relation to other objects in the world, we must communicate with each other, deduce possibilities, perform arithmetic etc.) and so, all humans should, in theory, have the same solution space for "true things". Scientific epistemology is seemingly the most pragmatic epistemology, so it should thus be the "best" epistemology. So, then it would seem that the appropriate criteria for evaluating truth claims would be to evaluate its pragmatic content? To me this presents a bit of an issue now as it could be very difficult to evaluate pragmatic content in some cases.

mrpickle
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Re: Correspondence theory.
Context-sensitive definitions do not translate to relative truths... By whichever context you choose to define a table, whether as a solid object or simples arranged table-wise you must translate the proposition to the appropriate context. Only if you insist on remaining within your context will the truth seem relative.

The table being flat is not a 'relative' truth...it is true in a colloquial sense and false in an engineering sense. This does not make it a relative truth! In a colloquial context, it is absolutely true and in an engineering context, it is absolutely false.

If you know nothing about engineering and flatness standards you effectively cannot change context and the conversation seems to imply a relativeness to truth...If you can at least acknowledge that you don't know about engineering standards then you can simply say I do not understand how you are using the word 'flat', but according to my use of the 'flat' the table corresponds to being 'flat'.

Needless to say 'being able to put some stuff on a table without it falling off. Is absolutely true in some context of 'table' and 'stuff' even if you have no language to express different contexts of the word 'flat'.

I challenge you to find one case where 'relativism' is not mearly a refusal or ignorance to accept the words of the person in the context in which they intend them.

truthseeker
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Very late to the game here, but I think Pierce's view can be reconciled with relativism if we incorporate the factor of human interest. The end of inquiry is not a determinate point, like an abstract future physics ala Hempel. Instead, the end of inquiry is a negotiation between (present) human capabilities and (present) human interest. I can't draw a curve here, but you could imagine some maxima for capability and interest where the current end of inquiry resides. At our time in history, that might look like the scientific consensus of the academy or whatever. Most people just won't have the interest or capabilities to further the inquiry beyond what the relevant experts have already accomplished. So truth in the Piercian view could be reconciled with a theory of truth contingent on the utility of truth to the knowers. Not that there aren't weaknesses here, i.e., once an expert has determined a career track, it generates an interest in "producing" truth (to differentially establish a reputation within the field or something). I think this theory fares better using ordinary examples. If I see a black and white striped, horse-like animal at the circus, but then it disappears from sight, I will probably be satisfied to end the inquiry with my impression that it was a zebra. Going out of my way to gather more information would require interest I probably don't have. So, I saw a zebra. It works at the level of individuals and institutions (even societies). This brings power into the equation, which I don't want to touch here. But you could intuit the influence on truth that Catholic authority had in the 13th century or whatever.

anthonyspencer
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This feels more like a linguistic argument. I think it is a weakness of natural language that correspondence theory breaks down but I don’t think that actually addresses the core philosophical proposition. I will grant you that what we call a table or how we define its flatness is subjective and somewhat arbitrary but I disagree that the truth of its existence or truth about its qualities are relative.

wilsonborkowski
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Thanks for the content Kane! Personally, I would be glad if Kane made one or a series of videos about pragmatism in epistemology and philosophy of science. In my opinion, this approach largely correlates with relativism, constructivism, etc. At the same time, there are not so many videos on this topic in good quality on YouTube. Support with likes if you also want a video about pragmatism!

LEMAN-AND
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If truth is correspondence to a proposition about the world, then truth is relative. If truth is that which actually is, does and does not in the world, then truth cannot be relative. The actual is absolute, perspective must needs be relative.
Without perspective can there be such a thing as falsity?
With perspective and the knowledge that there are others that may or may not perceive as you do,
then truth and untruth come into existence.

MagnumInnominandum
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How does this relativism of truth play out in actual life? Does it feel different to argue about global warming (for example) depending on whether you subscribe to relative truth vs. absolute truth? How does it interact with uncertainty and humility? Can relativity of truth allow for such concepts, or are they just rewordings of "I acknowledge a larger-than-usual possibility that some future version of me will have a different truth"? Can a relativist believe things that are untrue? If truth is relative, and I hold that truth is not relative, am I right or am I wrong?

MsNathanv
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Very on topic to my thoughts lately thanks. And see you in a few hours on the Pangburn thingy

daltsu