Why Did Soldiers Fight in Lines With No Cover? Because Muskets!

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The second part to our exploration of that "Necessary Madness," linear warfare. Which is to say- why did soldiers fight in long, shoulder-to-shoulder lines, without bothering to take cover? Well, sometimes they did take cover, but that's besides the point, because there are a LOT of very important reasons why they would also fight in "Close Order."

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Timestamps:
Intro 00:00
Sponsored Message 01:20
Maximising Firepower 03:39
Why Not Spread Out? 05:21
Morale & Psychological Impact 08:15
In Melee Combat (Bayonets) 09:23
Depth of Formations 10:18
Skirmishers & Concluding Points 12:55
Credits 15:03

[BrandonF]

One little point of correction- towards the end, I say "The British always fought in two lines" but that really just reflects my preference to the late 18th C. above the rest of the period. This was NOT always the case, it just became the more common method during at least the AWI and Napoleonic Wars, and even then you can find plenty of exceptions where they fought in different styles. That line was a little more 'off the cuff' and I was way too broad there!

[LokiLaughs]

Explaining the necessity of closed rank formations requires people to understand that opposing armies are going to be using combined arms warfare against you. Enemy cannons will out range your infantry and make a mockery of cover. Enemy calvary will easily run down dispersed infantry caught in open ground and spike unsupported cannons. Most importantly if a route begins it is contagious and retreating infantry cannot outrun horses. Most will be killed or captured by enemy calvary.

[Altrantis]

Also, one thing to consider: These armies could beat any army that fought in a more traditional manner. Quite overwhelmingly, too. That meant they only had to worry about what other armies that did the same thing as themselves did. Which is what leads to this sort of firepower over cover logic.

[LEARSIKCIGAM]

Brandon (Britphile) F stands in his living room and sweetly fondles his musket.

[bromhead]

you always know it is good when you see Brandon has uploaded 3 minutes ago

[ReviveHF]

The musketeers or Line Infantries are fulfilling the archers or crossbowman's role in the early modern period. Archers and crossbowman from the classical and medieval period tended to launch their arrows in volleys to suppress the enemies before engage in melee combat. Linear warfare was not limited to Europe, the Japanese, Koreans, Manchus and the Chinese were known to fought in lines. There's a Chinese General named Qi Ji Guang wrote manuals about linear tactics.

[junewalker]

I think a lot of armchair tacticians forgot the critical part where people don't want to die. If the enemy masses up in a line, yeah you could take a series of potshots when they pass by you hiding place or something, but everyone who does that is dead. If you bring a les dense line, yeah maybe you could get a scenario where you're trading better than they are, but most people in that battle will probably die. The only way you're getting people to stand up to that (without bolt action levels of firepower or machine guns) is to bring as many people as they do so that the people you bring think they might survive if they win.

[Nikolapoleon]

I think it may be helpful to at some point add concepts of maneuver on the strategic [rather than tactical] level to the dialogue, to help potential viewers understand the relative value of conventional and irregular [guerilla] tactics and the circumstances under which each can be used.
What I mean is that some viewers may question why any army or faction in a war would wish to risk fighting a "set piece battle" in the first place, when it might be safer to always hide from the enemy and slowly pick them off bit by bit.

From my own research, I get the impression that it's because it becomes necessary, at times, to mass as much force as possible to protect or attack _strategically_ valuable targets. For example if an army isn't willing to engage in open battle, how can they prevent the enemy from capturing or destroying their supplies, command posts, or civilian population centers? [Consider, for instance, how Julius Caesar would famously force battle upon his Gallic adversaries by positioning himself to pillage population centers or supply depots.]
I think this bears mentioning, and you may have something even greater to add to all that. Either way, though, I think it's important for the viewer to be made to understand why anyone would fight a "field battle" in the first place, before going into too much depth about the utility of line formations in the field.

[gadyariv]

I really don't see the issue.
Humans fought in formation ever since the first organized armies in Mesopotamia, all through History into the 18th centaury.
would be actually strange if they suddenly stopped doin that, that just how combat worked, why would we expect the introduction of fire arms would immediately change that.
it's just our Anachronistic modern point of view that expects 18th centaury people to apply 20th centaury sensibilities on their era.

[Fusilier]

Linear warfare was not limited to Europe, Asian militaries fought in lines too. Shogunate Japan is a good example, during the Sengoku period, Oda Nobunaga began adopting the matchlock musket, called the Tanegashima Teppo, as a result the Japanese began to change their tactics. Originally, the ashigaru fought in open order, but soon realised random potshots was impotent at stopping an infantry advance, so Samurai clans began experimenting with formations, to improve the efficiency and use of the teppo. Like Europe, teppo ashigaru were arranged in either two or three ranks, depending on the size of the province's population, and the availability of teppos, those without a musket were armed with pikes called yaris, however, the bow, or the yumi was still retained to protect the gunmen while they reloaded, and it worked as a skirmishing weapon in order to save volley fire for tactical advantages. The ashigaru eventually developed tactics that utilised these arms, first, the bowmen would skirmish, next, the gunmen would fire a disciplined volley, then the pikemen would advance to capture the field, so even Japan joined the infantry revolution, and used identical tactics familiar to Europe.

[TheReykjavik]

I think the value of close order comes more from melee combat (infantry vs. infantry or infantry vs. cavalry) than from concentrating musket fire. The example of two units with different density but the same length doesn't really make sense, unless one side has only half as many soldiers. If two forces of approximately equal numbers fight with musket fire only, the side with the looser formation will hit a higher percentage of shots, and also holds the flanks. The morale impact of enemy fire is also diminished if you are in loose order, because if they kill someone three spots down from you in close order, that's a couple feet away and you may be splattered with blood and hear them screaming, but in loose order you might not even notice in the battle. And without at least the threat of a bayonet or cavalry charge, punching a hole in a loose order formation doesn't mean that much, if 100 men concentrate fire on 10 and wipe them all out, while the other 90 distribute their fire, even if the concentrated force hits all their shots and the distributed force only hits 1/3, it is the concentrated force that loses more soldiers. Overconcentration of fire is a waste of combat power that can lose a battle. A close formation can theoretically distribute their fire across a wider length than they occupy, but coordinating that is impractical, and would defeat the purpose of concentrating fire in the first place.

But as soon as the possibility of a charge is considered, the need for close order becomes far greater, while a loose formation can aim at an angle across the line to focus fire onto a close formation to exchange volleys at close to parity, they cannot do the same for melee. A close formation can fire one or two volleys at a looser formation, killing enough and breaking the formation enough to walk in and have an overwhelming number of bayonets, and each of the soldiers in loose order in turn faces 4 enemies at once, their musket and bayonet will be parried aside while two or three others stab them, they will die quickly with little chance of even wounding their attackers, who can then turn to the next soldiers in line, and the soldiers not yet in melee might refuse to fire into the charging enemy after they've met the line because their could kill their comrades (although shooting into a clump of 3 enemies and one friend who has already been stabbed won't make your friend any more dead and might save your life).

So the ideal density of a line is enough to repel a charge and no more. In the period this channel covers, that means a tight formation is needed in a field, a loose but still linear formation in rougher terrain (as the rougher terrain inhibits charges).

I don't think more accurate modern rifles fundamentally change the ability of skirmishers to kill everyone standing on a battlefield, with muskets it will take more volleys and each volley will take longer, but the opposing force also suffers the same inaccuracy and slow rate of fire, so the skirmishers can still kill them all if they stand still. Loose order still gives one volley in the same time as close order does. What modern firearms and artillery do fundamentally change is how well a loose formation can defend against a charge. While skirmishers with muskets or muzzle loading rifles may get 1 to 3 volleys off at an advancing enemy, the same soldiers armed with Enfield rifles can put 10 accurately aimed rounds downrange. Machine guns and rapid firing artillery with explosive shells further enable the braking of charges. In the age of linear warfare, artillery could already wipe out close order formations, but with their limited range (especially for cannister shot), infantry or cavalry could form up for a charge out of range and potentially cover the distance before all being dead, but with the extended range and increased rate of fire, that slowly became impossible (except for unusual circumstances) first for infantry then for cavalry.

[jeromydickey]

Brandon, I’ve been watching your videos for a while and I love seeing the passion and expertise you bring to this niche interest, keep up the good work. It amuses me when people ask “why does/did the army do this/that?” In the army we only have one question: “how do we maximize unit lethality based on our current situation?” And everything else that we do is the answer to that question. I’m glad that you elaborated on that concept in this and similar videos and don’t try to muddy the waters with random hogwash.

[anitaibele]

I suspect control and communication were also important reasons for fighting in closed formations.

In a formation, even less disciplined soldiers would know "where their place is"

It is also much easier for officers to command a group of men than individual soldiers scattered on the battlefield.
Remember, communication in combat was limited to shouts, trumpets, and flag signals.

[CrazayFish]

1:26 POV Brandon forgot to take his medication and begins to experience psychosis

[titolovely]

cohesion was also a huge part of it. most armies did not have the totality of their men being professional soldiers. the core of the army was ofc, but to fill the ranks levied troops and mercenaries were quite common. the flight risk of these troops was therefore much greater and in order to prevent routes, tightly packed units interspersed with veterans and officers assured most of the time that these troops would stay and fight at least up to a point. desertion was a huge problem within armies of all periods. the romans actually employed a similar tactic by putting veteran troops behind the auxiliaries to both fill the gaps as the frontline units faltered but to also motivate the troops in the front to stay and fight rather than route.

[mnk]

As in so many other things, the best way to do it is BOTH. Have a screen of light infantry that fights in open formation whittling down the enemy with needle pricks in front of your main body of regular infantry who then will deliver the decisive freight train. People just love to forget that combined arms tactics are nothing new.

[ncrrangerrolandtembo]

Love your videos Brandon I have always loved and been into 18th century military’s and I learned a lot of stuff from you keep up the good work

[MattythDVN]

Shoulder to shoulder in a desperate square, shot and smoke fill the Flanders air, sabers rattle horses thunder pass but they stand their ground and the square holds fast.

[uccmaster]

Brandon you’ve done an excellent job at explaining the roles of various European armies of this era. Would love an opinion essay from you as to why the American Revolution whet the way it did. We’re taught in our high schools and colleges that Americans won with lots of guerrilla tactics and our ability to skirmish vs British over reliance on linear combat. However your prior videos have suggested that the British redcoat army was not as heavily reliant on linear combat as we were taught and used a great amount of light infantry and forest warfare. So then, how did Nathanial Greene and George Washington and Benedict Arnold and other such early American field officers survive against what feels like a very versatile and flexible army?

[britishmuzzleloaders]

Great topic... talked about this very subject on BOTR the other day! Super nerdy point "Extended Order" vice "Open Order"... The former refers to the interval between files, whilst the latter refers to the distance between ranks...