Consciousness Live! Ep 15 -Discussion with Michael Silberstein

[ejackpete]

The transition between Presence and the early Witness state emergence, is an energetic “contraction” of Presence, into a localized (witnessing) sphere in a perceptual field. The contraction is the arising of the “I” thought; which is the beginning of the subjective experience of dualism.

[wesmartino]

Nice David Lynch pic in the back Dr. Silberstein

[sgtpepper]

Awesome stuff! And i agree with Richard that Michael sounds suspiciously like a panpsychist... ;)

[ericlindell]

Great dialogue !! As regards subject-object cut, von Neumann and Pauli addressed this. Howard Pattee proposed the cut occurs at the point of energy transduction -- e.g, the eyes' bipolar cells, where photonic inputs convert to electrical optic-nerve impulses.
I like to call this the WHERE question, preceding the HOW question of how the incoming stimulus can cause an internal, subjective conscious experience -- I.e, the mind body problem.
I further speculate that the HOW and the WHERE questions are predicated on an affirmative answer to the WHETHER question, as to whether subject and object are distinct.
This ordering of WHETHER, WHERE, and HOW questions applies equally to perception and to willful action.

[milliern]

If one imposes future constraints, so as to eliminate the independence assumption in Bell's Theorem, then how exactly would science yield laws? The assumption of independence in science is the cornerstone notion that the measuring device is independent of the thing measured; so I don't follow how eliminating the independence assumption makes for a tenable thesis. Maybe I am missing something? I have only just begun the book, by the way.

[brahmacharimayumnelsonshar]

please upload a lecture video on Spinoza: the concept of substance. thank you.

[rysw]

I think Silberstein’s version of neutral monism is confused.

I find Mach’s version (or at least my reading of Mach’s version) interesting. First, he doesn’t take his monism as a metaphysical claim. It’s more like a tentative epistemological claim that is subject to refinement and change.

What he basically says is there are sets of things we know about, some of them are objects, some are sensations, etc. We want our theories to encompass all of the things we know about, so we have a single category everything goes in. Then we can later say “hey these neural objects over here in relation to this sensation encompass a conscious experience”. It’s that relation that is mental/subjective.

Conversely you can look at a relation between these neural objects, some photons, and a tree and say the relation between them is a physical one.

But you haven’t admitted any fundamental difference between the actual things in the system, or really more importantly stated what the ontology of the things are at all.

In both cases they are just empirical objects known through experience, and your theories are allowed to draw relations between them.

[nonchai]

An enjoyable and wide ranging conversation that begs for a "rematch" !.  Wasn't expecting the first hour to be phil-of science/physics focused but since I am very into that too didnt mind at all ( just recently started watching some Rovelli talks on YT ). When it came to the second hour on consciousness that was real fun. Found myself being persuaded at different points by both sides!. For the good. Was a little surprised and confused ( as you were clearly ) when it came to his explanation of his form of NM and - like you - it struck me of something near to Idealism.  
Glad you tried to draw out exactly what he means by “presence”. And glad he challenged you on HOT etc. ( something like HOT could turn out to be true AND some future form of IIT true too.... imo)
I could agree with both of you at different points yet both of you do with me. I’d say i’m functionalist, very partial to IIT - and if IIT is wrong I want something of the same i’lk as IIT to be true - because at the least IIT claims to be able to raise predictions *and* have a mathematical/structural basis by which different “quales” ( all intentional - i don’t believe subject-less quales exist ).  I think I agree with him when as i read/recall it - he asserts that that if one isn’t a functionalist its harder to make he case for physicalism unless going panpsychist. But then he seems to me to still fall into a particular strain of panpsychism. 
I was hoping that he would be speaking more about the constraints and contextual aspects of his current thinking - and how he uses that when discussing emergence ( as he has in his co-written papers ). 
As mentioned at the end - the answer to the Hard Problem might come when some misconception/s get replaced by better ones. For example - much of the HP critiques of naturalist physicalist ideas might vanish if reductionism based around point-properties - “things” - gets replaced by relations in the mainstream of metaphysics and physics ( with QM and GR thats already the case but as Layman and others make very clear - these classical physics/metaphysical ideas refuse to die in everyday thinking). 
Michael doesnt seem quite ready to let *every* *thing* go just yet though. 
I’m probably in one of the more wacko ends of all this ( as an amateur ) in that  I want certain theories to become shown to be true - yet in no shape to defend them -but  laying my cards on the table - I am partial to a bit of Tononi mixed with Ladyman shaken and stirred with Tegmark 
Hey - maybe its all a load of Koch.
But I don’t consider myself a panpsychist…. so go figure 
( ok ok ok i’m just confused )

You may now laugh.

[Israel..]

Hey professor Brown do you have any recommended readings for someone at the undergraduate level with a casual interest in philosophy of mind. I've been constructing personal reading lists based primarily on the St. Johns College catalogue but I would like to add some philmind to the mix. Reading Plato after a 3 year philosophical hiatus has made me realize just how much I've forgotten. Hell it doesn't even need to be philmind, just whatever you consider to be elementary and essential.

[martin]

Emergence even if dependent & determined by the physical, isn't physicalism, if defined as only physical entities exist, it's trying to have your cake & eat it too

[mac]

I don't really understand how is RBW is solving anything re: consciousness.

First, To say that instead of moving, things are relational is some tautology or language game. It might (or might not) solve *some* physicist's qualms.

Second, the proposed neutral monism does not solve anything, not even hard problem. It basically claims that there is no qualia and what we see is the world of "neutral stuff". Embodied mind and extended mind solves no hard problem issues. By abandoning the "strong" emergence of consciousness, you're not magically free of the problem of how the subjective experience arises.

There is no explanation about why is my "neutral" stuff different in kind than other "neutral" stuff, apart from the claim that everything is "neutral". Why is red color at all existent and photon frequency is distinct? Delegating literally everything to "neutral (but real) stuff" is a deflection, not explanation. Surely we don't see the objective world out there. We have no God's eye view; when we perceive an apple we see just a symbol that human mind gives out. But why do we experience the symbol at all, and not something else? And why is subject constructed as a subject? Neutral monism gives no answer.