Can we perceive moral properties?

If there are moral facts, how do we know about them? According to moral perceptualism, we can literally perceive moral properties. This videos outlines some of the arguments for and against moral perceptualism, and ends by considering whether moral perceptualism can solve the epistemological challenge to moral realism.

0:00 - Moral perceptualism
4:02 - The contrast argument
15:06 - The looks objection
23:40 - The defect objection
31:21 - The moral theory objection
37:20 - Moral perceptualism and realist epistemology

[KaneB]

Articles mentioned in the video:
Cowan, "Perceptual intuitionism"
Cullison, "Moral perception"
Faraci, "A hard look at moral perception"
Reiland, "On experience moral properties"
Werner, "Moral perception and the contents of experience"

[alvbjo]

Yes, we can perceive moral properties. This is what is happening when you watch a movie that is trying to convey a moral story, simply because you cannot understand what you are watching without it. let's not forget what Kant and Popper have already discovered: even concrete observations of objects are theory-impregnated, are perceived through a certain conceptual lens in the mind. There is nothing different in principle for moral perception, it is just that it is more abstract, and possibly, the causal make up of that perception depends on a type of evaluative understanding that comes from within, rather that photon's hitting the eye.

[Papesz]

Hi Kane. I am wondering what do you think about the following idea. When we ask the question can we perceive at least some type of value in the world, my immediate reaction to this is yes we can. Isn't it the case that in conscious interoception, when I feel pain, pleasure, discomfort, frustration, suffering - any sort of affective states - those have an intrinsic good or bad qualities to them? I mean when we talk about for instance health and disease or life and death, we tend to associate these concepts with positive or negative evaluations, but I think these are cases where we can understand a concept without any sort of evaluation. Death is the end of life processes and it is a further question whether or not it is bad or not, in what context, why etc. But when we talk about pain, pleasure, or other affective subjective experiences, separations between facts and values seems strange to me. In psychology, when we talk about valence, then it seems to me that valence is a real quality of experiences. In fact, I think that the first time when good and bad emerge in the world is with the emergence of affective subjective experiences. Pain is bad, no matter what anybody thinks about it, because it has this kind of negative, intrinsic quality of it - it is not just a matter of interpretation, construction, fiction that it is considered or evaluated as bad. Now it is a further question how we go about constructing a moral system out of these values, but my point is that at least some values seems perfectly objective and factual in a way that undermines the distinction between facts and values.

[exalted_kitharode]

Hey, Kane, have you considered making a video on Colin Marshall's compassionate realism? It seems it is related to perceptualism. It seems you tend to focus on non-naturalist over naturalist solutions

[kravitzn]

Proof that moral perception is bunk: moral reactions can be elicited by fiction, deception, or mistakes in interpretation. In contrast, if I perceive redness or a shape or a sound, I can't be wrong that I'm perceiving that. You can't trick someone into having an experience of redness, whereas you can trick someone into having an "experience" of "wrongness" (e.g. by telling them that a horrible thing happened). Or, you tell them that P believes X, then they see P telling Q that ~X. They will think that P has lied and will think it morally wrong, even if it wasn't wrong, since P doesn't believe X. Moral evaluation can only be a matter of interpretation (in fact, evaluation, which may be taken as a sort of interpretation), not perception.

[ahmedbellankas]

It seems that perception here is used as sense-perception in the looks argument )

[james]

Moral realism strikes me as a really really odd position to hold.

[Locreai]

I've really been getting into your channel. I just started reading Aristotle, after homer, and plan to work my way forward from there. How the HELL do you get it all to sink in so well?

[Alex.G.Harper]

Have you read Vinding’s “suffering-focused ethics: defense and implications”? I find his defense almost sufficient.

[squatch]

Thanks. Excellent video. My first instinct at the beginning of the video in reaction to moral perceptualism was the defect objection. Then I saw you included it too.
Have you ever thought of doing a video on Moral Irrealism? I don't quite understand it myself, and would like a good explanation of it.

[iamFilos]

I find Sturgeon's response satisfying. "Moral Explanations."

[sisyphus]

Hey Kane

Firstly, thank you for the upload. It's pretty fucking swell

Second-- is moral realism a common standpoint in academia? It sounds quite marginal/radical to me, don't know why :P

Thanks :)

[ivan]

l can't stop myself for saying: "Nice spooks".