Metaethics - The Moral Fixed Points

This video outlines a new defense of non-naturalism proposed by Terence Cuneo and Russ Shafer-Landau, who argue that there are various moral propositions that are conceptual truths. These are the moral fixed points.

0:00 - Moral non-naturalism
6:28 - The moral fixed points
15:54 - Conceptual truths
23:51 - Developing non-naturalism
Objections
35:16 - Conceptual deficiency
41:41 - Are the MFPs conceptual truths?
49:30 - Why be moral?

-- Cuneo, Terence and Shafer-Landau, Russ. (2014). "The moral fixed points: New directions for moral nonnaturalism." Philosophical Studies 171(3): 399-443.
-- Evers, Daan and Streumer, Bart. (2016). "Are the moral fixed points conceptual truths?" Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 10(1): 1-9.
-- Ingram, Stephen. (2015) "The moral fixed points: Reply to Cuneo and Shafer-Landau" Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 9(1): 1-5.
-- Killoren, David. (2016). "Why care about moral fixed points?" Analytic Philosophy 57(2): 165-173.

[KaneB]

Metaethics introduction:

Moral non-naturalism:

Moral naturalism:

Moral disagreement:

Evolutionary debunking arguments:

[unknownknownsphilosophy]

This content is why Kane and I get busy under the blanket.

[Twistedhippy]

Excellent. You speak so directly and efficiently I don't seem to get lost when listening to you.
Thank you for what you do

[athlios]

Another great video I'm ready to watch Dr. Baker!

[lanceindependent]

Excellent video, as usual. I'm always happy to see more coverage of metaethics. This video discusses the published critiques of their views, but I'd be curious to hear your own take on moral fixed points in some other video that's less about presenting the academic landscape.

I am reflexively inclined to reject their arguments, but in this case I find myself more confused and hoping to hear more than to simply reject what they're arguing for out of hand. It all sounds very obscure and dubious to me, but I want to see if there's something I'm missing, if there's more arguments or details beneath the surface that would help make sense of what they're arguing for and why.

[nandoxus]

I assume that Morality doesn't exist. Because so far, for me it appears that moral properties can't be defined empirically.

[hamdaniyusuf_dani]

What are the costs vs benefits of recreational slaughter? Our assumptions put into the equation will affect our moral judgment.

[rodrigolabarre]

Is there any video about Moral constructivism? Sean Carroll always talks about it, I think there's a humean constructivism. He makes it sound very intuitive and naturalist.

[niart]

This video greatly confuses me. There are only unmarried bachelors because those are synonyms. It's like saying there are only human people. Is the claim that "wrong" and "recreational murder" are synonyms? Because they then list other things, so "wrong" must have quite a few, contradicting synonyms

[jacklessa]

People try to evoid suffer, we have tried to destroy diseases, hunger, homeless, getting old, evoid death... To not suffer.

The rules of society are going in the same way, we are replacing rules that create more suffer for new rules that create less suffer.(sometimes through argumentation, sometimes trough conflict and war, because some rules that create a lot of suffer are beneficial to some people, but the ones that suffer because those rules rebel against those rules and many times they found a way to change those rules, by argument or by force. Workers, slaves, womans, black, gays... They pushed the change of the old rules that was making them suffer for new rules. )

That make me think that this is the future of morality, that's is what is happening and will happen. And if humanity do not destroy itself someday morality will be resume to this: "the rules that create the minimal suffer to the greatest number". Seems it will end in negative rule utilitarianism, not because everyone care about everyone suffer, but as a equilibrium between having rules that protect themselves from suffer and that will not make others rebel against them and make them suffer, is not about altruism, is about self interest. Will become instrumentally efficient follow those rules, today is instrumentally efficient follow many moral rules.

The rules are being created by us, but what is making us create those rules(our desire to evoid suffer) are not create by us. All beings want to evoid suffer, so this desire plus the conflict between beings seems that always will get them closer to negative rule utilitarianism no matter what being, not matters in which part of universe.

Evolution create suffer to help us to survive, a alarm to conscience that the body is or will be under attack, so conscience must try to find a way to evoid the destruction of the body. But now we don't want just to survive, but to live well, survive without the alarm, survive without pain. Free yourselves of that necessity.

All his morals fixed points fit very well to negative rule utilitarianism.

[atlas]

For the final objection, would we not say that it is conceptually true that normative statements are action-guiding? We could restrict it a bit more to things like 'guiding rational action, ' whatever that might mean, but the point still stands: there are conceptual truths relating normative statements, and therefore moral statements, to action-guidance, so of course if 'killing is wrong' is a MFP then that would compel you, or whoever falls under the action-guiding restriction, to not kill.

You could further object to this that 1. In its restricted form we can ask why we should fall under that restriction. For the rational action case, for example, why be rational? Why do rational actions? 2. In its unrestricted form we could argue that no statement is categorically action guiding and we get back to standard meta-ethics debates

[darcyone]

There's one basic idea here that I don't seem to understand, how comes that concepts are independent of the way the world is? I know that if we made an empirical investigation there's no way we can find married bachelors, but the reason for that seems precisely to be that we build our concepts depending on how the world is! We go around in the world and find out that there are some men who aren't married and we give them the term bachelor! What am I missing?

[ekszentrik]

My main argument against moral realism: ok, slavery is always wrong. So there must be a clear definition of it somewhere. At the very least, of an idea(l) or prototypical version of either slavery or the traits that should encompass it. Somewhere, such a clear definition has to exist, you can't be COMPLETELY fuzzy, else you have nothing..
Now take thing X. Thing X NATURALLY and OF COURSE is slavery, but is this other thing, this kind of bondage thing Y, also slavery? Most people would say no, but maybe their mind can be changed? (Actually, in country Z they consider it slavery).
Here's the thing: Y falls outside your traditional slavery definition. But the moral realist isn't a COMPLETE tool, he allows for common sense clauses that allows for evaluation functions for borderline/extraordinary shit.
But ... congrats. The moral constructivist will say that we parsimoniously ONLY need this evaluation functions, and don't need to invoke some realism at all. It's all human evaluations. Always has been.

[Alex.G.Harper]

I have always phrased my view like this:

Natural truths are truths ‘of what there is’.

Mathematical, logical, or normative truths are truths ‘about what there is’.

Saying, “there aren’t any numbers, where are the numbers? Since there isn’t any numbers, math can’t really be true.” This assumes that mathematical truths, or that all truths, are truths ‘of’ what there is, when there are truths ‘about’ what there is. Asking, “where are the reasons?” I cannot point out into the distance and show you.

The epistemology of all this is complicated, to be sure.

[InventiveHarvest]

If they want to say that something is immoral by definition, they need to set up necessary and sufficient conditions.