The Drydock - Episode 211

00:00:00 - Intro

00:00:35 - What is the actual relationship between a captain and an admiral on his ship?

00:05:36 - Where is/was the line for gross insubordination drawn, and how loose were the boundaries on it?

00:13:14 - How common is it for promotions in the navy to be back-dated to a certain earlier time point?

00:18:47 - Especially efficient ships?

00:21:23 - Why were USN 6" shells slower than other contermporary equivilants?

00:26:46 - Lexington vs Kaga in a gun duel?

00:28:21 - Side vs Vertical funnels on carriers?

00:32:18 - How did the woodern fin's on the Japanese torpedo bombers torpedo's help them from burying themselves into the sea floor at Pearl Harbour?

00:40:29 - Channel Fleet in WW1?

00:44:55 - If the Hornet (CV-8) had been taken as a prize at Santa Cruz, would the IJN have had the technical, infrastructural, or systemic capacity to copy her equipment & technology, or even recommission her for Japanese service?

00:47:28 - Is appropriate to credit the I-19 with the most effective single torpedo salvo in history?

00:49:08 - Did German U-boat commanders know that they were being located with HF/DF? Did they take countermeasures like dummy nonsense transmissions that looked like legit U-boat communications?

00:53:16 - Fast transports for the Med?

00:55:49 - Are the Glorious records the only aircraft carrier loss records sealed for 100 years and how "muddy" are the facts relating to that event?

01:01:45 - “Damn the torpedoes, full speed ahead" what does that mean? And also how good of an admiral would you consider him?

01:05:51 - Channel Admin

[deaks]

Comparing Huff Duff to Khorne the Blood God is possibly one of the weirdest analogies I've heard and I am 100% here for it. Great work as ever Drach.

[HalfLifeExpert]

47:28 I would give that distinction to HMS Conqueror torpedoing General Belgrano in 1982. That action caused the entire Argentine fleet to retire and remain in port for the duration of the war. And it was with cheap torpedoes that did not need replacing.

[genericpersonx]

00:00:35 - What is the actual relationship between a captain and an admiral on his ship?

To make this one a lot simpler: it depends on the admiral. If the Admiral wishes to command the ship he is on for whatever reason, he can. If a captain overrides an admiral's orders or commands, the captain's ability to do so is dependent on the charisma of the captain and the timidity of the admiral.
Where things get murky is the fact that this is about two human beings asserting legal and actual power over one another, so what the rules say and what the conditions demand are very different concerns. This is what Drach's answer is mostly addressing, the many different ways in which a captain and admiral can work around, with, or against each other depending on those conditions.

00:05:36 - Where is/was the line for gross insubordination drawn, and how loose were the boundaries on it?

Again, depends on the conditions. The Rules are simple: refuse an order and get punished for it. The question is if someone is actually refusing an order or adapting to the situation in a manner consistent with the values of the military in question. German military tradition, for example, was inclined towards a subordinate that refused orders to attack was much more likely to be punished for insubordination than a subordinate that declined one order to attack in favor of attacking somewhere else. The expectation of the German tradition was to attack somewhere, so failure to attack was generally punished more.

[roscoewhite]

47:28 If you use "torpedo" in its original form, as referring to naval mines, then those put in place in the Dardanelles by the Ottoman minelayer "Nusret" had a massive effect: not only did they sink two battleships, but they led to the Gallipoli land campaign... and all that happened thereafter.

[simonwaldock]

Another very informative video. I found your explanation of the strategic subtleties of the Channel Fleet in WWI really interesting. Loved the Warhammer reference!

[GrahamWKidd]

For your wet Saturday morning listening pleasure.
Thanks Drach.

[Archiec]

Lexington Vs Kaga Carrier 8inch Slapfest love it

[Jaromir]

Loved the Khorne reference Drach, hope you are on the side of the god-emperor.🤣

[niallcunningham]

If you read the report of the US Naval technical mission to Japan it suggests that the reason for adding the small winglets (and their wooden extensions) in 1940/41 was to increase warhead size, not for better shallow water operations. In the original version of the Type 91, roll control was handled by the torpedo having a centre of gravity below the geometric centre. This meant that the warhead compartment was only partially filled. By adding the small winglets (the report refers to them as flippers) gyro stabilised to handle roll control; in the Type 91 Mod 2 this allowed the warhead to be increased from 330lb to 450lb. No mention is made of these modifications having anything to do with shallow water operations. In fact it says that the wooden frames on the flippers were used on all air launched torpedoes from 1941 onwards. It does mention that having these flippers (and their wooden extension for air travel) helps control directional stability after water entry, but there is no mention of them improving depth control. (Reports of the US naval technical mission to Japan 1946 - Section 0 - 01-2 - Aircraft Torpedoes - Page 25 - Section O. )

[markmulligan]

Bravo for you work of unmatched brilliance, clarity and visual elegance. You left something out about Admiral Farragut. This might be pertinent in terms of England’s naval defeat of France and Europe by extension, and World War submarine campaigns versus opposition ship building capacity. That is, backup construction potential.
Farragut flung whatever squadron he had at hand because Federal shipyards could replace his losses much faster than Rebs could compensate for their ship and fort losses. Like Hitler, Hirohito and the USA Pro-fa today, the slaver rebellion relied on massive, pre-arranged sucker punches to KO its adversaries before their backup construction potential could restore order. Bullies with glass jaws otherwise. What do you think?

[mikemullen]

Huff-Duff. There was a more technical reason for the success of Huff-Duff. Radio triangulation was common even into the 20's, but the known method was to turn a loop antenna until there was a null. This took a skilled operator, and the transmission had to be long enough to do the turning. The Germans figured this would take longer than 10-15 seconds, so they kept their messages short to counter this. I understand why this was why the contact and weather reports were so condensed. What Huff-Duff did (heavily simplified) was use two crossed loops, and use the different amplitudes to instantly plot a line on a "radar" screen. Thus, a bearing could be determined in less than a second.

[barrydysert]

i am CHUFFED, to the MAX (love you Brits, but i''m a Yank) to learn the true purpose of the wooden fins on Japanese torpedoes !:-)
💜🙏⚡️

[keithrosenberg]

The US did its 5 star rank promotions very carefully to make sure that one officer, like Marshall, would be able to command a subordinates, such as McArthur and Eisenhower. Literally 1-2 days between each promotion. And it had to promote Bradley to 5 star rank so he could be Chief of Staff while McArthur was still on active duty.

[GaldirEonai]

Okay, "Khorne the Blood God of Electronic Warfare" was not something I'd been expecting :D.

[VelmiVelkiZrut]

Great video as always. Hopefully I’ll bump into you at a Fight Camp down the line if I can ever bother to meander that far West again.

[jonathan_]

53:16 - For fast transports for troops or other small high value cargo I'd call out the USN's ADPs. That was a situation where warships were converted to fast transports; however the WWI era Wickes and Clemson destroyers were nowhere near as large or valuable as the types of ships the question was asking about. And because of that as the Fletcher Swarm materialized the US was willing to convert some of those old destroyers to transports by reducing their armorment, removing half their boilers (and associated smokestacks and engines) and converting the volume into cargo/berthing space; resulting in still a fairly high speed (25 knot) fast transport. Primarily carrying troops for assault landings (as they also got some landing craft on davits) -- they could carry other relatively small high value cargo.

[Kwolfx]

The very first question, about the relationship between an admiral and captain on his own ship; there is also the very rare relationship that existed between two admirals and a captain on a single ship. During the Battle Off Samar (Oct. 25, 1944) Admiral Kurita Takeo; who was the Commander of Second Fleet (Hereafter referred to as Center Force) had been forced to transfer to the Yamato when his flagship Atago had been torpedoed and sunk on night of October 23, making the Yamato the new flagship of Center Force. However, the Yamato was already the flagship of Battleship Division 1, which was commanded by Admiral Ugaki Matome, who previously had been Chief of Staff to the late Admiral Yamamoto. The acting Captain of the Yamato was Rear Admiral Morishita Nobue. So I'm wrong, this was a triumvirate of admirals on a single ship. Actually, I have to take that back, Admiral Kurita's Chief of Staff was Rear Admiral Koyanagi Tomiji. What is that, a quadumvirate of admirals on a single warship?

At some point fairly early in the Battle Off Samar, Admiral Ugaki made a comment that apparently irked Admiral Kurita. I'd have to look it up to find the exact quote, but it wasn't critical of Admiral Kurita; or at least it wasn't openly critical, though perhaps in Japanese there was some implied criticism. The comment was about the battle itself, what Ugaki thought was happening or a guess about what the Americans were doing, but whatever it was Admiral Kurita replied by telling Ugaki "Take command of Battleship Division 1." In other words, "You give orders to the Yamato and Nagato; like "open fire" or "Nagato follow me, " but let the me handle the important stuff."

There was also some misunderstanding by Admiral Ugaki about why Admiral Kurita gave certain orders, which can be found in Ugaki's diary. He stated, "Though it's (Kurita's) reasoning was unknown, the fleet order called for battleship divisions and cruiser divisions to attack and the destroyer squadron to follow. The Fleet's (Kurita's) attacking directions were conflicting and I feared the spirit of an all-out attack at short range was lacking." (Kurita wanted his destroyers to conserve fuel to reach Leyte Gulf and be able to return back to their base; he didn't believe in suicide missions, and apparently Kurita was confident his battleships and cruisers guns would suffice for the task at hand. Also, Kurita didn't feel like explaining his decisions.) Also, according to either H.P. WIlmott's book "The Battle of Leyte Gulf: The Last Fleet Action" or Evan Thomas' book, "Sea of Thunder, " Admiral Ugaki could be heard muttering to himself, "We are going the wrong way. The enemy is in the other direction, " after Admiral Kurita had given his order to withdraw and was heading North to meet a non-existent American taskforce Kurita thought was there. So, there was some real tension between the two men.

Admiral's Morishita and Koyanogi managed to stay out of this mess. Morishita concentrated on maneuvering his ship and giving other orders directly related to the Yamato itself while Admiral Koyanagi did things like convey messages from the radio room to Kurita and back.

[ditzydoo]

I agree with the wooden fin attachment being for air stability. It is sound aerodynamics for the air, not hydrodynamic for the water. That is to say, like a throne dart. The warhead is much heavier and wants to pitch down in the airstream. The fins add much needed drag to provide a counter force and keep the front from dipping too low and preventing the torpedo on contact with the water from plunging downwards.

[MakeMeThinkAgain]

Lee at Leyte Gulf: Gets especially tricky when Halsey is on one of his two fastest battleships. Plus, since TF 34 had never been established, Lee wasn't directing anything. His ships were all parts of other Task Groups and so under the orders of other admirals.

[ronaldfinkelstein]

An example of the USN using a warship for transportation, was the heavy cruiser USS Indianapolis, which brought the plutonium core of the Nagasaki bomb, "Fat Man", to Tinian.