The Drydock - Episode 138

00:00:00 - Intro

00:00:42 - How did submarines know the tonnage of their targets?

00:03:40 - Why the weird focus of kamikaze attacks?

00:10:19 - Courageous class as actual cruisers

00:16:05 - How did Laffey manage to survive that battering?

00:20:50 - Could SMS Emden have survived longer?

00:26:38 - Why did Warspite have chronic steering problems from Jutland?

00:29:44 - The Swordfish, how?

00:35:07 - If German DD torpedoes at Narvik worked?

00:38:14 - Are there any estimates of the amount of damage battleship-caliber HE shells would do if impacting on main belts of heavy cruisers or above?

00:40:42 - On a WW2 era warship what was the extent of spares that a ships machine shop could produce?

00:43:31 - Other roles of gun crews in the Age of Sail?

00:47:07 - In regards to carrier design and construction; Did the US navy take any lessons after WW2 from the Japanese carriers?

00:48:30 - What was the most effective form of torpedo defense?

00:55:46 - Was Cradock right to have engaged von Spee's East Asia squadron the way he did?

01:12:38 - Channel Admin

[joearnold]

“It’s again a combination of things... mostly size and shape of the bulge, but also a certain amount of technique involved”
-Drach, 2021
50:58

[bryantcurtis]

U.S. Navy boiler technician here. I love this channel. I loved my warship also and my shipmates.

[tonygibson]

Ah, the Swordfish, the plane that will go and do things where angels fear to tread, so bad it went full circle and became good again.

[matthewkidd]

Drach on bulge effectiveness: "It's a combination of things. Mostly size and shape of the bulge, but also a certain amount of technique involved."

[roscoewhite]

In "The Enemy Below" there's a scene where the U-boat commander at his periscope calls out features of the US destroyer and one of his officers checks the details against a book, finally calling out "USS Buckley class."

[mpersad]

Drach. Your answer to the q at 00:03:40 is as well considered, and informed an explanation for this unique combat situation that I have heard. Thank you

[Meatwadsan]

Regarding the torpedo defense discussion, it was telling that after the RN and USN started deploying their new torpedoes armed with TPX/HBX warheads, torpedo hits started producing almost guaranteed results with each hit. In the USSBS post-war interrogations, IJN commanders remarked at the effectiveness with which the torpedoes were completely negating their torpedo defenses during the latter half of the war. The RN began testing their new explosive with the Mark XV torpedo in late-1942, with deployment in mid-1943, along with the Mark VIII and IX that were redesigned to use TPX. After their discovery of TPX, they informed the USN, "Hey Yanks, look how much bigger the booms are when you add aluminium!" So the USN also began their own testing with TPX in early-1943 on the Mark 18 torpedo, with deployment in mid-1943. The success also caused it to be incorporated into the Mark 13, 14, and 15 redesigns, with the Mark 14 mod 3 and Mark 15 mod 3 deployed in late-1943, and Mark 13 mod 10 in early-1944. The Mark 15, and some Mark 13 torpedoes depending on manufacturer, actually used HBX (High Blast Explosive) which was a variant of TPX which is less sensitive and more stabilized, essentially the explosive power of TPX with the safety of Comp B.

[ykonoclast]

Great questions in this episode, thanks everyone and thanks Drach for answering. Incredible that after all this time we still get so many original and intriguing questions.

[Owen-fnff]

I have lived in Japan for the last 15 years, and can speak the language fluently. I am a student of history and have read extensively on WW2 matters as I am sure a lot of you have as well. I have always been interested in the kamikaze attacks and have asked myself similar questions to those posed in the video. From my understanding of the culture, speaking to a lot of now elderly people who would have been children at the time, and my reading, Drachinifel’s assessment as to the hows and whys of the attacks and their overall inefficiency is absolutely spot on.
It was never a viable strategy, just an act of desperation from a culture that glorifies death, and sacrificial yet futile acts.
No one wanted to be a kamikaze, in fact the IJN, the more professional of the military branches tried hard to shield its pilots from the government letters asking for sacrifice.
However, a factor that made it hard to block these requests was that IJN pilots, while among the elite after years of training, were technically Non-Com or basically enlisted men, and enlisted men didn’t have rights.
Everyone knew that it was futile, a waste, but when your family and your town is already paying their respects to you, telling you where your grave will be, even before you have left, you understand that you are not supposed to come back, when you see your school mates get shot down, you feel anger at the whole mess, but then you see one of them makes it through and manages to strike back against this craziness, giving his death at least some small meaning then you clutch at that straw as well and through crashing into a ship, any ship, you feel you are also fighting back against the injustice.

[ryangale]

I do love hearing Drach discuss the people side of warfare, as with his discussion of Cradock and his decision-making. The technical side of things is interesting for sure, but hearing more about the admirals and sailors make the decisions is sometimes so much more nuanced and interesting for me.

[glennricafrente]

Thank you for answering my question about Cradock, I really appreciate the lengthy and thoughtful response. It's been bugging me for a while, since your Mers-el-Kebir and Coronel episodes offered such a juxtaposition in how command decisions can result in the deaths of over a thousand men in each case. In a way, you confirmed that the inflection point of that battle (Coronel) was how social conventions of the time put such pressure on a commander that it led to so many needless deaths. Not sure if I would be quite as forgiving as you of Cradock considering how things played out, but I get the mitigating factors. If nothing else, you laid out the issues well.

It's ironic that Cradock and the commander of HMS Glasgow at different points in the battle were both faced with the same life-or-death decision -- stand and die or retreat and save what you could even if it meant leaving other ships behind -- and they made different choices. You might argue that Cradock's choice enabled the Glasgow commander to make his. And indeed, von Spee was faced with the same Kobayashi Maru scenario weeks later at the Falklands battle, and again he chose a different course. So much to learn from such tragedies, even if they are more than a century in the past.

[kemarisite]

"Someone builds a torpedo with a much larger warhead than anyone else has before ..."

*nudges Japan*

"He's talking about you."

[Tuning]

Oh, mysterious technical issues. Those make both the best and the worst experiences. Best workshop I ever had about it was explaining that:
1) Focus on the actual physics, work out how sensitive the mechanisms are for disturbances. Be careful rolling away with only how you think it works. Human imagination is way to eager to construct complicated failure modes in the face of uncertainty than admitting that simple key parameters are actually not known or even quantified.
2) Don't be afraid to apply maximum conclusive tests: so if you think a certain small very inconsistent misalignment, might 'somehow' be causing quality issues, it might be better stap to crack up that misalignment a few factors and see if quality issues go through the roof or stay similar. A way more conclusive way instead of trying to figure out if an possible issue, that 'might be the cause', actually occurs enough or significantly enough to matter. The later way easily ends you up in a rabbit hole that risks always ending up trying to proof a hypothetical failure scenario occurs instead focusing if this scenario actually matters.
A good design should have a certain robustness in regard to the small uncertainties that you expect, and you really want to prove if this expected robustness is actually present, or maybe even underestimated. If your designs works even under overloading, but still fails in the field, than this could indicate your design loads are not taking into account actual field circumstances: that is not a quality issue, but might be a design issue.

[johnevans]

The Swordfish's procedure was to sight the target, establish the direction of the attack run, then drop steeply in a weaving dive to just above the water, straighten out, release the torpedo, then turn away. While not regarded as fully aerobatic, the Stringbag was as tough as old boots and highly manoeuvrable - and its inherent drag and slow speed made it an effective dive bomber when deployed as such; not plummeting quite as steeply as a Ju.87, but close.

[kevdupuis]

And don't forget the most common work of the ships machine shop, making ashtrays from spent shell casings, although our machinists mate made a 1/2 pounder and carriage which the captain loved to use on special occasions.

[LukesYuGiOhChannel]

I really liked that last answer with Craddock, that was very well explained.

[deaks]

A really interesting question and answer on Cradock.
I must admit, I had forgotten he thought he was pursuing only Leipzig, which makes leaving Canopus behind and keeping Otranto with him to help search and also keep her safe makes a lot of sense, which is a really important reminder to not be, as Bernard of MHV puts it, a Hindsight General or Hindsight Historian and judge decisions based on what information was available to leaders at the time, in this case Cradock.
Sure, we can say now exactly what he should have done, ie keep Canopus with him and/or send Otranto off the moment he spots Von Spee's fleet, but that's easy to say in hindsight; we know what Von Spee was doing and what he planning to do. Again, MHV often says; Context Matters, and in this case, there were good reasons Cradock left Canopus and retained Otranto when viewed in correct context, rather than just reading the results of the battle and working backwards.
It's good to be reminded of that now and then, and I think this question does do that (For me at least)

[salfox]

This is the favorite part of my Sunday. It pairs well with my coffee on a quiet morning

[rayner]

Well done sir. Counting down to the 200 mark. Thanks for all the hard work.

[konsthum]

I always thought of Cradock as a man trying to do his level best and knowing he will fail. And then comes Sturdee with his superior force to claim all glory and victory.