Rauli Nykanen - Non Identity and Becoming – Deleuze and Leibniz: Difference?

A/V#17.09 2013 Autumn

In Difference and Repetition Deleuze formulates the ultimate metaphysical conundrum of both mind and body; ‘The shortcoming of the ground is to remain relative to what it grounds, to borrow the characteristics of what it grounds, and to be proved by these.’ (Deleuze 2004, 110‐11) This is the very locus of what we wish to concentrate upon in this paper. It is precisely this form of identity as an absolute which constitutes what Christian Kerslake has called a ‘distortion’ by which Kant turns the ‘old problem’ of identity conceived of as that between being and beings, or logic and real, to that of one between form and logic, thus formalising existence as such. It is, indeed, upon this metaphysical ultimatum that both positions, the formal and the real, or substantial, hinge. As such, the transcendental sceptic is reliant upon the very same metaphysics which it seeks to undermine. It was Leibniz who so clearly saw this state of affairs and upon which he mounted the most astonishing critique, namely that of the indiscernibles in the form of differential calculus. Contrary to some readings which thought that Leibniz was using differential calculus as proof of identity, but in a way which would then have provided identity with an indefinite sense, it is clearly argued by Leibniz that far from being an infinitisation of terms, or identities, it is precisely this form of logic, i.e. differential calculus, which undermines any identity‐structure as such. This is to say that Leibniz turned the tables in relation to the question of identity such that what is not problematic is that there is Nature, or an outside, but rather that there exists phenomena for which it seems there is an outside. This is in stark opposition to the Kantian formulation which maintains that it is precisely the outside which is problematic concerning the subjectivity of the individual. The latter formulation fundamentally misses its mark on what it seeks to criticise by enforcing a structure of identity and absolutising it. The mistake, as we see it, consists in Kant’s misunderstanding the problem of space and relativity which occupied Newton and Leibniz. While Leibniz, along with Newton’s considerations, realized that identity was an impossibility and that as such the real problem of philosophy is to conceive of how identity is constituted, a problem which is seemingly very paradoxical since from it the human being can in no way be exempt and as such it involves the fact that, like quoted above, it is the subject itself that is explaining itself. However, Leibniz’s ingenious insight was then to discern between logic and real. For there to be existence at all, argued Leibniz, that which appears as real for us cannot be but a phenomenal illusion and that this being the case, there cannot be anything whatsoever for which the real appears as relational either. This is to say that in the philosophy of Leibniz there are no essential identities. However, this is not to make the claim that Leibniz has escaped the problem of identity once and for all, and the problem still remains; how exactly is identity constituted?

Although it is not in the scope of this paper to consider the problem of constitution of identity as such, we nonetheless think there is value to be had from presenting this problematic as we see it in order to clarify and concentrate the locus of the problematic, and consequently to provide a renewed opportunity for reopening the case of Leibniz in relation to Kant, as well as proposing a study of Deleuze’s Leibniz. The further aim of such enquiries would then be to see whether Deleuze really differs from Leibniz in any fundamental way despite his seeming conviction, at least at the time of Difference and Repetition, that Leibniz is still fundamentally subject to the very identity that he sought to refute. Initially, at least, we wager that no such difference will be found, and that as such it will be the case rather that Leibniz and Deleuze will have to join forces to become Leibniz‐Deleuze in the face of the transcendental ‘monster’. It is precisely in view of such considerations that we must first start by asking what the distinction between the two might be.

Rauli Nykanen is an MA-student in European Philosophy at The University of the West of England.