Q-Day Is Coming: Quantum Computers Will Decode National Secrets

Some recent headlines have been touting that Q-Day is coming potentially as soon as 2025. What is Q-Day? Well, it’s the day when quantum computers will be able to crack the current encryption protocols that we use on the internet. How big of a threat is Q-Day really? And is it really coming next year? Let’s have a look.

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[NeonVisual]

When a quantum computer has an error, you have to turn it off and on again at the same time.

[BobbbyJoeKlop]

You're winning me over with your subject choices as of late, Sabine. Especially the debunking services you're providing to the public. Bravo.

[carlbrenninkmeijer]

Each time I listen I understand a bit Moore

[tophrrr]

I remember when I first dipped my toes into quantum computing there was mentioned a deadline for all banking services to be quantum computing safe by the 2030s so that financial entities were protected and thus, their customers. AGI was also rumored to be premiering around that time, and now we continue to hear rumors that not only is it around the corner, it may already exist. The next decade will be interesting to say the least.

[walnutclose]

From a Fujitsu study: "By using the above general purpose program, Fujitsu further generated quantum circuits that factor several composite numbers from 10 bits to 25 bits, and estimated the required resources of the quantum circuits necessary for factoring 2, 048 bits composite numbers from the calculated resources. As a result, Fujitsu found that approximately 10, 000 qubits, 2.23 trillion quantum gates, and a quantum circuit with a depth (6) of 1.80 trillion were required to factor a composite number of 2, 048 bits. This equates to a 104-day long calculation using a fault-tolerant quantum computer."

Things change of course, so that's hardly the last word, but that's one hell of a leap from where we are today with quantum computing.

[MikkoRantalainen]

2:50 If you use encryption algorithms that support perfect forward secrecy, the full symmetric encryption key is never transmitted over the network so future adversary cannot decode the encryption without guessing the correct symmetric key. Algorithms that support perfect forward secrecy cannot be used offline, though.

And it currently seems that not even quantum computers can help breaking symmetric ciphers such as AES-256.

[jaewokG]

sorry, my mind drifted off to imagine Noah talking to God, "Right. … What's a cubit?"

[DelandaBaudLacanian]

Thanks for doing a video on Q-day. Even if every organization magically switched to quantum-resistant data/algorthms, there is a ton of RSA encryped data that is already preserved.. to be fully exploited by the "Harvest Now, Decrypt Later" actors. Q-day when it arrives will be extremely disruptive.

[RiiDii]

Quantum Candy! Now, your kids can have their candy before and after dinner; just don't ask which it was.

[kevinbrooks]

Well, I mean, in America, every politician has boxes of classified documents sitting around...

[walnutclose]

It would probably be useful to your audience if you spend a little time explaining how and where RSA encryption is actually used, because that has a huge impact on the practical effects of a Shor's algorithm Q-day. When RSA is used in https (that is, TSL or SSL), e.g., it is used to authenticate sender and receiver, and to negotiate a symmetric encryption key that is then used to encrypt the actual data to be sent. Likewise, most data encrypted at rest (say, in cloud storage) is encrypted using symmetric algorithms, with keys that are not stored with the actual data. The consequence of this is that in order to use the ability to break RSA encryption to read data, you have to have captured not only the encrypted data, but also the key establishment conversation that set it up. That doesn't mean there is no threat to stored conversations, but it does, practically, mean that whoever stored those conversations had to have man-in-the-middle to the entirety of the an encrypted session in order to crack it. Still a problem, but a lot less of one than the hair-on-fire crowd imagine.

[sirdiealot]

Sabine has such a monotonous deadpan tone, when she makes a joke it’s hilarious 😂

[vaclavkrpec]

- I absolutely need a quantum computer, where can I buy one?
- Do you know how to program it?
- No...
- Do you know how to program classical computers?
- No, but...
- What do you imagine computing on it?
- Well... It's super fast, isn't it? My games will finally stop lagging...
- ...
- What?

If I had a quid every time I had this conversation with somebody, I'd have... 8 pounds and a sixpence. (Some people run away too soon.)

[Brodes]

Thanks for the Quokka shoutout! Watching from Perth Australia 😊 I'm sure most viewers have no idea what that animal is 😂

[napotronix]

"A shitstorm in a tea glass." I'm so going to steal this.

[XH]

Q-day is a financial problem : if the computer needed to decrypt my bank password costs $10B to run, it being quantum or classical, I'm not that worried.
Meaning there will be years between the first working (with a scalable number of qbits) quantum computer and the real Q-day when costs start being actually lower than with classical computers.

[skidoo]

Question: I'm interested. Can you please provide a link to the Haribo quantum licorice site?

[buckythepunky]

Thank you again for explaining complex things in a simple to understand way

[Mark-psiy]

What, you have quantum candy???? Stfu and take my money!!!

[disgruntledtoons]

The encryption used when I was in the military was based on a 64-bit key. A million processors (easy to procure if you are a state actor) brute forcing a million keys per second (should be easy) will break the code in an average of 9 million seconds, or about 16 weeks. I don't know if the equipment based on this key is still in use; it's been twenty years since I left the military.