123. Personal Identity & the Transporter Paradox | THUNK

What makes me "me?" How can I still be me, even though I change over time? Is Starfleet taking applications yet?

-Links for the Curious-

[Nexnaught]

As you've mentioned, there is a reason why it's so difficult to establish meaningful criteria of personal identity. It's because the concept itself is ultimately meaningless - it's merely a mental heuristic that's part of our intuition, and as with many other parts of our intuition (most notably morality), when you put it under the microscope, it always breaks down. There is no hard criteria - it's just something that humans "feel". If you try to give it clear-cut criteria, you can always find a counter-example that just feels wrong. That's because ultimately, the idea of "identity" does not exist in the universe. The universe is just a collection of particles interacting with each other. Even at the quantum level, there is no clear-cut identity, because particles switch places with each other all the time. When we try to define an idea that exists only in our minds, and not in the universe, we'll always run into these difficulties, because our perception of reality is not always representative of reality and its underlying mechanics. For these reasons, I think that trying to define things like personal identity and morality are ultimately futile and meaningless.

[antoinemargo]

Hey Josh! I just started watching your series again after a long break. It's still just as insightful. Thank you for it.

On another note, this episode made me feel very excited! It so happens that in 2009 in business school (I left, it really wasn't for me) my super-depressed self wrote down this same exact experiment instead of revising for my exams. I still have the almost decade-old file backed up on my computer. I had always wondered if anyone had already thought of it, considering I haven't watched or read a lot of science fiction or philosophy. That day I learnt to accept that identity permanence is likely simply a cognitive bias.

It does being one to question one's fear of death. Why fear it if in truth, we die at the very least once every day? Or at least our conscience does. Which is the only really important part as far as I'm concerned. We should either fear every single one, or none at all, including the last one.

[InternetArtifacts]

The Upanishads have an interesting take on the Self. Similar to Buddhism, it has a view of most of the transitory elements of personal identity (personality, body, etc.) as empty, yet recognizes a "True Self" beyond this that is identical to Brahman. This Brahman is "always looking out" from each of us and individual identities are illusory. And so there is only one "experiencer, " although it may be more appropriate to say that experience is always experiencing itself.

I was first acquainted with this view when it was mentioned by Schrodinger in his book What Is Life? and he expressed sympathy towards it. There also seem to be some parallels with Schopenhauer's conception of Will. I don't know if I can believe that we are each identical with such an ultimate, but it is an interesting perspective at least.

[xway]

I definitely think that the idea of a persistent personal identity is incorrect. It seems like if we assume that it's a thing, that always leads to a paradox. Well, that in and of itself is a proof by contradiction, implying it's not a thing. So that would mean that neither of the two Rikers are the original, because there's no such thing as being the original. They both would have the same claim to Riker's life (as would, in theory, anybody else), and would have to make some sort of compromise.

I feel like I should expand on my remark that in theory anybody could say that they're "the original". Of course it's silly to think that Picard could be Riker just as much as any of these two people in sick bay could. I think the reason for this, however, is because our entire society is based around the idea that a person remains the same person over time. It just feels wrong to suggest that's not the case, but I think logically it's the only answer. I'm not saying that I think we should reform our society based on this, as there's really no reason to. What we have been doing in this regard has been working fine so let's just keep going with it. What I am saying is that if we ever in the future end up in a situation like the Riker example in this video, I think we should recognise that neither one is more a continuation of the old person than the other. Basically I think we should pretend like the persistent personal identy exists until we encounter a paradox in reality (not just in hypotheticals) and then abandon it for that specific case, only to then go back to pretending it exists.

[SmartK]

If you look at this identity in four dimensions then it seems more clear. A thing can change, but it's still part of one object, because history (including future) of that object can be traced and is included in its identity (it's one piece). You can then of course debate how would you define borders that separate object and surroundings (some other object). From one point of view a human standing on Earth is all one object. Because you need to define what separates their identities. Another problem stems from the information you have available. You assume full/partial knowledge. But what if you have none? Someone switches a thing in the shop for a structurally identical thing (elementary particles scale). Is it stealing if shop owner doesn't know about the switch? Or more importantly: Is it stealing when he does know? What if he knows but it was his favorite childhood toy? Did you steal sentimental value? There are even deeper implications. What if someone makes a perfect copy of you when you sleep, kills the original and puts you exactly on the same place where you were before. The perpetrator would know that this person is a copy, but that's him knowing the history and having perfect information. But from your point of view nothing would change. Some might think that "objectively" you are a different person (because of a different history), but that someone also has perfect information. What if observer doesn't know. Observer might see a person sleeping, lights go off, next moment lights go on and observer sees exactly the same person sleeping in the exact place. Is it the same person? Or someone performed the experiment mentioned above? Or no one did anything? Observer doesn't know. So he assumes that it wasn't performed (Occam's razor).

[rustygates]

Why are you, specifically you? As opposed to someone else, at some other point in time and likewise, your body could be here today, all the same, but with another "awareness" having control over it, and yourself not existing. It is clear the exact copy of you has a different consciousness or awareness/experience of self and control, one that is distinctly different to yours. In the case of the transporter breaking you down into atoms first and re-assembling you, I am at a firm position that you, i.e. your conscious/awareness would end as your original body is essentially annihilated; the copy that is re-assembled is someone else with the same memories and bioelectric processes, however others would just see the copy as the original you, to them, the copy would be no different.

So, still doesn't rule out a "soul", something that pervades and persists all throughout existence.

[veitchy_]

Going into the teleporter is the same as going to sleep. People don't fear going to sleep, so why fear the teleporter?

That being said, at a past point in my life I wouldn't have taken it, but certain experiences have changed my mind.

Ego death on acid and the realisation that there is no 'you' and personal identity is an illusion is quite an experience.

[aaronrheams]

The biggest problem with the question is that the answer has actual consequences, despite its unsolvability. There is no clear line of demarcation between one entity and another if all the peripherals such as memory and personality can change without altering the core subject. Even breaking a continuous line in Minkowski spacetime might not result in an entirely different phenomenal consciousness if all other parameters remain intact, and once you have eliminated each parameter in turn, there is nothing left. If you therefore changed every parameter at once, there would still be a subject. This would effectively mean that "you" persist as long as any consciousness whatsoever persists, meaning you ARE awareness living with the illusion that you are localized. Much of Eastern philosophy accepts this as a default.

[spockrates]

The trick is to not have a personal identity. Just be a generic shadow trotting about on two legs.

[AmaranthOriginal]

I find the concept of past self vs present self to be rather interesting in the sense that me from 7 years ago might not recognise current me at all.

In the end, I look at a lot of these conundrums like brain teasers. They're fun to think about, but not things that cause me to lose sleep. I can't know if I'm still me any more than I can know if I'm in the Matrix, so I choose to carry on as though I am. Of course, that brings up the time lapse again, because what past me would do in these circumstances is different than what present me would do a lot of the time.

[TheAgavi]

Probably my favourite episode yet. I'd suggest that anyone interested in exploring it further read Derek Parfit's work. As far as philosophy goes, it's very approachable.

Every time I watch these videos I'm baffled as to how your subs haven't exploded. Your content is great and so is your delivery. Have you thought about tweaking the format a little?

[MetsuryuVids]

Great video as always.

But you say that we die every time we fall asleep (or lose consciousness) or every seven years, but I don't think that's really fair to say.

When you fall asleep you have reduced cognitive functions, but they are not completely "off", you can still respond to external stimuli, be woken up, dream, and even think if you can lucid dream.

Even people who go unconscious do still have some brain activity, so even if they don't remember anything about when they were out, their brains were still working, so I wouldn't say they were "dead" or that their consciousness stopped being continuous, it just means that some of their memories were not "saved" during that period, so they can't access them, but I'd say they were still very much alive.

Same with the cell replacement every 7 years, that happens gradually, so you could say it's more like a "ship of theseus" thing, and it's hard to say if replacing one neuron every minute does anything significant to the "identity" of the brain, but I'd say not really, it's such a small change that it's basically insignificant overall.

Anyway I really have no idea how to define consciousness, as in my "point of view" to the external world.

Why does it reside inside my brain?
Why doesn't it change over time as the atoms in my brain get replaced?
Why do I still wake up in my body every morning?
Maybe I dont?
Maybe this is the first time "I" ever woke up in my own body, but I just have no way to know, and when I will fall asleep tonight I will be gone forever?

[Ensivion]

I believe the example that you create a duplicate of you might has a flaw in the personal identity of the duplicate. The very process of making another body that is an exact copy would have to be at a different point in space, which in the context of the universe is enough to change it, albeit a very tiny amount. This difference would make the chains of memory different. The immediate question following a duplication is: what do we do with a clone?

The more interesting question about this topic is actually whether teleportation is suicide or not. I believe that this question is answered by most people with yes (CGP Grey notes it and gives a compelling argument). The problem is, does it matter if it's suicide? This quickly delves into the problem of the afterlife, which implies a metaphysics. The teleporter kills you, but if you don't believe in an afterlife nor absolute meaning in life, the argument against doing it becomes less compelling. As an existentialist (I agree with Camus), I think that it's a leap of faith to put your conscious being at risk to teleport yourself, but it's still in the back of my mind that it might be worth it.

edits for clarity, it's late >.<

[PriusOmega]

Hey Josh, great video. You should check out Alfred North Whitehead's process philosophy for a great take on this topic. Rather than scrambling to identify substances and persistence of objects, just say "f**k it" and claim that there's _literally nothing that persists_, and what is core to reality is fleeting configurations of configurations of configurations, turtles all the way down. Neat stuff!

Keep up the great content, always enjoy a good Thunk episode :).

[zsdCKanVOIJANSO]

im surprised you didnt bring up the ship of theseus

[pastelshoal]

I would suggest that personal identity can't exist, and that identity can only really be formed through societal perception, but even that is subject to much of the same issues that personal self identity is...

[LuisSoberon]

Just found your channel and it looks pretty cool! I think describing one of the interpretations as a "cognitive or linguistic mistake" is a little harsh. Object permanence is something that is learned in infancy, which is why the peekaboo game works up to a point - like where DID he go. But rather than being a "mistake" I think a better characterization is that it is a necessary/useful fiction. I think it's analogous to the passage of time. We know that time passes independently of our active attention, but there are people with psychological and psychiatric conditions that impair that innate sense suffering from "dyschronometria." Actually, that'd be an interesting episode if you haven't hit it already - perception of time stuff.

[HumbertoRamosCosta]

As we recognize a link of memory states we also recognize a link of mass states, it's like if we see the person as a combination of the software and the hardware where it runs. In your example if another member of the crew talks with the A and the B commander Riker this member couldn't tell the which one is the 'real' Riker, but if this member knows which copy have a links of mass states with the original body he or she will identify this body as the real Riker, even if seven years had passed an all the atoms had been replaced (it's not the atoms per se, but the link between the set of atoms that forms our body, like the link between our states of consciousness). Even if the proccess had hurt the brain of the original body making his personality diferent, the crew member would tend to think that the original had changed, not that the new body is the original person. It's a better way to define, but not without problems, you could think in a machine that split the atoms between the two copies, this way both 'new bodies' will have the same amount of shared history with the original.

[judgeomega]

the answer here seems very obvious to me; when we reference a particular object, there exists the reference (in our mind) and the physical instantiation of it... thus creating ambiguity. are we talking about the physical object or the reference? using the exact same words in different context will have different subjects. it is just that these subjects are so closely intertwined we usually make no distinction between them. but there is a categorical error when we get down to nitpicking the boundaries.
furthermore, our internal references need not be consistent or conform/relate to actual reality. ideally, our thoughts are strongly rooted to closely match the objective universe... but it is impossible to have full knowledge of even miniscule objects. so we are forced to generalize. we have large fuzzy definitions of things.
as we go even deeper, it is purpose (or utility) which becomes more and more important over the precise truth. we dont need to know the exact atomic vector of every molecule of a tool in order to harness that tool to accomplish our goals.

[LeeCarlson]

Ahh. The Ship of Theseus all over again.