Who's to Blame for the Failure of Operation Market Garden? BattleStorm 8/8

Who's fault was it that the tanks never got to Arnhem? Let's see what historians think.

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Sources:
John Frost, A Drop Too Many. 2009.
Max Hastings, Armageddon. London, 2004.
Robert J. Kershaw, It Never Snows in September. Surry, 2007.
Martin Middlebrook, Arnhem 1944: The Airborne Battle, 17-29 September. 2009.
Robert Neillands, The Battle for the Rhine 1944. UK, 2014.
Poulussen, R.G. Lost at Nijmegen. 2011.
Cornelius Ryan, A Bridge Too Far. USA, 1974
Major General R E Urquhart, Arnhem. 1958.
Major General S Sosabowski, Freely I Served. Great Britain, 1982.

Music used:

[BIGGSIPP]

I removed my previous comment and will simply say that this is indeed the most in-depth, detailed, and thorough documentary of an operation that shared many one sided views and speculations about what really happened. No one, and I mean, no one could have done this better than TIK. I am amazed at the amount of detailed information of this battle period you were able to document in this series. As a current American Airborne soldier who has served and conducted many jumps in the 82nd in recent past, to be able to watch and learn of the division's history is priceless and valued. Thank you for an extravagant effort! Job well done!!

[TheKulu]

Basically, I think the operation failed was because too many factors--capture of bridges, arrival of units, etc.--had to go perfectly, Plus, the Germans fought well. I think too many Allied generals believed the Germans were beaten and on the run, and didn't realize they could still put up a fight.

[dongilleo]

The ability of the Germans to take a mishmash of broken, depleted, and training units from a wild assortment of backgrounds, and organize them to fight was a big factor in the outcome.

[ARCNA]

An excellent overview of the battle. That said, I tend to disagree with your conclusions.

I feel that the biggest problem with your theory is treating XXX Corps as a monolithic entity. When you say they reached X at Y time, it really means advance elements reached X at Y time - not the whole Corps. Thus, I feel the focus on the actions of Gavin and the 82nd is really a distraction concealing the inability to move sufficient men and tanks forward fast enough to relieve Arnhem (much less push deep into Germany).

Even if Gavin had taken and held the bridge on day 1, given German counterattacks along the highway and their defense of the island, I'm unsure XXX Corps would have been able to reach Arnhem in time. And if it did, it would still have to fight its way through Arnhem in a battle every bit as difficult as Nijmegen and then continue its advance on a narrow front in the face of heavy resistance. Thus, I believe the plan was doomed from the start and should never have been attempted.

However, in watching your series, I was also extremely impressed by the ability of the Germans to quickly react and target all of the key Allied positions. In the face of a less competent enemy, Gavin's time table would likely have been perfectly adequate.

[clivesinclair]

The debates will go on.. and on.. and on. Having served 20yrs in the British Army, one thing springs to mind - the number of radio systems that have failed to work as required, been delayed coming into service, running massively over seems little has changed.

[zettle]

I would have to blame Montgomery, or his superior, Ike. Orders flow down from the top, not up from the bottom. Other than that quite simple explanation, it comes down to a combination of factors. Everything, i repeat, everything had to go right for the allies. The Germans simply had to delay the Allies advance, which should have been expected. Since it was 1 road thru enemy territory, that was the access of advance.

[TheKulu]

I guess my big question is why Gavin and possibly Brown decided that there were a thousand German tanks in the forest? What was their evidence for this enemy force?

[brucebrant]

Historian Victor Davis Hanson's new book on WWII says M-G was "...flawed from the outset: bad or warped intelligence, poor weather forecasting, and poor planning..." By XXX Corps' own timetable, by the time they reached the Nijmegen bridge, they were suppose to already be in Arnham. Once across the bridge, the armor division waited 18 hours before renewing their attack. Gavin felt he needed to take two other bridges and the high ground, Groesbeek heights, to protect the LZ for reinforcements. As it was, the LZ was attacked and had to be retaken while the reinforcements were delayed by weather. In hindsight, it would have been easier to take the bridge sooner. But to say the M-G failure we due to Gavin while there were so many flaws from planning to command decisions is, well, flawed.

[paspb]

Hi TIK, just wanted to say your videos are brilliant; very informative and well researched. Rare in this day and age to get such a thorough and balanced perspective. Well done sir, keep up the good work

[samuel]

Lets get one thing there was alot of anti British sentiment from America and because of Monties ego and the US leadership like to put the blame on the British theres a sentiment that the British role was failure after failure after failure which is a load of ballocks because after British troops got off the beachs ever fight they had with the Germans was a won hell in certain cases British forces advanced further than anyone else in this case Britain wasn't to blame infact everyone one was not just one party and Hollywood has alway portrayed Brits as ignorant and incompatent which is in itself bullshit.

[aisthpaoitht]

1) Unrealistically optimistic plan
2) Fierce and competent German resistance

[donmckeoun]

Political pressure allowed Montgomery to launch this blunder Ike did not want it but was forced into it. Ike had to stop pattons 3rd army which was almost to the German border for this epic failure

[TheBeeperman]

Airborne operations on this scale are just insanely complicated. Add another layer of complexity of mixing in armored forces and ground infantry. Add a timetable with no flexibility. Add another layer of confusion with an allied chain of command. It's astonishing that it had any success at all. One has to ask what was Monty thinking. He was a ground pounder with no apparent Airborne experience. The plan just screams risk. I'd lay the blame at his feet.

[nicolaiitchenko]

Montgomery! He and he alone must bare responsibility for the failure of this Operation Market Garden as his ill formed plan was insufficiently developed and doomed to failure from the moment it left his desk.
Gavin may well be responsible for the failures at Nijmegen, he was a part of a plan made by an insulated, secure in his position, protected (as a blue blood, favorite of Churchill - also a failed leader - Gallipoli) General Montgomery who was trying desperately to gain control of the whole of the war at this stage and be the first to enter Berlin. As a matter of pride more than anything else, he invented this half baked plan to make himself number one. I believe he had aspirations, after the war, of entering into his retirement as a national hero along the lines of Nelson and dreamed often (read his memoirs) of another column somewhere noticeable in London.
The plan was too many 'patches of objectives with far too little resources, far too little logistical fore thought, far too little research (the ferry for example) and far too much untouchable arrogance and false pride from Montgomery in his attempts to outshine his competing and better co General - Patton.

[jaytduce]

I have always said that Gavin was at he was. I am happy to been vindictated at last about this issue.

[andym]

It's a real shame that most people get their history from Hollywood. Films are nearly always inaccurate because they have to be sold to make money in the US. Its unfair to portray real people, brave men in a different way to suit an agenda. Well done TIC for trying to find the truth.

[smooth_sundaes]

I tend to go with Frost, he was there on the ground and as able a tactician as any, Gavin should have been overruled and made to get a move on. Browning should have been aware of the importance of taking the objectives quickly and aggressively as the airbourne commander! You could argue that the entire operation was flawed in depending on too many things going right and not allowing for the unforeseen but the operation was a nearly and the delay was the result of poor command at the top.

[andrewszigeti]

Gavin screwed the pooch all right. But his superiors should have given him solid written orders that the bridges were his #1, #2, and #3 priorities and anything else should come after the bridge was secured. "Get the bridge or don't come back", in short.

Planning an airborne operation so big you were incapable of delivering ALL the airborne assets in one day is also a big point of failure. You can NEVER count on the weather co-operating all across that large an operational area for three full days.

That the Germans managed to do as well as they did with literal 'bottom of the barrel' troops against elite airborne units is just the icing on the cake.

[davidrendall]

In answer to your three options:

1. It was a hasty plan, conducted with severe restrictions (the German rout and Brereton's lift plans.)
2. Your enemy always has a vote in your success. (Model and Bittrichs presence so close to objectives)
3. Loose sight, loose the fight. (Gavin at Nijmegen forgot he was a commando leader, lost sight of his primary objective.)

These are all well known, well travelled truths of combat, taught in some way at every leadership school. They are also the combat soldier's trade and lot.

In the Falklands war a young RM Captain was explaining the landing plan to his men "If the SBS signal with a green lamp, it means there is no enemy and we go in unopposed. If they signal with a red lamp, it means there is enemy and we go in opposed." "What if there's no signal Sir!" says one of his men. "That means the Argies have killed the SBS and are waiting for us in their thousands." "What do we do then Sir?" "We go in anyway!"

You can only hope to mitigate your problems, not eliminate them, and being a solider if a higher rank says go, you go whatever the risk. This was a problem for Guderian in 1940 over much the same ground, and he won taking greater risks the other way around. They were factors at Dunkirk, 1st and 2nd El-Alamein, Sicily, Anzio, D-Day, Goodwood and Cobra. Not all of them victories, all of them bigger than Market Garden, each one a necessary attempt at going forwards.

Points 1 and 2 are to be expected in any fight. Despite all the planning problems and the swift and vicious german response, XXX Corps was on the Southern bank of the Waal in force, on schedule, while 1st Airborne still had two beachheads North of the Rhine.

Point 3 is why this necessary, hasty, restricted plan in the face of a fearsome enemy didn't come off. Gavin's conduct was not that of a Commando leader and he dramatically missed the intentions behind his orders.

Ignore your flanks, that is the spirit of commando ops. Go for the jugular, swiftly and violently, ignore all distractions from your objective. Surprise and the violence of action can carry the day against a superior foe. He ignored all this to dig in against an unknown threat, that didn't materialise. He was attempting to fight a conventional light infantry battle, 50 miles behind enemy lines against a suspected armoured opponent.

Holding the high ground is Buford at Gettysburg - different war, different situation, different orders, different responsibilities. If there were Panzer divisions in the Reichswald, Gavin had a far better chance of holding out in the dense urban area of Nijmegen town. He stood a better chance of survival if he took the bridges and stopped reinforcement from the North. A simple way of cutting down his engaged front.

If he had to hold onto landing zones, why must they be on the vulnerable Groesbeek? The 504th had landed around Grave, why not hold those sites for the second lift? Or use the small airfield nearby? He thought light infantry divisional artillery would hold off a mass of German armour coming from the East? The whole of XXX corps would have foundered in the face of 1, 000 panzers. No part of his plan makes sense.

Groesbeek was a XXX corps objective. The bridges and town were the 82nds objective. If Gavin couldn't see that, and if Browning couldn't make that clear, they are responsible for failure of Market Garden.

If Nijmegen had been taken on time, If the Guards had got to Elst for day three, Market Garden might have been pulled off.  

If it had, we wouldn't be arguing over poor intel, Browning flying in on day 1, the single road, XXX Corps tea breaks....etc... the 9th and 10thSS PzDiv would be described as 'shattered, lacking all forms of equipment'. We would be talking about bold, imaginative planning and swift violence of action. Many victories, German and Allied, had been based on poor intel, single line logistics, hasty and rash actions and plenty of tea had been drunk up to this point.

[paulpopescu]

I guess, the decisive mistake was made by Gavin, for not taking the bridge at Nijmegen. Even if he assumed tanks were ready to attack from the east, a better defensive was in the town, closer to the bridge.