Choosing and Controlling Beliefs: What Do Philosophers Say?

This video is about doxastic voluntarism, the view that belief is under our voluntary control. First, I explain exactly what doxastic voluntarism is and why it matters. Then, I discuss why many philosophers are involuntarists, and focus on Alston's influential argument for involuntarism. Finally, I raise some worries about Alston's case and briefly discuss why I think many philosophers are wrong about whether we can choose our beliefs.

[brando]

Yes, we can choose to believe some things at will.

[nickolashessler]

Suppose I had numerous options for what I could believe on a matter, none of which were contrary to reason as far as my evidence was concerned, and I had the goal of believing one of them. I could obviously willfully exercise the kind of indirect control you describe to get myself to believe it, but I could also choose to pragmatically entertain the view in a way that over time submits me to indirect influences over my beliefs as a result of practical steps I took while entertaining the view. If you looked at what was going on in my mind at that moment, it would look more like I was engaging in a fiction than it would that I was actually believing the view even though over time I might arrive at a straightforward belief in the view thinking I had believed it all along. Its a process that superficially looks like exercising direct control over my beliefs even though it is actually an indirect process.

[joelturnbull]

I love the point about direct control being overrated. That, I think, actually undermines many of the critiques of DV in a powerful way. It maybe doesn’t completely destroy them, but it at least defangs them to some degree.

[joelturnbull]

On imagining a pink elephant being a better example of direct voluntarism than lifting your hand:
1. It seems to me that external forces can stop you from imagining something, such as excessive noise or some kinds of drugs, etc.
2. Some people are very bad at imagining things, so having the intention or desire to imagine a pink elephant may be frustrated due to internal reasons.

Probably not the most important point, but that just came across a bit strange to me.

[joelturnbull]

On the psychological argument: I wonder whether there is something else to be said about epistemic motivation. For example, does it take a special kind of motivation to change one’s beliefs (i.e., something like money is not a proper motivator of belief)? Or, do most people (especially epistemologists) just have such a strong motivation to believe true things that it would take an unusually strong motivation to trump it?

[wilkielai]

In the case of ambiguity, I'm only controlling "acceptance" and not "belief". My credence will still track the evidences (reason responsively) and I would have no control over that. If I was color blind, I might "accept" that green and red are actually different as others would tell me. But I don't think I will "believe" it no matter how much incentive was offered, or how hard I directly try to ignore my perceptual evidence. Of course, it can be shown that scientifically that the wavelength of red is different than that of green, but on any particular instance that I only have my visual perception to rely on, then I don't think I have reasons to believe what is contrary to what is evident to me, even if I know there is ambiguity (because I know I am colorblind). In those situations, I would have a credence of, say, 0.5, and I can't control that no matter how hard I will it with my mind. That's what seems to me from my armchair; I have no formal philosophy education.

[anthonyrowden]

I just started up the video, but I would be interested in whether it's more common or not among non-philosophers or ordinary people whether they think they can just change their beliefs at will. Sometimes engaging in discussions with people outside philosophy with different religious view you get the sense they just think you can change your mind about your views.

[aaronchipp-miller]

Im a belief involuntarist. Though its unfortunate, because id like to believe in voluntatism!

[Jamie-Russell-CME]

You can believe Calvinism or not by conditioning yourself. By surrounding yourself with those who believe the same thing. Only supporting this category of belief by what you listen to, a reinforcement after the fact.

[RandomTheology]

No but taking epistemic responsibility you can put yourself under the best evidence for beliefs

[Jamie-Russell-CME]

I found Haidt convincing. I believe in Doxastic Voluntarism. Not that he was arguing for it.

[Jamie-Russell-CME]

What moment causes someone to suddenly change their mind?

[Jamie-Russell-CME]

Should one ought to want to believe something?

[ILoveLuhaidan]

1:34 I don’t think you can choose to believe a proposition.

[Jamie-Russell-CME]

I have the power. You can do it. Just try harder. Haha