From Cause, Not Qualia? With Philip Goff

I've thought deeply about consciousness and so has Dr Philip Goff who I think has done more to reach out to the public about panpsychism than anyone else I can think of.

I've listened to Philip and Sean Carroll disagree and I feel that there may be a solution to the problem. A resolution to the disagreement.

Qualia are great. I believe there is a redness to red that isn't entirely reducible to numbers. Though I think even if we were willing to say that the illusionists were right about qualia, there's actually another very powerful way to get to panpsychism.

So I was delighted to be able to sit down with Philip and exchange ideas.

Time Indexes:

0:00 - Cheeky Ident
0:14 - Philip's Conversations
1:05 - Coming Up... Trying to be a smart arse
2:34 - An Introduction to Philip's Work in Panpsychism
5:55 - Philip's Collaboration with Keith Frankish
7:53 - What Is Illusionism?
15:27 - Turning the tables on Illusionism
17:24 - The argument from consciousness From Cause, Not Qualia
19:04 - I experience, therefore I am. I tell you about that, therefore I do.
22:19 - The Laws of Nature
25:46 - Defending Panagentialism
26:14 - Not just freewill but will itself
32:19 - Helen Steward, Defender of Freewill (Mind Chat Episode)
33:52 - Jonathan Lowe, objective value, platonic numbers.
37:08 - David Hume & Causation
41:36 - Aren't Qualia Arguments Also Causal Arguments?
46:27 - Conscious Causality By Evolution
51:38 - Scientists Who Don't Believe In Weak Physicalism
54:45 - A Strange Ethical Situation
55:51 - Philip's Take On Moral Responsibility
59:00 - How Many Subjects of Experience Are There?
1:08:25 - Can Idealism or Cosmopsychism Ground Morality?
1:09:48 - What Conversations Have Made Philip Really Think?
1:12:24 - Philip Asks Me What's Made Me Think
1:14:42 - Galileo's Error & How Panpsychism Solves It
1:16:40 - End Credits

Clips Used For Criticism, Summary & Review:

Alex O'Connor - Is Everything Conscious?
Within Reason #27

The Joe Rogan Experience - #1739 - Philip Goff

Lex Fridman - Philip Goff: Consciousness, Panpsychism,
and the Philosophy of Mind | Lex Fridman Podcast #261

Mind Chat - Sean Carroll & Philip Goff Debate
'Is Consciousness Fundamental?'

Skeptic - Michael Shermer with Philip Goff —
Galileo’s Error:
Foundations for a New Science of Consciousness

[SabreenSyeed]

I love Dr Goff's work. I am a research in Consciousness too and Panpsychism is the big elephant in the room when it comes to Consciousness studies.

[Neon_White]

Where the present moment happens, a simultaneous measurement and decision; we use it to run the simulation of our selves, consciousness.

[randombartz]

Is Hume's and/or the current Humeans claim that causality is just the repetition of patterns an ontological claim, though? I've always thought it was just an explanation of how humans derive their notion/intuition of causality (on an epistemological level) rather than an ontological claim about what actually makes things happpen. I think it is perfectly reasonable to claim that our scientific models of the world are based on repeating patterns and just assume that they will repeat as a brute fact, but that is precisely why they are just models and why they don't explain what causes such behavior. But actually claiming that this is literally how the universe operates on an ontological level and that there is notting causing these patterns does sound kinda crazy.

[eximusic]

These arguments always lack any teeth . . . or meat . . . whichever metaphor you'd like to use. The hard question is always formed out of some metaphor or vagary to begin with. It's a language problem, the limitations of language, to begin with. Other primates and mammals are demonstrably conscious in the same way as humans, but don't create these problems without language. Language provides symbols and avenues for communicating facts about past timeframes, future expectations, abstract concepts, and non-existent things we just made up. Displacement it's called, using placeholders/symbols. And it works well for math, and physical objects that can be described as far as shape or texture. But things like colors, musical notes, certain smells always have to be described with metaphors or by association with other things (red with anger because our faces get red when mad). It's why being a classical music reviewer is so hard. Beyond using words like pretty or dissonant, you have to come up with more interesting metaphors for musical experiences (and like visual experience with describable shapes and textures, music has easy to describe rhythms and music math). And of course both colors and notes can be classified by their frequency and intervals. But describing how a minor third makes you feel different from a major third is the hard part. But one person can share the experience simply by hearing the same thing, and relate to the metaphors used. It's just a limitation of language to describe certain aural and visual experiences, that are absolutely shared and common experiences with other people. Not having words to describe experiences doesn't sound like a solid foundation for doubting it's all the emergent properties of biological brains.