5 Reasons the Allies won the Battle of Waterloo

In a mirror of our previous video, 5 reasons Napoleon lost the battle of Waterloo, today we have 5 reasons the allies won!

[dangregory]

Missed opportunity of no.1 being the cavalry commander failed his order roll and Ney decided to use the c and c reroll and rolled a double 6 🤣

[richiehall]

As a result, the story that Blücher believed he had been impregnated with an elephant by a French soldier became famous. The problem is, Blücher wasn't being literal and had simply directly translated a common German idiom into French. The fact that this was a metaphorical way of speaking was lost on the Duke, and most other English speakers at the time, and was taken at face value.

You see, the phrase "to be pregnant with an elephant by X" in German at the time simply meant that "X" was giving a person a problem, difficulty, or headache. What Blücher had done was made a joke; he had essentially said, "The French gave me such a headache. Can you believe it, French soldiers giving ME a headache?!" This anecdote, shared by Britain's greatest living national hero, combined with Blücher's eccentric behavior, history of depressive breakdowns, and bedraggled and excited appearance on the field at Waterloo combined to give the old Field Marshal a reputation for madness that simply wasn't true.

[andyalton]

Ha "Hard on for the Dutch Belgians" cracked me up even though I actually have an army of them for the 100 days campaign.. 😂

[nickrhodes]

Interesting that you mentioned the mobilisation of the Austrian & Russian forces. Reminded me of an article I read many years ago about a post Waterloo action fought against the Austrians by forces under Rapp. 30 years on I must confess the details (beyond it being essentially a delaying action) rather escape me. I do however remember my surprise at the revelation of actions on other fronts in 1815.

[thescarletpumpernel]

it really does make one wonder whether Napoleon was simply bitter that he had been forced to surrender the year before without being able to give battle and go out in a blaze of glory and wanted that opportunity and no more. On the oher hand I think the line from Sharpe's Waterloo about the british wanting a chance to beat old Boney must have been a sentiment held by most the army remembering the retreat from Corunna and gaining newfound pride in the Peninsula.

[davidcollins]

Most people know Napoleon lost due to deploying his tanks piecemeal, failing to use close air support and his lack of cluster bombs. Wellington's secret weapon was the English longbow and a contingent of Balearic slingers. Blucher had his horse land on top of him but a few drafts of brandy and he was ready to fight again. Some of these statements may or may not be true, read at your own risk.

[andrewbirdsell]

You forgot, the secret weapon, Sharpe!

[joealp]

We are always told about the deluge the night before. But it is not emphasised enough in my opinion. Napoleon's men had been marching most of the night in the rain in sodden clothing over muddy trails already churned up by Wellington's men before them. Most had not eaten for 48 hours, would not get breakfast because the supply train was still working its way through the mud. I think when Napoleon woke that morning, seeing that bold maneuver would be impossible, immediately recognising the strength of Wellington's position and all the force multipliers it had, and the condition of his own men, his moral cratered. He put up a show of bravado in front of his very shaky officers that morning; his angry jibe about the "sepoy general" is so telling, but his sluggishness during the battle is a reflection of the sluggish nature of the battle itself. I think in his confidence broke and he just let events take their course.

[rhysnichols]

I believe the number 1 asset of the allies was the good communication between Wellington and Blücher, they were able to converge on Napoleon at Waterloo, and as i insist on pointing out (because I’m a Napoleon fanboy) the British centre was buckling and when Wellington withdrew his army to just behind the hill, the French cavalry charged to force the British into squares to stop Wellingtons army reforming properly. The plan was to then send in infantry reserves to decimate the squatted, however it was at this point all reserves were directed to face the Prussians. Ney kept charging to try and buy time but ultimately this destroyed the French cavalry. I believe if the allies didn’t coordinate and converge at Waterloo, there is a good chance Napoleon would have taken the field gassing Wellington in a close style victory such as Wagram. Given the fact Wellington said ‘it was the nearest damn run thing I’ve ever seen in my life’ shows how close a call it was even WITH Prussian support. Take that away and I don’t see the allied centre holding.

[tywilton]

The 1st Division, only had two Brigades, of two Guards Regiments each. Total strength 5000, under Cooke in 1815. It was the only Division that was not mixed.

[markcoldwell]

Reason no 6 Dutch Belgians! Stubborn resistance and holding the ground at Quatre Bras before the British re-enforced prevented heavy Prussian loss at Ligny and enabled Waterloo to happen. Also initially held onto Hougomont and helped beat the old Guard at Waterloo.
Re point 3 Napoleon was fighting to sue for peace, beating The British would have dramatic consequences for the campaign. Would the Austrians see an advantage in a broken Prussian army to make short term peace? I think all armies were war weary. Napoleon might have been persuaded to cement his legacy had Russia marched on Paris. Napoleon’s strategic ambition was to take Brussels garner support from old allies and protect the French boarders. Once this and his legacy been established might he have wanted a period of peace? Maybe not 😉

[olafsson]

Ive read an article saying that Davout was left in Paris because his relation with Napoleon deteriorated over the years. So in my opinion it was more like 'Napoleons ego was too big' rather than 'He expected to lose'. In a sense it was a bit like what happened with Murat. I get that he literally betrayed Napoleon, but he was a more than competent cavalry commander. He could have used his abilities and then find a way or a reason to subtly get rid of him

If you want to read the article, and i strongly suggest it because it was extremely interesting, you could google 'Davout and Napoleon: A Study of Their Personal Relationship By John Gallaher'. The website is called the napoleon series. I would place a link but I cant.

[reglavcor]

Where is your review video on Ridley Scott's "Napoleon"?

[morningstar]

If you haven't already Mercer's account is highly recommended. Interesting video. Thanks!

[peterwebb]

Wellington’s correspondence from the Peninsula includes some very strong complaint and criticism regarding some of the officers foisted upon him due to their personal and political connections.
Both by the British Government and the Spaniards.
By Waterloo, it seems likely that he had enough clout of his own to do something about that.
Given the degree to which Napoleon-romantics wish to blame Boney’s Marshals for the French loss, I’m not sure we can say the same thing about them, or Boney’s ability to choose and mentor his officers.

Counter to your narrative that Napoleon was pessimistic, is an account that on the evening prior to Waterloo, Boney was warned by one of his Peninsular officers that the British infantry was superior to any that Boney had yet faced. Boney responded that the battle would be “a picnic”. I think it more likely that Boney had too much faith in his own legend. He believed his own press.

[ebm]

Davout was not commanding an army. He was minister of war.

[andreasolsoon]

Thank you! Great content, as ever. I think that you are right when talking the strategic perspective in consideration. I do not think that Napoleons empire would have lasted in the long run anyway. In that way it was just a matter of time and Waterloo happened to be the end. However, I don’t think that Napoleon and the French lacked confidence in believing that they could win. Of course they believed in victory otherwise they would not have continued. I think it is easy to be blinded by that we know what actually happened. Even if the allies would not have thought that they could loose, the prussians still did at Ligny. And the French could have won the Waterloo battle as well, but we know they didnt. Looking at Napoleons quite recent track record of 1814 it shows that he still had it in him. He didn’t have that great marshals to support him at that time either but still managed to out manouvre several oponents and beat them one by one. At that time politiks got in the way, so to speak.

[Rusty_Gold]

I was deep thinking after watching and went through some scenarios( of what i knew of the big day as a amateur historian ) Could Bonny have won and what would have happened ? But then it was occurring to me, at what stage could you say the French had the upper hand at Waterloo? I cannot answer that as most key events of the day were not enough . Well apart from taking La Haye Sainte.

[anglophone]

It is a miracle that such a diverse army triumphed over the French.

[geebards]

I would describe Waterloo as a pyrrhic Allied victory. Whilst the Armee du Nord may not have been France's best army it was good enough to beat Prussia's best at Ligny and push back the Anglo-Allies at Quatre Bras. Do you think the real issue was that the French army had no depth - so no significant reserve? Naploleon's impetus was lost with Grouchy's absence? It was an all or nothing campaign with no possible margin for error? Every effort was potentially their last.