Losing at War: Battlefield Blunders and the Men who Made Them

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“Loosing at War: Battlefield Blunders and The Men Who Made Them” with John Curatola, PhD, James Holland and Conrad Crane, PhD.

These two scholars delve into a discussion of some military decisions during WWII that historians have typically referred to as “blunders” and the leaders who are responsible for them.
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On the Psychology of Military Incompetence by Dr Norman Dixon, MBE, RE, (1976).

Most valid analysis of the military mind over a century.

jameswhyard
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Probably the best and most insightful comprehensive overviews of WW2 ever!
Ty very much! 💛💛💪🏻💪🏻

flashgordon
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31:41 my uncle John Sanford would be one of those American pilots flying "the Hump" in Burma, but not from Assam. He would lose his life flying supplies for Christian missionaries in the mid 1960's. The China - Burma - India theater is one of the most overlooked of WWII history discussed in America, these days

wills
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*I think this is the single greatest title of a lecture in modern history.*

trygveplaustrum
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It has to be mentioned that Nikita Chrustshew himself openly acknowleledged that the Soviet Union would have lost the war without the suplies of material from the US and Great Britain. And he must have known what he said because he was part of the innermost cercle around Stalin in this crucial time. Therefore Barbarossa was a blunder of Germany that still could have resulted in victory.

piushalg
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I would suggest that Eisenhower was not an inept tactician who would have never made it past Lt.Col. in a modern US Army. He was just never given an opportunity to be a major or colonel with a combat organization in time of war. Ike was a very smart guy who never had a chance to learn at the colonel level. In WWI he was a trainer who never saw combat. In the 1930's when the Patton's of the world were honing their craft, he was writing speeches for MacArthur. Ike didn't choose that, the army did. In spite of what Douglas MacArthur later said about Eisenhower when Ike had completely eclipsed Mac, MacArthur highly regarded eisenhower and wanted to keep him. Ike also impressed two other very important generals, Fox Connor, and Marshall, the later of which raised him from obscurity. The North African campaign was not run well until Eisenhower replaced Lloyd Fredendall. Were mistakes made by Ike. Yup. He should have fired Fredendall much earlier, and he probably interfered at the beginning too much. But you also have to bring the enemy into this as well. The US Army in North Africa was completely untested at the beginning of Torch, facing Rommel. In spite of Ike learned though, eventually won, and Sicily went a lot better right from the start.

davidgrandy
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Many of these blunders were only considered that after the war had ended, when it became clear what their wider implications were. There had been reasonable justification to make the decision at the time.

PunksloveTrumpys
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There is story about an American colonel sent back home right before D Day. He complains to Ike that he just called his counterpart a “bastard.” Ike responded that the guy is a bastard but “you called him a ‘British bastard’ and I can’t have that.”

jamesreilly
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Really fascinating information gentlemen. Keep throwing out those good book recommendations. Highly appreciated.

dls
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To fully understand the German military self-inflicted gaping wound called "The Eastern Front", one should read Martin van Creveld's superb book - "Supplying War".

zvilender
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You've got to admire the approach of James Holland, kicking off a US event, and makes all his opening examples from the first half of WW2, during which the US hasn't yet entered the war. Even the notion that the term "Allies" predates US involvement might trigger some of the audience members.

dave
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The most interesting thing I found was James Holland’s revisionist view of Mark Clark Something for me to read up on

guygardiner
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James Holland is great. I love listening to him. He constantly cuts to the quick. I would take issue with one point he made--how important was the loss of German aircraft in the Mediterranean. More important was the loss of the air crews.

dennisweidner
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“In the end, historians are always going to win.” So I changed my mind, and am now glad my son studies history.

jaymacpherson
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I do think it's funny that one of the panelists thinks the book about Omaha beach and the author's criticism is too much about hindsight when the three of them have just spent almost an hour doing the same thing. 😕
That being said, I loved the video and enjoyed hearing the thoughts of all three men.

johngetty
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The Me262 was delayed by the engines. It was put into production with 3500 test flight hours not conducted. All German fighters were supposed to be able to serve as fighter bombers. That was Luftwaffe strategy. Whether bomb racks was fitted to the Me 262 depended on supplies.

Italy was a point of attrition which was supplied by German troops from the Soviet Union. In the end there was one million Germans there and 600 000 German casualties.

tarjei
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I loved the discussion on “blunders “. BUT MOST OF THE BLUNDERS SEEM APPARENT AFTER THE FACT 😗

patrickshanley
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The gentleman claims that the U.S. Army didn't mistakes twice, however individual commanders did. General Omar Bradley refused to take advice from an officer that had saved in the Pacific and observed the ineffectiveness of direct fire by battleships on coastal fortifications. Bradley refuse to have the battleships supporting the Omaha landings assume positions father offshore so that their gunfire would be in a arc with the shells hitting the coastal fortifications in an downward arc. Bradley showed his stubbornness later in the Battle of the Huegen Forrest where he ordered American units to continue to attack entrenched Germans troops instead of bypassing the forrest. The units involved suffered over 100% casualties and contributed to the the American Army having to put green divisions in the line before the German counter offensive in December 1944.

valdorhightower
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@55:00 Such an excellent question, with a regrettably anemic answer.... 😕

SantaFeNM-stcx
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The real blunder of the U.S. strategic bombing campaign was the use of the Norden bombsight which was an overhyped piece of garbage. Sperry had designed a high altitude bombsight, which was far and away a more accurate bombsight than the Norman. But with the Norden corporation's false advertising campaign and the connivence of the U.S. Army Air Corps. Norden received the contract instead of Sperry.

valdorhightower