3 Varieties of Philosophical Skepticism - The Given & C. I. Lewis

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In this third lecture, James Conant continues to discuss and contrast Cartesian skepticism with Kantian skepticism, but particularly focuses on Kantian issues of perception through the work of C. I. Lewis.

In this series of lectures on varieties of philosophical skepticism, James Conant distinguishes between two forms of philosophical skepticism: Cartesian skepticism and Kantian skepticism. He discusses their general structure and shows how they're related. This sheds light on issues in various different areas, including within the philosophy of perception, philosophy of mind, and philosophy of language. Some of the philosophers discussed throughout this course include Wittgenstein, Sellars, Hilary Putnam, Kripke, C.I. Lewis, John McDowell, and Stanley Cavell.

This series of lectures was given in 2005 at the Department of Philosophy at the University of Bergen, Norway. Note, the audio has been slightly edited and improved.

“The pure concept and the content of the given are mutually independent; neither limits the other." C.I. Lewis

"If there be no datum given to the mind, then knowledge must be contentless and arbitrary; there would be nothing which it must be true to. And if there be no interpretation or construction which the mind itself imposes, then thought is rendered superfluous, the possibility of error becomes inexplicable, and the distinction of true and false is in danger of becoming meaningless." C.I. Lewis

00:00 Introduction
10:21 Price
22:25 C. I. Lewis
34:24 Kinds of Kantians
50:37 Lewis again

#Philosophy #Epistemology #Kant