The Drydock - Episode 226

00:00:00 - Intro

00:00:52 - Is it safe to say that WW1 Dreadnoughts were more stable than a WW2 Battleship?

00:06:11 - If the RN had made the fusion design and had a 25 knot battle line from before the US started it's Standard classes do you think the Standards would have still been 21 knots?

00:12:26 - Changes in the Divisions of the Grand Fleet?

00:19:01 - Battles significantly affected by the weather?

00:24:46 - Were the Indiana-class pre-dreadnought battleships really as bad as some sources say they were?

00:29:30 - Given the insane luck HMS New Zealand had, and given the Navy tradition of naming ships after lucky/successful predecessors, why has there never been another HMS New Zealand?

00:33:21 - Why was the force at Gibraltar called "Force H"?

00:36:48 - What were the Courageous class for?

00:46:46 - To the best of your knowledge, would the Anglo Japanese alliance have survived into the 1940s if it was not broken up by treaties?

00:53:12 - What's the most horrific Darwin Award from the Pacific theatre of WW2 linked to the use of naval aviation?

00:57:07 - Why did the French 13" gun have a longer barrell life than the Italian 15" despite having a higher muzzle velocity?

00:59:40 - What would you recommend to read about the reasons and the events of the British naval decline after the second world war?

01:01:56 - Why did SMS Lubeck had multiple screws on a single shaft?

[ahseaton]

As for Darwin Awards, I'd nominate 3 events:
1. Pearl Harbor. Even without hindsight, the lack of basic US fighter cover gave the Japanese a perfect attack. (With a 1a of the Japanese calling off the third attack wave on drydocks and fuel dumps, which gave the US a fighting chance at recovery & the fuel to counterattack)
2. Marianas Turkey Shoot: it devastated the last trained Japanese air crews and planes, forcing them into Kamikaze tactics that started shortly thereafter (which in itself turned Darwin Award tactics in a devastating and arguably effective weapon)
3. The US attack on Truk. This attack devastated the iJN surface fleet when they did not have the time or materiel to replace. It also lacked much of an air defense response, either

[stevevalley]

Thanks for your reply to my question about Courageous. I am satisfied that Furious was intended as a test bed for the 18". The design was in hand, could be built quickly, and, was large enough to carry the 18" guns. Since posting that question, I found a letter on The Dreadnought Project: Fisher to d'Eyncourt, saying words to the effect that the Baltic operation was "the story we will use to sell them to Cabinet", which makes it sound like the Baltic op was not what Fisher really had in mind, but only an excuse to build them. In that letter, Fisher also says having the draft be 22 1/2 feet or less was imperative. The draft was the only parameter laid out in that letter that Courageous missed, by a wide margin. Renown's draft was some 5 feet less than Revenge, but Courageous' draft was only some 14 inches less than Renown, so hardly seems worth the bother. I tried redesigning Courageous in SpringSharp to see if I could get to that 22 1/2 foot draft. Could not make the hull any flimsier, so replaced the two twin 15" with three twin 9.2" turrets borrowed from Lord Nelson pre-dreadnoughts, to reduce weight. Only reduced the draft to 24 1/2 feet. It could be a matter of Fisher seeing those unused 15" turrets and deciding he would see them used, for something, other than a monitor, and Courageous was what he came up with, to have the turrets put to use, much as the construction of Vanguard was due to the availability of those same four turrets.

[MrNicoJac]

Drach actually took the trouble to turn one of those turrets at 7:20 to face backwards, making it more visible to us viewers!
He's so kind/thoughtful ^^

[harrykoppers]

Parsons built Turbinia with 3 props per shaft, for 9 total props. Her 34 knots in 1896 was impressive, to say the least, Imitation is the sincerest of flattery. It wasn't until 1910 that someone successfully fitted a reduction gear.

[nowthenzen]

Hi Drach,

Sometime ago you graciously answered my question about forming ad hoc air groups from the scout/observation planes of large warships. In that vein I stumbled across this tidbit from the U.S. Naval Institute Blog: "About the first of December the PT’s received welcome assistance from half a dozen SOC’s–Navy scout observation planes. The SOC’s had been carried aboard cruisers damaged in the many actions around Guadalcanal, and were left behind with orders to work with the PT’s when their cruisers left the area for repairs." Seems to me in that approximate 40 year period when amphibious single engine planes became feasible to long range radar and helicopters, Scout Observations planes were tempting but difficult to employ beneficially unless an efficient doctrine was strictly adhered to. I'll post the URL in a reply to this comment (in case URLs are blocked).

[VersusARCH]

24:40 Clouds worrked both ways at Midway at least. With the Japanese having poor radios no radar it was essential for the Japanese to visually detect incoming strikes, but the clouds concealed the high flying SBDs from both the ships and the CAP that busied itself with the TBDs and the Thatch flight that flew in low, under the cloud cover and were thus detected by both the escort ships and the CAP.

[TokuTaisho]

46:46 I think you are perfectly right when you say that this is an impossible question to answer for certain. When the Washington treaty was debated in Japan, it was very much an argument between two factions of the Navy. The Japanese called it “the war of the two Kato” because the two factions were led by admirals named Kato: Katô Hiroharu (or Kanji depending on the reading) and Katô Tomosaburô. However Katô Tomosaburô was the most senior of the two, and had been minister of the navy and full admiral since 1915, and was Japan's chief commissioner plenipotentiary at Washington, so his faction, which was the majority, won. From what I read the Japanese were not too much against the Washington treaty as an armament regulation treaty (Katô Tomosaburo was appointed Prime Minister after his return from Washington). They were, however, disappointed by the British because they felt that London chose Washington over Tôkyô and the British were relegated in the camp of “the anglo-saxons” i.e. the English speaking superpower that wanted to undermine Japanese success. The relations between Japan and the US were already tense and the British siding with Washington was a big disappointment for the Japanese. However the big Kantô earthquake of 1923 put aside military matters and worsened the economic and budgetary situation of Japan. But by the end of the 1920’s, Japan had recovered from its economic crisis and then came the London naval treaty, which was much more debated and opposed than the Washington treaty. Katô Hiroharu was by then Chief of the Navy General Staff and Japan’s economy was doing well unlike the US’s and Britain’s economies (Wall Street Crash of 1929) so the treaty was seen even more as unfair for Japan. So… To return to the initial question, I don’t see anything against a continuation of the Anglo-Japanese alliance at least until the 1930’s. In the late 1910’s and in the 1920’s Japan was in a period called “the Taishô democracy” so is not the dangerous, expansionist and militarist country (anglo-saxon vision) of the late 1930’s. And to be honest (non-british opinion here) I don’t see the British oppose imperialism, unless it is against their interest. Japanese politics at this period are quite unstable so it would be impossible to guess the outcome of an alternative 1930 London treaty in which the British are still allied with Japan (they might obtain more with British support) but at this point it is science fiction.

[tombogan]

55:00 Rex's Hanger has an excellent video on the Devastator.
The ones lost at Midway were the only combat losses.

[NathanOkun]

It was only in mid-WWII that the problem of not being able to tell one ship's fire from another at the same target was solved by the British when they adopted the French "K" shell modification using colored dye bags in the APC/CPC ammo windscreens with high explosive shell nose fuzes and boosters in the tip of the windscreen to cause a bright colored flash and puff of colored smoke when the shell hit either the water or, a benny, also the target. The Japanese and the US in WWII kept the dye bags that colored the splash on water impact only in the windscreens, which did not work at night or with even moderately poor weather.

[lukedogwalker]

Book recommendation for the decline of the RN: 'The Age of Invincible' by Nick Child. Focuses on carriers but the first half gives an excellent overview of the politics and economics, as well as the geopolitics and strategic imperatives. It does this so as to set the scene, explaining why the UK ended up with small STOVL carriers instead of CVA01. An excellent read.

[LeCharles]

Feel free to break Trafalgar up into a few episodes. We won't complain that you want to give us as much detail as possible. <3

[robinstevenson]

Drach - I REALLY LIKE THE IDEA OF DOING THE "FAQ" VIDEOS. It would also be a time-saver for you and would reduce the occasional redunancies of repeat answers.

[yvc]

Liked for the intro music! Perfect for this channel.

[larscelander]

Might add that you don't want a battleship to be too stable. If it is, for example rolling motion has a shoter period and this faster motion makes accurate gunney harder. A ship that is too stable is also less comfortable for the crew. The objective is to have a nice slow suitably sluggish roll (while not capsizing).

[princeoftonga]

Ahh The Dry-Dock. Now I don’t have to pretend I’m interested in the football!

[timenginemannd]

Re: French 13" .vs. Italian 15": I wonder how much of the wear and tear is due to difference in powder blends. Some smokeless (civilian) powders of the 1930's were known to cause erosion at the end of the chamber...  

Perhaps the Italian blend burned hotter to get the velocity causing this erosion.
 
Another possibility is tolerances as well as metallurgy, if you're a bit oversized on the shell and/or the driving and rotating bands this will cause issues. As will harder metal for both bands. Not to mention, if the rifling and grooves are out of spec., either at the start of firing, or as the barrel heats up the rifling protrudes further into the bore and starts hitting the steel of the shell .vs. both of the bands.... bad juju!


Last possibility is the Leade/Throat, which is the area between the end of the chamber and the start of the rifling. (I'm lumping the two together.). The greater the distance between the first part of the rifling to touch the bullet or shell the higher velocity and lower chamber pressure you have 

Also, does the rifling start at a shallow angle (harder to make) or a sharp, almost 90 degree angle to the bore?

[fmnb]

Nice drydock. A book that might be of interest about post WW2 RN, is Paul Kennedy's The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery, Penguin originally published in 1976. It focuses on the economic and social conditions. In 1914, the RN roughly had a quarter of total government spending due to the war and dreadnought arms race. By the 1920s it was down to 5-6%

Kennedy is both a serious historian, and a popular one (popular works, Victory at Sea: Naval Power and the Transformation of the Global Order in WW2, Yale University Press, Engineers of Victory, Random House, 2013, serious: The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000, 1989.)

[Claymore]

Would definitely recommend DK Brown's Rebuilding The Royal Navy - it's a valuable resource covering the decline and the reasons behind (usually political - all parties hate spending money on defence - it's nothing new, just go and look at the Great Naval Race of the 1900's and how public opinion and certain newspapers ('We want eight' comes to mind) forced the politicians to open the piggy banks)). The fact that the author was at the centre of events in the Naval Design Office gives a unique insight into the process however don't expect too much into the commentary on that - the author does seem to be rather reluctant to discuss this (certainly with the later designs) probably due to the proximity of events. Nonetheless recommended.

[Alex-cwrz]

19:01 Interestingly USS Constitution vs HMS Guerriere would have been significantly effected if the weather was only slightly different. As USS Constitution was being chased by a squadron of ships and the rather light winds on that day, meant smaller ships sail faster. It was hanging in the balance as sometimes the winds would pick up and the 64 gunner HMS Africa would start to lead the Pack. HMS Shannon which was pound for pound the best fighting ship in the world, was also there. If the wind had been a bit stronger, USS Constitution would have been captured and it would not have been pretty in the slightest for her. Either she surrenders instantly or she gets brutally mauled. One raking shot from HMS Africa would be devastating. HMS Shannon would be using her 9lber cannon as a sniper rifle on the helm again.

[SirThoreth]

24:46 I was curious to how long 300 cubits was, and it works out to 450 ft. Looking up the Connecticut-class battleships, which you mentioned had the same length-to-beam ratio as the Ark was described to have had, I was amused to learn that they were 456 ft long. That's actually hilarious.