Which View that You’ve Defended are You MOST Certain of? (Richard Swinburne)

Richard Swinburne answers which philosophical view he's defended that he's most certain of. You might be surprised by his answer!

[andrewmiller]

I'm convinced by the second argument he gave starting at 6:05. I thought it was brilliant. I have kind of had similar thoughts before but could never have put it so succinctly.

[whatsinaname]

Swinburne: substance dualism
Me, an idealist: ah heck

[calebjackson]

Put it another way, the law of identity is a necessary element of logic. It is true in every possible world. 2+2 is always identical to 4 for example.

There is at least one conceivable world where I am not identical with my body. For example, I'm 100% sure that I exist, but I'm not 100% sure that my body and the external world exist. it's at least possible that I could be in some kind of simulation that makes me think that all of these things exist. So although I can be certain that my mind exists, I cannot be certain that parts of the brain like the prefrontal cortex, etc exist because knowing that would require the reality of the external world.

But if it's true that that's at least possible, then it means that in that world I would not be identical to my body. But if I identity is necessary and applies to all possible worlds, then if I am not identical to my body in one possible world, then I'm not identical to my body in any possible world. Therefore, I'm not identical to my brain and body.

[PBRimmer]

I find his argument for substance dualism completely unconvincing. Concerning the operation, I think they'd both be me. So what if I don't know what 'the other one' is doing? I presently lack all sorts of knowledge about myself. Here's a thought experiment: I can imagine having a curious disorder (it seems metaphysically possible, anyway) that I have two personalities, one that is active Monday, Wednesday and Friday (me-A), and the other Tuesday, Thursday and Saturday (me-B). I'm unconscious on Sundays. Me-A only retains perception and memory from me-A, and me-B from me-B. But both are obviously me. I don't see why the 'simultaneity' of me-A and me-B would change anything. It's just a matter of setting a different schedule.

[daman]

What? I'm a Christian, but doesn't he beg the question that there's a soul whenever he introduced the idea that there's a "me" and "you"?

[matthewantero]

Substance Dualism opens up to the identity problem and concedes too much with regards to the metaphysical views of early modern philosophy.

[yellowpetelol]

Doesn't this argument completely beg the question? By asking which one of the two guys, if any, will be "you", he already presupposes that there is some persistent "you" to be found somewhere.

[frankamodeo]

Our true essence is spiritual not physical, our soul is driving the body not the other way around.

[Mathswart]

The two hemispheres do not perform the same function, arguably, which is explained in the concept of lateralization
Some knowledge about neuroscience would probably effect how one thinks about the argument
The soulific substance will be damaged in different ways by removing parts of the tissue, I do not agree with the argument

[Mentat]

This argument only works as a counter to the brain-centric, reductionist approach to living beings that is so popular today. A touch of Wittgenstein, a dose of Kenny/Hacker, and a sprinkle of Heidegger and/or Merleau-Ponty would solve this with alarming ease. You are a living animal organism, not a brain. And personhood is an ethical/social matter. So, the "something else" is just what we would always use to say this picture of a kitten is of the very same being as this old cat over here, but that picture of a kitten is of some other creature altogether.

[ungodlyatheism]

I don't see any argument here. Seems to me more like, "I feel there is something beyond this physical stuff that is me, therefore there is."