Russian Mobilisation - what does it mean for the war in Ukraine?

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For nearly seven months, the war in Ukraine was not really regarded as a genuine war by the Russian government. The fighting would be done not by a fully mobilised Russian force, but by regular units, mercenaries, and Donbass conscripts - Russia's own conscripts would stay at home.

But after seven months the result of that complacency was a crushing shortage of manpower to feed Russian frontline units. Ukrainian mobilisation had made good manpower losses and allowed the formation of entirely new units - while the Russian regular army, still undoubtedly a powerful force, found itself overstretched and forced to trust sections of the front to proxies or Rosgvardia.

The results of that policy were obvious during the Kharkiv offensive.

Now, Russia has decided to double down and recommit to war. Announcing mobilisation, enacting stop-loss, and 'annexing' parts of Ukraine.

In this video, I explore why, how it's going, and what the implication may be.

Patreon:

Caveats:
All my videos suffer from fog-of-war effects, but this one is especially difficult because it relies on things that are hard to quantify. The morale of Russian conscripts for example, is critical to the impact this mobilisation has, but is difficult to assess from open sources. As such, take my observations in this video as an attempt to surface relevant considerations, rather than any kind of confident or definitive assessment.

I also want to stress that while I focus on some of the difficulties Russia is facing during the mobilisation I want to bring one point home yet again.

Russia may be able to find its feet and generate new units if given time and an absence of battlefield pressure. It would be wrong to write off Russian mobilisation potential - and thus It is reasonable to assess that the importance of Ukraine accumulating additional resources in order to compensate is more vital than it has been in months (in my humble opinion).

Notes on Sourcing:
CSIS piece on Russian force design and manpower issues

Aljazeera (just as an illustration of media coverage) on Russian recruitment strategies prior to mobilisation:

Full text of the mobilisation order:

Many of the DLPR/Russian sources used in this video should be familiar to those on this channel. Given the nature of many of these individuals, I do not directly link their content (and obviously do not endorse their views). But these are easy to find if verification is desired. Often quoted for example is Alexander Khodakovsky, commander of a 'regular' unit of the (now defunct) so called 'DPR.'

Again, credit to Rob Lee and others for their work collecting and reporting on Russian obituaries and unit casualty identification.

Timestamps:
00:00:00 — Opening Words
00:01:40 — What Am I Covering?
00:02:41 — Sponsor: BLINKIST
00:04:20 — The Problem
00:04:48 — Strategic Inputs
00:06:24 — Russia's 'Unused Strength'
00:08:22 — 1GTA: Instructors and Missileers
00:09:26 — Driving Issues
00:09:37 — I1: Casualties and Attrition
00:11:03 — I2: Contract Lapses
00:13:36 — I3: Recruitment Deficit
00:15:46 — I4: Deployment Restrictions
00:16:58 — Bleeding or Just Fading Away?
00:18:12 — Preparation & Denial
00:19:47 — The Announcement
00:21:07 — The Document
00:22:45 — Reality Might be a Bit Different...
00:23:04 — Stop-Loss & Referenda
00:23:15 — Stop-Loss, Russian Style
00:25:07 — Redefining Russia
00:27:36 — Mobilisation
00:27:51 — Russian Reserves/Resources
00:28:12 — What Are the Russian "Reserves"
00:28:50 — Russian Reserve Readiness
00:29:30 — Who is Being Called Up
00:30:52 — Making Quota
00:32:57 — Training Standards
00:35:42 — Training Failures at the Personal Level
00:37:40 — Equipment Standards
00:39:17 — BYO Kit
00:42:14 — Acknowledging Missteps
00:44:26 — Public Responses
00:45:52 — Motivations for Evasion
00:46:45 — Evaluating the Public Response
00:48:11 — Impacts & Questions
00:48:52 — Q1: Training Pipeline
00:52:27 — Q2: Morale
00:54:26 — Q3: Utilisation
00:56:14 — Stabilising the Situation
00:57:51 — Learning from Ukraine
01:00:44 — A Workable Proxy?
01:03:34 — Inflection Potential?
01:05:23 — Towards General Mobilisation...
01:07:18 — More Painful War
01:09:00 — Conclusions
01:11:43 — Channel Update
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Sponsored by Blinkist: Use the link below to start your free 7-day Blinkist and get 25% off a Premium membership:

And, again, apologies for always being a week behind the news - but I always prefer to have a fuller picture rather than be first to the punch.

PerunAU
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When Putin said: "It's Morbilisation time" and morbilized all over the Russian Federation, it truly was one of the moments in the war.

meinhart_esror
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I am 54, former US Army with no real disabilities. However, there is no way I could physically compete against a group of 20 somethings in an infantry batallion. It is a very physically taxing environment.

stevedavenport
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Dude you've set the bar for military and foreign policy analysis. I wish other media platforms would be so thorough. No click-bait. No plain-brain simplification. Straight-up data with context-sensitive presentation. Perfect.

albertnobbs
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"If a region don't have to be fully controlled to hold referendum, the opportunity is endless" is GOLD!!!

MouseCritical
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We’re all very spoiled to have this channel, I think. Perun is clever, well informed and puts in a lot of effort. Gaining his subs the old fashioned way with the best quality content.

georgemorley
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I'm Russian (still in Russia ATM) and as someone who's looking at this almost first hand, I can say the analysis about how mobilization itself transpired is quite detailed, for a western observer.

phobos_
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PT! I knew there was something obvious and crucial that I was missing. Physical Training, especially for infantry, is crucial. Half of boot camp is getting in shape. Even if you don't get a lot of valuable military training, you absolutely MUST get in shape if you're going to be useful in battle. Simple tasks like getting in and out of the hole, going from prone to standing and actually running, with equipment, is going to be very difficult for a lot of these guys. (Trust me, when you get older, getting up and down off the ground is kind of a big deal.)

mjly
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I'm 56, pretty fit for a 56-year-old, and I take ZERO offence that you acknowledge that I'm not as capable as a 26-year-old - one month on the front lines, my knees would go, my elbows, I'd have a cold, then the flu, then pneumonia - I'd be a damned liability, even assuming I utterly believed in the cause. A pretty fit 56-year-old wants a warm bed and hot food to stay a pretty fit 56-year-old, and on the front lines? Poor food? Sleeping outside? In winter? No chance.

neilgriffiths
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I'm increasingly beginning to feel like this whole war, and the mobilization in particular, is a demographic catastrophe in the making for Russia. Maybe not as bad as the two world wars, but Russia will be feeling this for decades to come. They were already dealing with a shrinking population, and now both the casualties and the people fleeing the country are diminishing one of the most productive segments of their population.

busshock
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You know, when I strip my party members weaponry and armor to sell off in a video game its both funny and sometimes useful.

When it happens in real life its horrifying.

MrDalisclock
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The Russia using 20% of its military meme is like the humans using 10% of the brain meme.

myphone
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Russian spokesman "There is no plan for mobilization." That is actually accidentally accurate. Russia has no mobilization plan

briansmithwins
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Just an anecdote..prior to Desert Storm I was an instructor in US Army. We had our E-4 and below pulled from us to fill out other units, but the instructors were kept at the training base. We had instructors volunteering to be deployed, but they were all told no. Thankfully losses were incredibly light, but we were training new people just in case. Don't change the logo..it's nice and simple, easy to recognize.

JBall-hdbw
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"So this guy hates the government and is loud about it. Let's force him to join the military against his will, give him a gun, and train him how to fight. How could this possibly go wrong?"

gimmethegepgun
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You showed the most important factor of military morale. The principle is as simple as efficient and can't be denied: The domestic advantage! Every sports team, military strategist and psychologist can tell you stories about how and why it works. Russians obviously underestimated it heavily.

gerdbb
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Just so you know, Czechs already posted petition for annexing Kaliningrad. It went basically like this: Czechs: "We want sea and people there would simply love being part of Czechia." There was already over 1000 signatures when I saw it few hours after it started (after Putler announced annexation)

liefzdel
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Hi Perun. I'm a Russian, I live in Moscow. And since I am pretty fluent in English and also exempt from the mobilization I thought I can be of use. Needless to mention - I hate this war. Feel free to write to me and ask for help with russian documents translation or anything. You have a great channel, keep up the good work.

Ergilion
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I am incredibly disappointed in the average Russian. Although nearly 350, 000 Russian men have now left the country to avoid the draft, yet there is still no vocal protest against the tyranny of Putin and his authoritarian regime.

roccobruno
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“Private. Conscriptavich.” -Perun 2022
Fricken beautiful 😂

NotTheBomb