Bakhmut & The Ukraine Trench War - fortifications, attrition, and lessons

As always, please check the pinned comment for any notes or corrections.

For months now, a city with a pre-war population of 70,000 has been the focus of relentless artillery and infantry attacks by the Russian military and the "Wagner PMC."

For many commentators, the attacks seem nonsensical. At a time when Russia is pivoting to defence just about everywhere else along the line, why keep pouring men and materiel into a city that simply doesn't have value relative to the effort expended trying to take it.

In this video I zoom in on the battle for Bakhmut, and explore its history, implications, and some of what we have heard about the tactics there.

At the same time, we also look at Russia's campaign of fortification building across much of the rest of Ukraine (and Russia). As the world focuses on Russia's Bakhmut attacks, Russia is throwing up belts of defences that...for now at least...seem to have some of the hallmarks of typical Russian defence procurement.

Many thanks to the people who provided input into this episode, with a special thanks to Sgt. Kates - USMC, for giving the kind of input only a combat engineer can (I do not have any idea how to clear a minefield)

As always, this video represents merely person views based on imperfect information gathered during an active war.

Patreon:

Caveats:
While I have attempted to discuss the factors I consider when evaluating casualty claims - the reality is that the error bars around any estimates are still extremely wide. Estimates of 1:10 ratios in some sectors at certain times are paired with claims consistent with very different situations elsewhere.

Even that Ukrainian Govt estimate on Russian losses may be low - simply because of when the estimate was made and the limited territory it may have covered. This is the problem of uncertainty when viewing a war from afar.

While I am confident in the analysis of matters at the overarching strategic level - be aware that the smaller you get in this war, the less certain things often become.

Notes and further reading:

Thanks as always to various OSINT aggregation channels whose work is critical to analysis like this. A non exhaustive list includes:

I do not generally link directly to Russian Telegram channels - but they provide an important source of information on how views of the war are evolving on that side.

"Arty Green" - Ukrainian artillery officer:

Examples of constant media coverage:

Timestamps:
00:00:00 — Opening Words
00:01:40 — What Am I Talking About
00:02:37 — DIGGING TO VICTORY
00:02:43 — Fortification and Entrenchment
00:03:59 — Search for Movement
00:04:47 — Always a Risk of Reversion
00:05:17 — THE UKRAINIAN EXPERIENCE
00:05:22 — The War in The Donbass
00:06:12 — War of Movement
00:07:07 — Transfer of the Initiative
00:08:16 — Russia Digs In
00:08:38 — Even in Russia...
00:09:52 — There's Bakhmut
00:10:49 — TIMELINE
00:10:58 — Core Objective
00:11:36 — "Protecting the Donbass"
00:12:42 — The Donbass Offensive
00:14:06 — It Isn't Just Bakhmut
00:15:16 — Wagner's Verdun
00:17:05 — A Brutal Back and Forth
00:17:14 — Encirclement Plan & Ukrainian Rotation
00:18:57 — FEATURES AND EVOLUTION
00:19:08 — Entrenchment
00:20:03 — Traditional Model
00:21:04 — Wagner Waves
00:21:42 — Wagner Tactics
00:24:47 — War by the Meter
00:25:42 — The Gas Station
00:26:13 — The Garbage Dump
00:26:55 — War Made Small
00:27:46 — Infiltration Assaults
00:28:47 — Myths
00:31:18 — WHY BAKHMUT?
00:31:31 — Road to Sloviansk
00:32:47 — "Smashing Their Foreheads"
00:33:22 — So Why?
00:34:34 — IS IT WORTH IT?
00:34:38 — We're Talking About It
00:35:19 — A1: Offensive Potential
00:36:05 — A2: Attrition
00:37:10 — A3: Politics
00:37:52 — Opportunity Cost
00:38:39 — Other Options?
00:39:04 — Real Cost of Bakhmut
00:40:46 — What if Bakhmut is Taken?
00:42:04 — ASSESSING THE COST
00:42:23 — Illustrating the Point: Causality Scale
00:44:35 — Medium-high Confidence Inputs
00:45:33 — Consistency and Assumptions
00:46:18 — The Picture
00:49:45 — FEATURES AND OBSERVATIONS
00:50:05 — Wat Defaulting to Attrition
00:51:12 — Drone & Artillery Warfare
00:52:45 — "Mines are the Worst"
00:54:53 — Challenges of Breaching
00:55:53 — Sidenotes on Options...
00:56:33 — "Wagner Line"
00:57:25 — The Ugly
00:58:36 — The Significant
00:59:25 — CONCLUSIONS
01:00:47 — CHANNEL UPDATE
01:00:47 — CHANNEL UPDATE

[PerunAU]

I get the credit for these, but thanks to the people whose input makes it possible.

Thanks to those in Ukraine who take the time out of, you know, fighting a war in order to correspond with someone in Australia about their experiences with this kind of fighting.

Also, since I know absolutely nothing about the practicalities of clearing a minefield under fire and how you could do it without vehicular support - special thanks to a USMC combat engineer (cheers Sgt Kates) for sharing some combat engineering 101 with me and discussing the implications that overhead threats have for entrenchments and ammo storage (plus introducing me to the APOBS).

Note: on one slide I say that EU sources estimate approx 100, 000 Ukrainian killed + wounded over the course of the war. that means 100, 000 casualties including killed and wounded (large majority wounded). it doesn't mean 100, 000 killed plus some extra number of wounded /endnote

[peytonhurley]

“Shock and awe is great but not when you have an inadequate supply of shock and/or awe”. I’m using that.

[jannegrey]

People often forget that Copernicus was known before his astronomy for his economics. And before that he was known for his fortifications. Knowing how to prepare fortifications was almost required knowledge to become officer. Especially higher one. Kościuszko also specialized in it. Practically every "hero" from 19th Century and before that you've heard about in military sense was specializing in fortifications, because they are such gigantic force multipliers.

[afamiliarfriend]

I never would've thought I'd hear an Australian say that an idea was so bad it makes Gallipoli look like a good idea.

[nrao]

"Perun was a totally unknown Australian video game vlogger before the Russian-Ukrainian war. Today, he is a highly respected and widely followed armchair military analyst with a head for strategy and logistics. He makes these videos in his spare time."

[ninjafroggie]

"Because even though we live in a world with satellite based reconnaissance and hypersonic missiles, it seems there's a significant place on the battlefield still for a man in a ditch with the will to defend it"

Heck of a concluding statement there. Another excellent video, well done mate

[myhvKun]

To be fair, Tchaikovsky established cannon as a musical instrument in 1812 Overture.

[Shachza]

One of the most chilling pieces of information I've every learned about World War One was that Le Mort Homme - Hill 304, which is named after its height in meters - was 300 meters high at the end of the battle. The devastation of attritional, artillery-heavy, position warfare blew 4 meters - more than 13 feet - off the entire hill over the course of a year. And this hill was heavily defended the entire time.

This kind of battle - the kind that literally grinds down the very geography - is apparently exactly what Russia wants for its soldiers.

[timedGuano]

There's a US Armored Captain that frequents a forum I post in-for the past decade, every time he's asked what a peer war for the West would look like, he's answered "All the best equipment smashed each other apart within a week, and then it's WWI with Ipads."

[rcgunner]

Some elements of this video remind me of my experience in Desert Storm. I was with the 1st Infantry Division and we were the assault division for VII Corps. The enemy was dug into fixed positions with extensive field fortifications and minefields. We rehearsed our assault over and over again by launching mock assaults against a position that was similar to the enemy's. We used suppressing fires to cover the engineers who used MCLCs to create breaches in the minefields. Each breach, called a lane, was plowed by either actual bull dozers or by tanks with mine plows. The engineers set off the lanes with small flags that we had to stay in between or else bad stuff would happen. That's a lot of working parts and there were quite a number of nightmare scenarios- like a tank going down in a lane backing it up and the enemy having a field day chewing them up with arty...

The reality was much easier, and worse too. We tore through their defenses pretty easily, but we took a number of losses due to mines and our own DPICM rounds leaving duds everywhere. Walking around the objectives was down right dangerous and we took more losses just waiting around for orders than we did in the actual assault. It really gets to you to know that only your immediate area is safe and that one wrong step could cost you a foot or even your life. We were lucky though. The Iraqi 26th Infantry Division was poorly armed, motivated, and led and they sensibly dropped their arms.

I can only imagine what an assault like that must be against a determined defender who has similar levels of arms and support as you. trench warfare in WWI happened for a reason, and it is ALWAYS a specter that armies must deal with when the odds become even. Those kids in Ukraine have a hard slog ahead, and only one person can really make it stop. I wonder if he'll have the guts to end this and save lives.

I seriously doubt it.

[timowagner]

It is astonishing, you are still going strong and you are still making fantastic videos. The topics are always fascinating, insanely well researched and brilliantly presented.

Thank you, Perun, for being an awesome youtuber.

[Covah]

"Even though we live in a world with satellite-based reconnaissance and hypersonic missiles, it seems there's a significant place on the battlefield still for a man in a ditch with the will to defend it." - Perun

Well said mate.

[WWFanatic]

Another irony on the "bleed them out" strategy is that recent scholarship has called into question if that was Falkenhayn's plan in the first place. The idea of "bleeding the French white" only concretely appears *after* the battle turned into an attritional one. Contemporaries like the Kaiser claimed that Verdun was to be a prelude, a smaller battle of part of a broader campaign in the west to defeat France. Driving a wedge between the British and French militarily and politically was a key goal of such a campaign. Problem is Falkenhayn had a lot of enemies internally, including Hindenburg and Ludendorff. Though we can't know for sure, it's quite likely that the "bleed them white" became an ex post facto justification to explain away the failure of the battle and the tremendous German casualties for no meaningful gain...which sounds familiar. As the saying goes, history doesn't repeat but it often rhymes...

[historian]

The famous Finnish Mannerheim Line was shockingly light, consisting mostly of machine gun hard points. It used the terrain well, but it was not designed for "They shall not pass!" It was to slow down the Soviets to buy Finland time. It was the soldiers' tenacity, not fortifications, that gave the Line such a reputation.

[niklasw.]

"... it makes Gallipoli look like a good idea"

Damn. That statement coming from an Australian hits different

[sirdavidoftor]

Perun: your videos are the only videos on YouTube where after an hour plus minutes, I am always asking myself, where did the time go? and is that all there is? I want more!
Keep doing what your doing!
I really appreciate your effort every week!
Have a very Happy Holiday!
Stay safe, stay sane, stay Strong Ukraine 🇺🇦

[Nakkikassi]

"Even though we live in a world satellite based reconnaissance and hyper sonic missiles it seems that there is a significant place in the battlefield for a man in a ditch with a will the defend it." Epic quote.

[viktorlindeblom]

I’m very impressed with the quality of your videos. Never imagined I would look forward to a 1h PowerPoint every Sunday. Highest marks from Sweden

[nancydelu]

Perun cracks me up! An ANZAC great grand kid saying that Bakhmud "makes Gallipoli look like a good idea." Laughed so hard I had to rewind over a minute just to get back to where I was.
Carry on, Perun!

[DavidVT]

A howitzer is definitely a percussion instrument, just ask Tchaikovsky. In fact, at Antietam battlefield, for the 4th of July, the Maryland National Guard uses 105mm howitzers (firing blanks, of course) to really give that extra oomph to the 1812 Overture.