Scientific Realism 2 - The No-Miracles Argument

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I examine the no-miracles argument for scientific realism, which claims that the best explanation for the success of science is that our best scientific theories are approximately true.
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you are saving my skin rn - thank you for your clarity - especially in emphasizing what the important like....sides are - or the heart of the different questions/views - you help me understand the significance and value of this subject ( so I can actually engage with the material instead of just trying to memorize enough to get by exams)

sperry
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This better than my philosophy of science class

DMGrass-gbkg
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Just now watching this video after the last one. Very nice introduction to scientific realism and philosophy of science. Can't wait for the rest. I like that you mentioned Hacking in the last video. I hope you could do a series of videos addressing the social constructionist movement, starting with "The Social Construction of Reality" by Thomas Luckmann and Peter Berger and then Hacking's analysis in his book the "The Social Construction of What?" then hopefully discuss in separate videos race, sex/gender and religion. Just a suggestion, since there's a lot of discussion about it today and misunderstandings of social constructionism by both adherents and detractors. "What exactly is being constructed?" is what Hacking said I believe. But keep up the great work.

kristinwatkins
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I'm so glad i found this channel. You should write a book with these kinds of overviews.

Regtic
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Actually, the precision in measurement of the anomalous magnetic moment of the electron is analogous to measuring the distance from NYC to London to the width of the thinnest of human hairs. For typical hairs you'd need a much larger distance. Note also that there is some controversy surrounding ultraprecision in QED.

mattphillips
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The whole notion of "approximately true" is a very messy expression of scientific realism. Scientific realism would say that there is a "real world" but that, given the limitations of our ability to observe it make theories about it, our statements about it must necessarily contain some element of incompleteness.

If I were to say that I was three miles away from Times Square, that might be viewed in several ways. It might be viewed as completely wrong, if I were 3.001 miles away, or it might be viewed as approximately correct. Or it might be viewed as an incomplete answer.

Since any theory we have is always based on incomplete information it's always going to be possible, however negligible the possibility) that a theory is going to be replaced by some newer and more complete theory.

The best that you can ever say is that a theory is the best predictive model we have that accounts for the world, given what we know of the world at any given time. But there is always the possibility that some new observation previously unpredicted, will require a new theory that will require not only a change in existing theories but in some revolution that will require existing, well-tested theories to be either discarded or absorbed into some larger explanatory framework.

Some theories that are displaced in this way were never simply "approximately correct" -- Newton, even though his math is very useful at conventional velocities -- his description is really incompatible with Einstein. It's not that he's right at slow speeds and wrong up near the speed of light. His underlying theory is wrong at all velocities, but very useful.

At some point, some theory is going to have to reconcile relativity and QM. It might be string theory or it might be something else, but as of now, these two very well-tested theories aren't simply "approximately correct" -- but they have to be considered incomplete until they are reconciled in some way.

On the other hand, the notion that, for instance, the germ theory of disease, is simply an intellectual construct that allows us to predict when someone's going to get sick but doesn't track from a mere conceptual model to actual infectious agents that result in real diseases is just plain silly.

Someone who advances that position will have to explain just what the difference is between "accepting" the prediction that being injected with a syringe full of black plague bacillus will cause you to get the black plague and saying that that statement is true -- because it's true.

prodprod
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I sense you are against Brexit. do you have any interest in political philosophy? Also thanks for these videos, I watch everyone of them. They are very helpful because philosophy is my hobby (don't have any formal education in philosophy, just reading and listening on my own) and you are very amateur friendly because you explain even simple concepts

jadwiga
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Hey, do u have any solid, in-depth textbook for philosophy of science? Im aware of the Godfrey-smith book already.

danielwa
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is there a metaphysical similarity between the Risky prediction of Science and the Risky prophecy of the Prophet

HamidSain
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Just out of curiosity, Kane B, are you a professional philosopher?

johnbehan
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I spotted error. 1 in 51 is not 0.5%. It is 1.96%

unless I am confused myself (had to listen two times to this part to grasp what this fallacy is about. cool stuff!)

jadwiga
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28:27
there is no "approximately true" in this scenario, either you have the SM with the electron or you have something not-SM without the electron. Taking an electron out of the theory nullifies the entire theory and thus there is no "approximate SM" without the electron... there just is no SM!
The interdependence on the electron and the electron-neutrino for example demand an all or nothing in such a way that if electrons were proven "false" and necessitated taking out of the theory, the entire theory must follow suit and be thrown out as well and a new one built up from what remains.

Elgeneralsimo