Scientific Realism and Epistemic Immodesty (2 of 3)

The second key premise of realism is epistemic immodesty, the idea that we can know the Truth about reality. In this video I outline the case against epistemic immodesty, and the realist response thereto.

[mikemastrangelo]

Are invisible gnomes the same as strings?

[Ansatz]

3:48 "There's lots of ways a realist can appeal to other sorts of scientific values to get around these problems."

That approach to the underdeterminiation problem is a shocking display of circular reasoning. It makes no sense to appeal to scientific values to rule out unscientific ideas unless we've already accepted scientific realism. Having a progressive research program or being well tested only counts as support for an idea if we assume that science is the way to get to the truth.

If we seriously consider that scientific realism might be false, then we have to accept that the gravity gnomes might be real in spite of having absolutely no scientific support. That's silly from the perspective of a scientific realist, but if we accept that anything that fits the data might be true, then gravity gnomes aren't silly at all.

[VerySexyPenguin]

The sound man, could you dial down those peaks and reupload?